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ABSTRACT 
During the final decades of the twentieth century, U.S. urban education policy experienced a sea 
change in its orientation toward equity.  Mid-century social liberalism and its programs for 
expanding access to public education resources through desegregation and more equitable 
funding gave way to neoliberal reforms focused on improving outcomes through deregulation, 
accountability regimes, and market discipline.  Charter schools are the vanguard of neoliberal 
education reform.  While much of the research on charters aims at either substantiating or 
critiquing their success claims relative to traditional public schools, in this dissertation, I 
examine the role of charter schools within the larger processes of urbanization.  Specifically, I 
focus on St. Louis, Missouri, where, in 1998, a single piece of education reform legislation 
(Senate Bill 781) legalized charter schools and set an end for the largest and longest-running 
school desegregation program in U.S. history.  Rather than legalize charters statewide, SB 781 
restricted them to St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri’s only two metropolitan areas to have 
operated court-enforced desegregation programs.  Combining critical policy analysis and 
 
 
economic geography, I link both desegregation and charter schools to urban neoliberalization, 
arguing that racialized processes of accumulation structured (and continue to structure) uneven 
development in such a way to make educational equity-based reforms necessary and their 
failures inevitable.  Here too, St. Louis has an important story to tell.  With deindustrialization 
and suburbanization resulting in a 63 percent decline in population in just over 60 years, St. 
Louis, like many other Rust Belt cities, has wholly embraced neoliberalism’s entrepreneurial 
ethos.  Through public-private partnerships and a portfolio of tax incentives, St. Louis has 
sacrificed public education in its efforts to attract capital back to the city.  Rather than mitigating 
these issues, the neoliberal restructuring of public education in St. Louis has embraced the same 
market logics that contributed to educational divestment and school segregation.  I argue for a 
more expansive approach to critical policy analysis in education, one that addresses the 
limitations of reform within the existing political economy and relocates educational issues and 
their solutions within a larger struggle for racial and economic justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND URBANIZATION 
 
The most significant development in U.S. urban education policy of the last three decades 
has been the emergence of charter schools.  Accounting for approximately 6 percent of the 
country’s public school student population, charters have spread to forty-three states and the 
District of Columbia since Minnesota opened the first charter in 1991.1  In urban spaces, 
especially those most segregated by race, charters enroll a far higher percentage of students, and 
their growth in these markets is accelerating.  When the National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools began publishing an annual report on cities with the highest concentration of students 
enrolled in charter schools over a decade ago, New Orleans was the only city in the country with 
more than 30 percent of its public school students attending charters.  Today, 17 districts have 
charter enrollments exceeding 30 percent, and charter schools account for over 10 percent of 
enrollment in 190 districts nationwide.2   The causes for the charter movement’s rapid growth 
nationally are numerous, but the purported raison d’etre of school choice-based reforms—that 
the creation of a public school marketplace will spur competition and improve quality—remains 
decisively unsubstantiated.  Battles over whether and to what degree charter schools are superior 
or inferior to their traditional public school counterparts with respect to prevailing accountability 
and school performance metrics (e.g. standardized test scores and attendance and graduation 
rates) constitute a considerable bulk of the academic literature and show no signs of abating, nor 
                                                 
1 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, “A Growing Movement:  America’s Largest Charter Public School 
Communities and Their Impact on Student Outcomes,” November 3, 2016, 2, http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-
facts/publications-research/. 
2 Ibid.  
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should they.3  Critically examining both the evidence of charter school “success” and the broader 
neoliberal logic of school choice reforms remains a vital part of the larger discussion of what 
successful U.S. public schools are and what they ought to be.  Critical scholars must confront the 
prospect that no study, no matter how effectively it demonstrates that charters fail to substantiate 
their claims of superiority even on their own positivistic terms, is likely to have much effect on 
the charter school juggernaut.4  If the growth of charter schools depended on an empirical proof 
of concept, charters never would have become such a paradigmatic solution for public school 
reform.   
On what, then, does charter growth depend?  The larger task for critical scholarship on 
charter schools is to theorize the differentiated underlying and often unacknowledged structural 
forces driving charter school growth.  Such theorizing is precisely the aim of this dissertation.      
In this first chapter, I address two questions vital to understanding charter school growth and 
regional concentration:  Why has charter growth concentrated in cities, and why is charter school 
concentration clustered in the depopulated and racially hypersegregated cities of the Rust Belt 
and St. Louis in particular?  Taken together, these questions create a thread that runs through 
every chapter in this dissertation and inform the central problem of how urban public education 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO), “National Charter School Study” (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2013), http://credo.stanford.edu/research-reports.html; Andrew Maul and Abby 
McClelland, “Review of National Charter School Study 2013” (Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center, 
2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-credo-2013; Philip Gleason et al., “The Evaluation of Charter 
School Impacts:  Final Report” (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional 
Assistance, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, 2010); National Alliance for Public 
Charter Schools, “Separating Fact and Fiction:  What You Need to Know about Charter Schools,” 2014, 
http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Separating-Fact-from-Fiction.pdf; Gary Miron, William 
Mathis, and Kevin Welner, “Review of Separating Fact & Fiction” (Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center, 
2015), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/ttr-charterclaims-mmw-1.pdf. 
4 I use the term critical both in the sense of those who are skeptical of the benefits of public education markets and 
supportive of public education as a fundamental institution of liberal democracies as well as the Marxian 
connotations associated with critical theory.  My own belief is that the latter have a far more robust theoretical 
apparatus for explaining why charter schools enjoy bipartisan support from elites and have flourished under 
neoliberal and neoconservative administrations.  
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equity is perpetually thwarted by the broader policies and processes of urbanization.  These are 
essentially questions of race and political economy, which I treat as distinct but deeply 
interpenetrating philosophical and sociological categories.  Urbanization is a political economic 
process that is, at least in the U.S., is infused with racialized and class-based injustices.  This 
dissertation explores the multi-faceted struggle for urban social justice and educational equity in 
St. Louis, Missouri.  I maintain that the origin and concentration of charter schools in St. Louis is 
both a process and consequence of urbanization, which historically is not a solution to but a 
cause of the city’s racialized class oppression.  Beneath appeals to equity and innovative reform 
characteristic of the charter school movement in St. Louis lies a revanchist response to federally 
enforced school desegregation and economic interests determined to use charter schools to 
extract private wealth from public education and revalorize property devastated by racial 
segregation and relentless urban decline. 
Issues of educational equity and its relationship to race and class figure prominently in 
the larger charter school movement and are even its discursive justification.  By this, I mean that 
prominent charter school advocates and the hegemonic diffusion of the movement’s “common 
sense” explanations for racialized inequity in urban education position charter schools as an 
innovative solution to traditional public school failures regarding marginalized populations.  
Such a view broadly holds that traditional public schools are institutionally incapable of 
overcoming—or might indeed exacerbate—the structural (i.e. racial and socioeconomic) barriers 
to educational equity, necessitating a new institutional form (i.e. charter schools) modeled on 
market entities, governed according to market principles, and propagated by market logics.  The 
imposition of market logics on every social issue and even on conceptions of the human subject 
is the leitmotif of neoliberalism.  In countering the common sense explanations and market logics 
 4 
 
of the charter school movement, I utilize a critical theoretical approach to argue that 
marketization of public education intensifies educational inequity.  Neoliberalism promotes 
markets as social mechanisms that foster fairness and efficiency while masking the current and 
historical record demonstrating their inefficiency and tendency to intensify inequity.  The history 
of public education and urban revitalization in St. Louis provides a stark illustration of the 
difference between such assumptions of neoliberalism and their real effects on urban life.  It is 
not historical amnesia that results in market-based solutions to problems created and intensified 
by market logics.  Rather, such actions are the modus operandi of capitalism, which seeks 
growth opportunities within the crises it creates.   
Throughout the dissertation, I alternate between a close-up focus on public education and 
urbanization in St. Louis and more panoramic view of urban neoliberalization regionally and 
nationally.  My reason for doing so is to situate education policy, specifically the end of school 
desegregation in St. Louis and its replacement by charter schools and neoliberal accountability 
regimes, within much larger spatial scales and processes of neoliberalization and their 
development over time.  As will become evident, there are benefits as well as drawbacks to such 
an approach.  The benefit of focusing closely on St. Louis’s processes of urban neoliberalization 
and their concomitant public education reform policies provides evidence of the path dependency 
of neoliberalization.  In other words, charter school concentration must be studied at the local, 
regional, national, and even global policy levels not in isolation from one another but in a 
dialectical tension.  A panoramic view helps to draw out neoliberalism’s themes, aims and 
processes, while analysis at the local level highlights particularity and differentiation that is 
lacking in primarily macro-level analyses.  To focus solely on one scale of neoliberalization is to 
miss how each scale affects and is affected by the others.  Herein lies the problem and also the 
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significance.  For reasons of practicality, I must impose boundaries on my analysis.  A detailed 
regional history is simply too large a project for this dissertation.  I pay close attention, however, 
to the historical development of charter schools in relation to urban neoliberalization in St. Louis 
while also situating such developments within the larger regional and national processes of 
neoliberalization.  More work is necessary—especially within the other hypersegregated, 
deindustrialized, and depopulated cities of the Rust Belt—in order to form a more complete 
picture of how the charter school movement capitalizes on and intensifies the crises of urban 
political economy in late capitalism, yet this work constitutes a significant contribution to a 
larger regional analysis of charter schools and urban decline.     
In addition to its potential contribution to a regional analysis, exploring the dynamics of 
public education policy within the larger policy ecology of a declining city is another primary 
significance of this dissertation.  Both in the popular and academic presses, interest in the history 
and present effects of public school desegregation programs is resurgent.  Too often, social 
issues like wealth inequality, economic and racial segregation, deindustrialization, and public 
education equity are discussed and explored in isolation from one another.  While I have not here 
forged a novel metatheory of educational, racial, and economic equity, focusing on St. Louis 
allows my work to bridge historical efforts at desegregation with urban neoliberalization and 
charter schools.  This dissertation, therefore, offers an historically robust critical analysis of 
education policy that unites several of the most pressing issues of neoliberal governance, urban 
revitalization, and public education equity in the early twenty-first century.  
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Overview of the Dissertation 
In this first chapter, I argue that the regional and local manipulation of the crises resulting 
from racial segregation and urban decline have been the case for the charter movement 
categorically, but I pay close attention to their effects in the Rust Belt, particularly within Kansas 
City and St. Louis, Missouri.  The second chapter provides historical and theoretical context of 
neoliberalism’s emergence as a reaction to Keynesian liberalism and its implications for urban 
policy.  While not a literature review in the same sense as a qualitative inquiry dissertation, it 
fulfills a similar function of grounding the other chapters in a tradition of critique of political 
economy with particular emphasis on urban neoliberalization.  The third chapter addresses 
critical policy analysis as a methodology and in relation to tensions between structural neo-
Marxist critiques and poststructural critical policy analyses.  The tension between structural and 
poststructural critiques emerges out of the previous chapter’s discussion of neoliberalism.  I 
argue that structural concerns about capital accumulation and urban revitalization must exist 
alongside methods of critical analysis that focus on the mutation and transfer of policy through 
time and space in order to retain coherence within critical policy analysis as a theoretical 
framework.  Also in Chapter Three, I turn toward St. Louis as an illustration of urban decline and 
revitalization with special attention to how education policy and schools themselves are 
implicated in David Harvey’s spatio-temporal theories of urban neoliberalization.  Chapter Four 
explores the history of urban revitalization in St. Louis as its relationship to the city’s landmark 
desegregation program.  This history is crucial in understanding the policy context that produced 
Senate Bill 781, a sweeping education reform bill that effectively ended the city’s school 
desegregation efforts and ushered in charter schools as the new paradigmatic approach to public 
education equity.  I argue that St. Louis’s transition from federally enforced interdistrict 
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desegregation to local, state, and federally supported intradistrict school choice illustrates a 
realignment of urban education policy in accordance with the political and economic interests of 
urban neoliberalization, which I analyze through the lens of Harvey’s theory of accumulation by 
dispossession.  Lastly, the final chapter addresses the increasing instability of urban 
neoliberalization and points to necessary macro-structural changes in political economy that are 
possible paths toward stable and robust forms of educational equity and social justice in racially 
segregated and declining cities like St. Louis.   
 
Charter Growth as an Urban Phenomenon 
Advocacy groups like the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools offer few 
explanations beyond trite slogans for the rapid growth of charters in the nation’s economically 
impoverished and racially segregated cities.  Bromides like the charter movement being “a leader 
in innovation” or “unleashing an environment of creativity” fail to explain exactly what is 
innovative about the movement or exactly how an environment can be unleashed.5  Setting aside 
questions about the ideological content of charter school innovation and creativity, these 
simplistic accounts paradoxically celebrate the urban concentration of charters while leaving out 
explanations for why charters are not more geographically diffused.  Presumably, if charters lead 
in innovation and unleash creativity, and if these are unquestionable educational goods, then 
charters would enjoy reasonably even growth across all geographic regions as suburban and rural 
districts desire innovation and creativity no less than urban schools.  Similarly, if school choice 
empowers families and students or produces better educational outcomes for all students, 
                                                 
5 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, “A Growing Movement:  America’s Largest Charter Public School 
Communities and Their Impact on Student Outcomes,” November 3, 2016, 1, http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-
facts/publications-research/. 
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especially those on the bottom of the “achievement gap,” surely suburban and rural districts 
would find it as compelling as urban districts.  Yet, the rapid concentration of urban charters over 
the last decade has brought about the decline in suburban charters as an overall percentage 
during the same time period,6 and the seven states remaining without any charter school laws are 
some of the most rural in the country.7  It would seem that there is more to charter school growth 
than the movement’s relationship to innovation and creativity. 
There is no single explanation for why charter schools concentrate in cities.  Population 
density provides some explanation for why urban charters are more viable than rural charters, 
which make up only around 16 percent of all charter schools.8  Rural school districts that have 
the population and resources to sustain only one P-12 school system cannot inject “school 
choice” into their public school system and expect either the charter or traditional public school 
to remain open.  Rural areas also lack the built infrastructure either of vacant school buildings or 
other facilities charters can convert into schools common in urban areas, a rather simple and 
straightforward explanation of how charters are a function of urbanism.  At around 20 percent of 
all charters, suburban charters account for a slightly larger percentage of charter schools than 
                                                 
6 Richard Whitmire, “More Middle-Class Families Choose Charters,” Education Next, Summer 2015, 34. 
7 The seven states without charter laws include Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kentucky, West 
Virginia, and Vermont.  Those states that have most recently passed charter school laws (Alabama, Maine, and 
Mississippi) are also rural.  Even though the number of rural charters has grown over the last decade, much of this 
growth has come from online charter schools.  Virtual charters claim to meet the needs of rural students for whom 
transportation over long distances is difficult.  Virtual charters are also not encumbered by the facilities issues 
associated with brick and mortar charter schools, and the technological infrastructure, while still lacking in many 
regions, has also grown dramatically during the last decade.  However, virtual charters have often proved so 
disastrous that even mainstream charter advocacy groups have distanced themselves.  See Lauren Camera, “Charter 
Groups Call Out Virtual Schools,” U.S. News & World Report, June 16, 2016, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-16/charter-school-groups-call-out-virtual-schools; James L. 
Woodworth et al., “Online Charter School Study” (Stanford, CA: Center For Research on Education Outcomes, 
Stanford University, 2015), https://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/OnlineCharterStudyFinal2015.pdf.  
8 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, “Details from the Dashboard:  Charter Schools by Geographic 
Region,” 2012, http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Geographic-Location-Details-from-the-
Dashboard-Report_20120224T143955.pdf. 
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their rural counterparts while remaining a fraction of the number of urban charters.9  Given that 
poor performance on standardized testing and attendance and graduation rates—the metrics 
associated with the “achievement gap”—propel the narrative of corporate education reform, 
suburban schools have historically had less of an incentive to experiment in new forms of public 
school governance due to the strength of their performance data relative to urban and rural 
schools.   
There is, of course, the peculiar relationship between charter schools and poverty.  It is 
not just rare for low-income students to outscore their middle-class and affluent peers 
categorically on state-mandated tests; it is unheard of.10  Charter advocates acknowledge the 
correlation between poverty and low academic achievement but view the persistence of the 
achievement gap as a failure of individual and institutional will power or creativity or both.11  
The dominant narrative of the charter school movement is that traditional public schools, 
particularly those in high-poverty, nonwhite, and urban communities have failed students for 
decades.  Rather than transcending racism or socioeconomic disadvantages, traditional public 
schools reinforce those limitations through policies and common practices that have enjoy the 
support of intractable public sector bureaucracies like teachers unions.  Deregulation would 
allow charter schools to innovate with curriculum and governance structures, while the creation 
of a public education marketplace would spur competition and improve the quality of services 
both in traditional public schools and charters.  Better services would narrow or close that 
stubborn achievement gap, which according to this view, provided considerable explanatory 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Christopher Tienken, “The Influence of Poverty on Achievement,” Kappa Delta Pi Record 48, no. 3 (2012): 106. 
11 The literature on the relationship between poverty and academic achievement is far too large to provide a 
representative sample, but for a relevant meta-analysis, see Selcuk Sirin, “Socioeconomic Status and Academic 
Achievement:  A Meta-Analytic Review of Research,” Review of Educational Research 75, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 
417–53. 
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power for intergenerational and racialized poverty.  In other words, structural issues outside of 
school walls manifest themselves in educational outcomes and performance data, but the “right” 
approach to educating oppressed groups—presumably impossible within the confines of 
traditional public schools—can overcome structural oppression not just individually but 
categorically.   
Charters holding to meritocratic explanations of how poverty forms and how it ought to 
be solved must walk a fine line between acknowledging the significance of structural barriers 
like racialized poverty while also advertising their own proprietary formula that enables every 
child to succeed.  Most, particularly those adhering to “no excuses” models, see overcoming the 
correlation between family income and educational outcomes as their primary mission.  Indeed, 
the name of Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) schools, which have become the standard 
bearers of the no excuses charter model, reflects KIPP’s message that its schools transcend 
structural poverty through trademarked character development programs and a strong emphasis 
on academic rigor and discipline.  While working in Houston as Teach for America (TFA) corps 
members, KIPP founders Dave Levin and Mike Feinberg were inspired by fellow educator 
Harriet Ball, who sought to motivate her students by reciting mantras like “You gotta read, baby, 
read, / The more you read, the more you know, /  ’Cause knowledge is power, / Power is money, 
and / I want it.”12  This etiological anecdote does much to explain KIPP’s position as the 
exemplar of the neoliberal school reform.  In addition to the meritocratic fantasy that the most 
well-read and knowledgeable are those with power and money, Ball’s mantra promotes the 
notion that the solution to structural poverty is an individualistic one, something “I want.”  KIPP 
and indeed all neoliberal anti-poverty strategies ignore the historical evidence that structural 
                                                 
12 Jay Mathews, “Harriett Ball Dies:  Teacher Who Inspired KIPP Charter Schools Was 64,” The Washinton Post, 
February 10, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/10/AR2011021000211.html.   
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poverty is most effectively addressed by the collective we rather than the individual I.    It is also 
worth mentioning that the views of liberals who oppose charter schools as threats to public 
education share much of the same vision of public education as a panacea for poverty as charter 
school advocates, the major exception being their differing views on structural changes to school 
governance and state education bureaucracies.  The liberal goal, it would seem, is one of equal 
opportunity to succeed within the political economy of late capitalism, which produces and even 
demands the sort of inequality the public schools seek to overcome.  Liberal politics is distinct 
from leftist or radical politics in the sense that liberals seek equal opportunities to thrive within 
the middle and affluent classes.  Radical politics seeks liberation from the very system that 
produces and is built upon class inequality, alienation, and exploitation from the start.  The 
continued relevance of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis’s criticisms of schools as mechanisms 
for assimilating students into the class structures of capitalism attest to the need to distinguish 
leftist positions on education from liberal positions, which in terms of class, are often quite 
conservative.13  Nonetheless, KIPP and other charter management organizations (CMOs) that 
target high-poverty populations would seem to have a natural incentive to locate in high-poverty 
communities.  If many high-poverty rural communities lack the population density or 
infrastructure to support charter school growth, then high-poverty urban communities would 
seem to be the obvious place to grow.  However, the notion that the location of charter schools 
simply tracks poverty, that, as advocates would say, they go where they are needed, obscures 
more than it explains.   
                                                 
13 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America:  Education Reform and the Contradictions 
of Economic Life (Chicago: Haymarket, 1976). 
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One problem with such an explanation is that contrary to the stereotype, the poor in the 
United States are increasingly suburban.  Although cities still have the highest rates of 
concentrated poverty, poverty has exploded in the suburbs since the year 2000: 
With this dramatic expansion in suburban poverty during the 2000s, metropolitan 
American crossed an economic Rubicon:  for the first time, more of its poor lived in 
suburbs than in cities…this shift had already occurred by the middle of the decade, and 
the increase continued steadily through the rest of the 2000s.  By 2010, 15.3 million poor 
individuals—55 percent of the metropolitan poor population—lived in suburbs, almost 
2.6 million more than in cities.14 
 
Gentrification and redevelopment within the urban core of U.S. cities either squeeze low-income, 
predominately nonwhite populations into increasingly concentrated tracts of segregated urban 
poverty or force those populations into the already racially and economically segregated suburbs.  
When states like Missouri—the focus of this dissertation—crafted their charter school legislation 
in the 1990s, they did so with racialized urban poverty in mind and showed either little interest 
in—or were actively hostile to—charter schools turning suburban public school systems into 
education markets. 
Before returning to charter schools and urbanism nationally, allow me to briefly illustrate 
how and why state legislation shields rural and suburban communities from charter schools.  
Missouri’s charter legislation (part of 1998’s Senate Bill 781) purposefully restricted charter 
schools to cities with populations of 350,000 or greater, which meant they could operate only in 
the state’s two major metropolises, Kansas City and St. Louis.  At the time the legislation passed, 
these two cities accounted for over half of Missouri’s black population, and both cities played 
pivotal roles in the nation’s efforts to desegregate its schools.15  The legalization of charter 
                                                 
14 Elizabeth Kneebone and Alan Berube, “Confronting Suburban Poverty in America” (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 2013), 18. 
15 St. Louis’s black population has steadily fallen during the last two decades due in large part to its movement to the 
segregated suburbs of northern St. Louis County, a specific example of the increasing sub urbanization of racialized 
poverty. 
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schools stemmed from Missouri elites’ ire over desegregation and their longing to bring the 
power of markets to bear on the problems of public education, provided such an experiment 
would be limited to the state’s majority black and low-income urban school districts.  Because 
markets are driven by profit rather than just efficiency in the abstract, charter schools presented 
more than just a new path forward for what elites saw as a perennial problem.  They presented 
property developers with a new tool for revalorizing property decimated by strategic and 
structural disinvestment of black neighborhoods.    
Kansas City’s public schools, the subject of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Missouri v. 
Jenkins (1995) decision, were under a federally enforced desegregation program that required the 
state to assume the massive costs of upgrades to urban schools, the creation of magnet schools, 
and suburban-urban desegregation busing after finding the state of Missouri legally liable for 
having created and maintained a segregated public school system.  After more than a decade of 
bitterly contesting court-enforced desegregation, the political elites of Missouri had the verdict 
they were looking for in Jenkins.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision found that 
desegregation programs must be limited in time and scope and that their end should be guided by 
the desire to return schools to state and local control rather than the more difficult and nebulous 
goal of having reversed the effects of segregation through federally enforced programs.  Writing 
shortly after the ruling, Gary Orfield compared the case to the court’s infamous Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) decision: “The courts assume today, as the Plessy Court did, that local agencies 
with a history of treating blacks unfairly could now be trusted to treat them fairly with no outside 
supervision.”16  Conservative groups cheered the verdict as proof that pouring money into a 
                                                 
16 Gary Orfield, Dismantling Desegregation (New York, NY: The New Press, 1996), 36. 
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struggling urban school system was not the answer to poor performance.17  Yet scholars have 
since criticized this conclusion for its failure to place Missouri’s desegregation spending in 
Kansas City within the proper historical context of the state’s systemic underfunding and within 
the proper relative context of the increased costs associated with comparable levels of urban 
poverty.18  In any case, too narrow a focus on urban-suburban education policy misses the larger 
reasons why urban schools were and are struggling.  The economic devastation of urban 
economies brought on by deindustrialization and the inequality and class antagonisms that issue 
from urban revitalization are only mitigated—not overcome—by liberalism’s efforts to 
redistribute resources to combat historical structural inequality, capital disinvestment, and racial 
animus.  Federally enforced desegregation, conservatives argued, had been tried and found 
wanting, yet the belief that racial and economic inequality centuries in the making could be 
undone by one decade of a desegregation program, even one as extensive as Kansas City’s, was 
one of political convenience rather than historical reality.  The myopic obsession with the 
persistent “achievement gap” serves as a useful distraction to avoid dealing with more painful 
and complex systemic issues associated with what Gloria Ladson-Billings refers to as the 
“education debt.”19 
The Jenkins ruling also prefaced the end of St. Louis’s historic desegregation program.20  
A parent-led lawsuit first filed in 1972 and later settled in 1983 had led to the largest and longest-
running voluntary interdistrict desegregation program in U.S. history.  As with Kansas City, the 
                                                 
17 See Paul Ciotti, “Money and School Performance:  Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment” 
(Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1998), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/money-school-
performance-lessons-kansas-city-desegregation-experiment. 
18 Preston Green and Bruce Baker, “Urban Legends, Desegregation and School Finance:  Did Kansas City Really 
Prove That Money Doesn’t Matter?,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 12, no. 57 (Fall 2006): 57–105. 
19 Gloria Ladson-Billings, “From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt:  Understandi ng Achievement in U.S. 
Schools,” Educational Researcher 35, no. 7 (October 2006): 3–12.     
20 I cover Liddell v. Board of Education of the City of St. Louis extensively in Chapter Four. 
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Liddell settlement made the state of Missouri responsible for the bulk of the program’s costs.  
Then Missouri Attorney General John Ashcroft appealed the settlement to the U.S. Supreme 
Court but was denied.  Undeterred, Ashcroft made his opposition to desegregation a central 
plank of his successful gubernatorial campaign, but there was little he or any other Missouri 
politician could do to oppose the Eighth Circuit Court’s enforcement of the Liddell settlement 
until the Jenkins ruling came a decade later.21  By that time, charter schools offered a new “Third 
Way” forward for issues of educational equity that appealed to the then dominant neoliberal left 
(unquestionably an oxymoronic label) in a way that public education privatization schemes like 
school vouchers never did.  This dissertation focuses on St. Louis rather than Kansas City for a 
number of reasons.  Prominent among them is the fact that St. Louis’s political elites were the 
driving force behind Missouri’s charter law.  Additionally, the end of the Liddell settlement is so 
thoroughly intertwined with the legalization of charters that understanding either demands 
understanding both.  Lastly, while Kansas City’s problems of segregation and urbanization 
persist, few cities capture the devastation of deindustrialization and the political economy of 
urban neoliberalization as poignantly as St. Louis.   
The roots of St. Louis’s persistent class antagonisms and intense racial segregation run 
far deeper than the emergence of charter schools, deeper even than Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka’s blow to de jure segregation.  Indeed, St. Louis has been at the center of the country’s 
ongoing struggles with race and property from Missouri’s compromised entrance into the union 
to the infamous Dred Scott case to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Shelley v. Kraemer decision to end 
racially restrictive housing covenants in 1948.  In terms of education policy, the end of enforced 
desegregation and the emergence of charter schools as an alternative marks the completion of 
                                                 
21 Gerald W. Heaney and Susan Uchitelle, Unending Struggle:  The Long Road to an Equal Education in St. Louis 
(St. Louis: Reedy Press, 2004), 127. 
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Missouri’s transition from the era of politically liberal notions of social justice through 
redistribution to the era of neoliberal notions of social justice through consumer choice within a 
public education market.  Paradoxically, the usual pro-charter narrative of educational salvation 
through “freedom of choice” is untenable as an explanation in St. Louis since the introduction of 
charter school choice was predicated on the ending of the court-enforced school choice offered 
through the city-suburb desegregation program.  Put simply, if choice is what improves public 
education, then there must be some other motivation for replacing one system of choice with 
another.  My position is that the structural forces that underlie urbanization—the ideologies that 
form and reform urban life and space—explain far more about the location and expansion of 
charter schools than do platitudes about “choice.”   
 
Public Goods vs. Private Growth 
Scholars should take the charter school movement at its word when it comes to matters of 
markets and competition.  Studying charters as corporate actors—that is, as business entities that 
are either franchises or startups—rather than as public schools in the more conventional sense 
explains more about where and how they grow than studying their curriculum, instruction, or 
governance patterns either in isolation or as compared to traditional public schools.  To draw an 
analogy to corporate franchising, McDonalds does not decide where to open a new location by 
evaluating the costs and quality of local restaurants and determining where they can offer a better 
meal at lower prices.  Rather, McDonalds looks to exploit existing vulnerabilities and create new 
market opportunities.  It drives expansion through a favorable regulatory framework coupled 
with aggressive branding and advertising until saturation and the prospect of diminishing returns 
force it to expand elsewhere.   
 17 
 
As public institutions, traditional public schools are ill-equipped to operate within 
competitive markets.  Far from signaling their inferiority, traditional public schools’ non-
competitive nature is an underappreciated asset in a culture increasingly insistent upon 
evaluating according to market logics.  Despite the chorus of neoliberals deriding traditional 
public schools as educational monopolies, it is only possible to consider a public institution a 
monopoly through considering public services commodities rather than as entities designed to 
stabilize civic life and support the common good.  Public schools have no more a monopoly on 
public education than public police forces have a monopoly on law enforcement, or public courts 
have a monopoly on the justice system, or public election commissions have monopolies on 
securing and tallying the votes in a democracy.  The instability that would ensue from having 
competing legal and electoral systems should be obvious to all but the most strident free market 
ideologue.22   
The danger of applying such principles to public education should be no less obvious.  
Educational services are rightly understood first and foremost as intrinsic social goods rather 
than as commodities.  Once market logics and categories become dominant within public 
education, however, there is no reason to think that market actors within public education or the 
commodities/services they offer will behave much differently than their private sector 
counterparts.  As Trevor Norris rightly points out, “the expenditure by corporations on 
advertisements and image creation has grown exponentially and now often far outstrips the costs 
                                                 
22 Ever pushing the boundaries of sanity with neoliberal experiments, New Orleans has authorized a private police 
force comprised primarily of off-duty police officer to work alongside the New Orleans Police Department in order 
to protect the tourism industry in the French Quarter.  Even if it is not in competition with the NOPD, the dangers of 
having a police force comprised of overworked officers who moonlight with a private company for extra money are 
obvious.  See Matthew Speiser, “How a Guy Dubbed the ‘Trash King of New Orleans’ Created His Very Own 
Private Police Force.,” Business Insider, August 11, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/businessman-funding-
private-police-force-2015-8. 
 18 
 
of the physical production of commodities.”23 If, as Norris argues, we approach public schools 
not as citizens or members of a community but as consumers looking to exercise choice within a 
marketplace, we can expect the proprietors of educational commodities to treat us as such.  The 
consequence of this market relationship is that schools shift their attention (and funds) from 
providing public goods to marketing them.  As in the corporate world it mimics, those who 
achieve dominance in a public education market would not necessarily be those who provide the 
best services but instead those that are best positioned to elevate their brand and exploit 
vulnerabilities.  There are consequences beyond diverting funds from education toward 
advertising.  In the era of native advertising and target marketing, the separation between public 
interest journalism—that which takes seriously the role of investigative reporting and 
professional editorial standards—and what is often called infotainment or sponsored content is 
increasingly difficult to maintain.  The massive civic and material investments in public 
education are jeopardized when reporting on such an important fulcrum of public interest 
becomes just another avenue for advertising.    
There is clear evidence that the consequences of public education marketization are not 
just abstract or potential problems.  Exploring the argument that school choice is an issue of civil 
rights in that it offers disadvantaged populations the opportunity to secure a quality public 
education, Christopher Lubienski, Charisse Gulosino, and Peter Weitzel analyze the ways in 
which charter schools move through education markets in three distinct contexts:  Detroit, 
Washington, D.C., and New Orleans.  The authors claim that market incentives, even those put 
in place to achieve equity (a concept as anathema to market logic as any), cause schools to 
maximize self-interest rather than public good: 
                                                 
23 Trevor Norris, Consuming Schools:  Commercialism and the End of Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2011), 6. 
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The patterns emerging in the geospatial analyses are telling, in light of the substantive 
differences between the three [local education markets].  Overall, there appears to be a 
high level of market acumen among charter schools and private schools, as well as in 
some public districts.  In Detroit, profit-oriented charter schools, behaving like business 
entities, are apparently willing to pay premiums to locate in more affluent neighborhoods.  
While initially focusing on areas with greater needs, even mission-oriented charter 
schools increasingly appear to target students in more advantaged neighborhoods where 
they can maximize market advantages but avoid “undesirable” students.24 
 
While the authors found slight variations in organizational behavior and charter school location 
in Washington, D.C. and New Orleans, these variations are to be expected given the different 
possibilities for profit or interest maximization afforded by those respective contexts.  In other 
words, charter schools—and to some degree public schools—showed “institutional isomorphism 
toward profit-seeking models” in all three cities regardless of differences in their purported 
mission or the political and geographic terrain.25  Market solutions require market motives, and 
market motives can never produce equity.  Competition draws public schools into a fight they 
will lose.  The corporate support of charter schools comes in more forms than just philanthropic 
funding.  Corporate organizational models and operational logics provide the ideological tools 
for expansion and interest maximization.26  The problem is not that these things do not work; the 
problem is that they do work.  When traditional public schools are drawn into market 
competition, they either lose because they lack the models and logics that produce success in 
such an environment, or they lose because they adopt those logics (the institutional isomorphism) 
and cease to operate according to public governance models and public aims. 
                                                 
24 Christopher Lubienski, Charisse Gulosino, and Peter Weitzel, “School Choice and Competitive Incentives:  
Mapping the Distribution of Educational Opportunities across Local Education Markets,” American Journal of 
Education 115, no. 4 (August 2009): 639–40. 
25 Ibid., 640. 
26 Elizabeth DeBray et al., “Intermediary Organizations in Charter School Policy Coalitions:  Evidence from New 
Orleans,” Educational Policy 28, no. 2 (March 2014): 175–206. 
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If the charter school movement is best understood through the lens of the same market 
logic it adopts, then the task remains to see where the vulnerabilities are and how it has gone 
about entering and exploiting these markets at the regional level.  The NAPCS is correct that the 
number of urban districts with more than 30 percent market share of public education students 
has risen dramatically over the last decade, but it remains the case that such growth is quite 
uneven as Figure 1 shows.27  St. Louis and Kansas City accompany more high profile cities like 
New Orleans and Washington, D.C., whose battles over charter expansion have largely played 
out under the national spotlight given the unprecedented restructuring of public education in 
New Orleans and mass media coverage of Washington, D.C.’s charter reforms during and 
following Michelle Rhee’s tenure as that city’s public school chancellor.   Looking at the map in 
Figure 2, the geographic patterns of charter concentration are even more apparent.28  The stark 
concentration of charters in the Rust Belt suggests a steady and systemic pattern of 
concentration. 
New Orleans’s experiment with an all-charter district is certainly dramatic in its intensity 
and the circumstances surrounding its takeover,29 but geographically speaking, it is an outlier as 
are San Antonio and the two California districts.  Charter expansion has clustered in the racially 
segregated and deindustrialized cities of the Rust Belt with nearly mechanical precision.  As with 
all market entities, nothing fuels growth like growth itself, and charter school growth and 
concentration is clearly regionally specific.  
 
                                                 
27 National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, “A Growing Movement:  America’s Largest Charter Public School 
Communities and Their Impact on Student Outcomes,” 3.  
28 Ibid., 8. 
29 See Kristen L. Buras, Charter Schools, Race, and Urban Space:  Where the Market Meets Grassroots Resistance 
(New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Cities with the Greatest Concentration of Charter Schools 
 
 
Figure 2:  Regional Clustering of Charter-Concentrated Districts  
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State law unquestionably plays a role in geographic concentration.  States with little 
regulatory oversight or those seeking to incentivize charter expansion with favorable funding and 
infrastructure laws create opportunities for charter startups and franchise expansions within 
multiple urban areas.  Seeking to promote advantageous state-regulatory environments for the 
charter movement, the Center for Education Reform published a ranking of states with laws most 
conducive to charter growth, which it defined according to the following criteria: “The existence 
of independent and/or multiple authorizers; the number of schools allowed and state caps; 
operational and fiscal autonomy; and equitable funding.”30  These criteria encapsulate the 
contradictions of the now dominant form of the neoliberal state that still clings to its classical 
economic liberalism’s faith in the purported efficiencies and virtues of market competition while 
requiring the state to take an active role in creating, maintaining, and funding markets.  Rather 
than the state actively governing public services, it should step out of the way—after initially 
favorable (de)regulation is in place, of course—of independent service providers working 
through multiple authorizers.  Government planning should not erect artificial caps or obstacles 
to growth once the (artificial) market is established, even or especially to protect existing 
educational bureaucracies, labor interests, or communities hostile to charter school growth.  And 
the state must provide equitable funding both for institutions it governs and those over which it 
exercises little to no control.  In other words, “free” market principles are at play only once the 
state has artificially created the market and suitably funded its independent actors.   
State laws alone, however, are an insufficient explanation for charters’ regional 
concentration.  States that earned an “A” from the Center for Education Reform include some of 
                                                 
30 The rankings include Washington, D.C.  “Charter School Laws Across the States:  2015 Rankings and Scorecard” 
(Center for Education Reform, 2015), 4, https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/CharterLaws2015.pdf. 
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the nation’s most heavily chartered public school districts, for example Michigan, Indiana, and 
Washington, D.C.  In contrast to their charter concentration, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey 
all received a very mediocre “C,” while Missouri earned a more favorable “B.”31  Heavily 
populated states such as California, Florida, and New York have high overall numbers of charter 
schools, abundant infrastructure, and the sort of legal environment the charter movement desires 
(B-range), yet they fail to achieve the degree of market saturation found in the Rust Belt.  Some 
degree of legislative and executive favor at the level of state government seems necessary for 
charter concentration but insufficient to account for its regional dominance.  The argument that 
charter concentration in the postindustrial Midwest is simply a matter of an arbitrary regional 
consensus on public education reform and corresponding legal framework ignores the political 
economic conditions that favored charter legalization and its uneven development regionally and 
nationally.  In other words, both the favorable regulatory environment and the potential for 
growth of a given market are themselves functions of the same uneven processes of regional 
urbanization.  It is necessary then to look at the structural forces that underlie urbanization in the 
Rust Belt to advance this dissertation’s claim that charter school growth in St. Louis is driven by 
racialized class interests and capital accumulation over and against public interests and 
educational equity. 
      
Racial Segregation and Urban Decline in the Rust Belt 
Three prominent and interwoven themes define Midwestern urbanization since the mid-
twentieth century:  racial segregation, deindustrialization, and depopulation.  It is important to 
keep in mind that, while racial segregation and deindustrialization are national phenomena, their 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 7. 
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unevenness and differentiation across regions and even within an individual metropolitan area 
are matters of historical processes and the particularities of place.  As geographer and Marxist 
scholar David Harvey contends, “It is impossible to understand space independent of time.”32  
What Harvey is getting at here is Marx’s conviction that the material conditions structuring a 
given society’s political apparatus and social relations are historical processes.  Because those 
historical processes and resultant social relations also structure the ways human societies use 
urban space and the various resources afforded by the environment, space itself, particularly the 
built environment of cities, becomes the contested terrain of past and present social relations and 
the physical expression of local economies’ relationship to global capital. Let us, therefore, look 
at how these three historical processes have made Midwestern cities such fertile ground for the 
growth and concentration of charter schools, beginning first with racial segregation.  
Racial segregation is a dense and multifaceted phenomenon, so it is helpful to start out by 
defining one key dimension.  Dissimilarity is one way of measuring racial segregation that 
perhaps most closely corresponds to common notions of racial segregation.  Racial dissimilarity 
describes the degree to which people of different races spread unevenly throughout a 
metropolitan area.  The range of moderate racial segregation is 30-60 on the dissimilarity index.  
Census tracts with rates below 30 have low levels of racial unevenness, while those above 60 
have high rates.  The index corresponds to the percentage of residents that would need to move 
to other tracts for the given area to achieve even racial distribution.33   
This dissertation discusses the ways in which St. Louis has historically engineered its 
racial segregation in greater detail later, but for now, it is worth pausing to draw attention to the 
                                                 
32 David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism:  Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development (New 
York: Verso, 2006), 122. 
33 John R. Logan and Brian J. Stults, “The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis:  New Findings from the 
2010 Census” (US2010 Project, March 24, 2011), 25, http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf.  
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magnitude of the obstacles to metropolitan residential desegregation in St. Louis, where racial 
unevenness is so high that 70.6 percent of the population would have to move to achieve an even 
demographic distribution.  Whatever the percentage of people who support desegregating cities 
in the abstract, the percentage of people willing to move to advance this goal is miniscule, a 
rounding error.  In addition to whatever overt racial prejudice informs their housing decisions or 
lurks within their subconscious to structure preferences, the housing market qua market attaches 
material and social consequences to efforts to desegregate.  Aside from other disincentives 
associated with inadequate infrastructure or services and increased pollution or crime, those with 
modest amounts of purchasing power risk their economic future by investing in neighborhoods 
with unstable or declining market values, which due to the racialization of poverty, are heavily 
segregated.  Even when such neighborhoods are stabilized or revitalized—seemingly the highest 
aim of urban planning in late capitalism—long-term residents often find themselves priced out of 
the homes they were unlikely to have owned to begin with and driven to less “up-and-coming” 
neighborhoods, unfamiliar places with familiar problems.  Gentrification is not a solution to 
urban poverty’s uneven development, it is the uneven capitalization and consequent 
displacement of urban poverty—the cyclical ebbs and flows of capital destruction and 
revalorization.  The notion that racial dissimilarity in St. Louis or anywhere else can be 
addressed within the parameters of the market without the “gains” being achieved through 
population displacement fails to recognize that, as Neil Smith argues, “The uneven development 
of capitalism is structural rather than statistical.”34  The geography of poverty is not a market 
failure; it is a market necessity.  The point here is that antagonisms of race and class are mutually 
reinforcing forms of oppression, but capitalism will produce geographic patterns of uneven 
                                                 
34 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 3rd edition (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 2008), 4. 
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development regardless of whether it can utilize race to do so.  In St. Louis and other areas in 
which urban poverty is racialized, resistance to both forms of oppression must occur 
simultaneously.  Otherwise, it aspires only to the pyrrhic victory of desegregating market 
victimization.   
Demographers studying black-white segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas focus 
primarily on areas with the largest black populations, since it is highly unlikely that cities with 
historically low black population would have or be able to achieve a relatively even distribution 
of black and white households.  They simply lack the diversity to diversify the city.  According 
to analysis of the 2010 census, of the 50 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with the largest 
black populations, the Midwest accounts for five of the ten most segregated (Detroit, Milwaukee, 
Chicago, Cleveland and St. Louis) and the Northeast accounts for four more (New York - White 
Plains/Wayne and Suffolk/Nassau, Newark, and Philadelphia).  Miami is the only MSA outside 
of the postindustrial Midwest and Northeast that makes the top ten.35  When segregation is 
measured by an index of isolation rather than dissimilarity, Southern cities such as Memphis, 
Jackson, New Orleans, and Birmingham—those most commonly associated with Jim Crow 
segregation—dominate the top ten.36  This difference is because isolation accounts for the lack of 
exposure to groups of other races within a given tract rather than geographical dissimilarity.  In 
other words, cities in the U.S. South tend to be more racially isolated than those in the Midwest 
and Northeast because their larger black populations live in predominantly black neighborhoods 
rather than racially mixed neighborhoods.  Still, several Rust Belt cities (Detroit, Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Cleveland) are also among the ten most racially isolated cities, with St. Louis as 
                                                 
35 Logan and Stults, “The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis:  New Findings from the 2010 Census,” 6.  
36 Ibid., 8. 
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the eleventh.   In any case, the notion that segregation is exclusively or even primarily a 
phenomenon of the U.S. South is utterly untenable.   
Keeping in mind the temporality of spatial phenomena, it is necessary to consider not just 
present segregation in Rust Belt cities but its persistence over time.  Comparing the 2010 census 
to those over the last several decades shows that black-white racial segregation reached a 
national high point during the 1960s and 1970s and has been slowly but steadily declining over 
the last four decades.37  At first glance, this would seem to be an encouraging trend for those 
concerned about racial justice broadly as well as particular issues of equity and racial segregation 
in public education.  Much of the momentum within this trend, however, has not come from 
meaningful housing and economic reforms in cities beset by racial isolation and concentrated 
poverty.  Rather, it is the result of the suburbanization of black populations as well as their 
movement into cities that historically had fewer black people and less entrenched residential 
segregation.38   
The Rust Belt, not the South, has had the most persistent racial segregation over the last 
thirty years.  Eight metropolitan areas have dissimilarity indices of greater than 80 for the 1980 
census and greater than 70 for the 2010 census.  Logan and Stults refer to these cities as the 
Ghetto Belt, which includes New York, Chicago, Detroit, Newark, Milwaukee, Gary, Cleveland, 
and St. Louis.39  Expanding on Logan and Stults’s data, Massey and Tannen describe the 
persistence not just of racial dissimilarity or isolation but of hypersegregation in U.S. cities, 
which offers a more holistic account of racial segregation.  Massey and Tannen break down the 
five components of hypersegregation as follows: 
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Unevenness is the degree to which blacks and whites are unevenly distributed across 
neighborhoods in a metropolitan area; isolation is the extent to which African Americans 
live in predominantly black neighborhoods; clustering is the degree to which 
neighborhoods inhabited by African Americans are clustered together in space; 
concentration is the relative amount of physical space occupied by African Americans 
within a given metropolitan environment; and centralization is the degree to which blacks 
reside near the center of a metropolitan area.40 
  
Massey and Tannen list the MSAs in which black and white populations were hypersegregated at 
any time between 1970 and 2010.  Of the 52 areas on the list, the South is the regional leader, 
followed by the Midwest and then the Northeast.  Only Denver and Las Vegas represent the 
West.  Many of the Southern cities that were hypersegregated during the 1970s or 1980s no 
longer remain so.  By 2010, 21 cities qualify as hypersegregated, meaning they have high scores 
across at least four of the categories.  Massey and Tannen divide those cities into those that 
scored highly (greater than 60) across all five categories of hypersegregation and those with high 
scores in four categories.  Those with high rates across all five categories show both the greatest 
persistence and intensity of hypersegregation, making them the most segregated cities in the 
country.  The eight cities that make up this unenviable list are Baltimore, Birmingham, Chicago, 
Cleveland, Detroit, Flint, Milwaukee, and St. Louis.  Apart from Baltimore and Birmingham, 
both of which are Southern postindustrial cities, the most segregated cities in the country are in 
the Rust Belt.  After averaging the scores across all five categories, only Milwaukee and Detroit 
are more hypersegregated than St. Louis.41   
The concentration of charter schools within these most hypersegregated cities is 
staggering.  Setting aside the Southern cities of Baltimore and Birmingham,42 charter schools 
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have a significant presence in each of the most hypersegregated Rust Belt cities.  While gaining 
only a 14 percent market share of Chicago Public Schools (CPS), Chicago charters have the 
fourth highest overall enrollment of charter school students (over 59,000) in the country.43  In 
spite of Arne Duncan’s tenure as head of CPS and strong support from mayors Richard M. Daley 
and Rahm Emmanuel, charters have not gained the same footing in Chicago as in regional 
neighbors such as Detroit or Cleveland.  The reasons for this are many, but forceful opposition 
from Chicago’s relatively strong teachers union (CTU) has without a doubt been an obstacle to 
the movement’s rapid expansion within the district.   
Milwaukee, the nation’s undisputed heavyweight champion of segregation according to 
Massey and Tannen’s metrics, does not breach the 30 percent charter market share threshold, but 
at 21 percent, it remains a significant market all the same.  Moreover, Milwaukee’s absence from 
the top tier of charter concentrated districts is the result of its failure to keep pace with the other 
cities.  When the NAPCS issued its first report on the cities with the highest charter market share 
in 2006, Milwaukee was tied with Cleveland for seventh at 16 percent.44  During the last decade, 
Cleveland has nearly doubled its charter market share to 31 percent, while Milwaukee has put up 
five percentage points.   Only a few years removed from Governor Scott Walker’s and the state 
legislature’s successful dismantling of collective bargaining rights for Wisconsin’s public sector 
unions, it remains to be seen whether the charter movement will capitalize on the union’s 
weakened state or the Milwaukee teachers union (MTEA) will build momentum with the social 
justice unionism model that has been so successful in neighboring Chicago.45  Like Cleveland, 
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St. Louis has passed the 30 percent charter school cutoff, while Detroit and Flint both have 53 
percent of public school students in charter schools.   
Of these six hypersegregated Rust Belt cities, Flint is the smallest in population by more 
than 200,000, and at just under 6,000 charter school students, its overall numbers are 
overshadowed by the other districts’ numbers, particularly its neighbor Detroit.  Flint, 
nonetheless, punches well above its weight in terms of its impact on public discourse.  The city 
has become a symbol of postindustrial dystopia and the ebbs and flows of capital.  The water 
crisis that began in 2014 sharply accented the tragedy of Flint’s long decline when city 
management switched the public water supply to the contaminated Flint River to save money, 
poisoning its majority-black population with toxic levels of lead.  Unsurprisingly, the appointed 
city manager who presided over the switch, Darnell Earley, left Flint’s city government to 
become the emergency manager of Detroit Public Schools before leaving that post amid 
controversy only a year later.    
A full analysis of the genesis and growth of charter schools within each of these 
hypersegregated Rust Belt cities lies outside the scope of this dissertation, but the correlation 
between hypersegregation and charter school concentration is irrefutable.  Charter schools’ 
dominance within segregated urban spaces speaks volumes about the state’s willingness to 
transform majority-black public school districts into education markets.  Taken together, the five 
dimensions of hypersegregation provide a sort of commentary on the black population’s 
(un)freedom to move through and shape urban spaces and public institutions according to rights 
as citizens or political subjects in a democracy.  Each of these categories of racialized urban 
space is inherently a category of class as well, since political economic power is what delineates 
the geographic boundaries of residential and commercial capital or the lack thereof.  In other 
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words, it is possible to imagine that distinctive racial or cultural populations may wish to live in 
the same neighborhoods, but it is impossible to imagine that they would prefer those 
neighborhoods to be poor.  If urbanization is the process by which capital moves through and 
(re)shapes space, then hypersegregated urban areas are those that capital has constructed to both 
create and preserve racialized class difference as a mechanism for advancing its goal of 
accumulation. 
 The twinned tragedy to the Rust Belt’s hypersegregation is its depopulation during the 
last half century.  Swollen by industrialization, the Great Migration, and the manufacturing boom 
of World War II, many Midwestern cities were preparing for perpetual growth during the 1950s 
and 1960s.  What subsequent decades delivered was just the opposite.  Suburbanization gained 
momentum after the war as cheap land, low taxes, and newly paved highways lured people and 
capital out of the cities and into what Kenneth Jackson famously referred to as the “crabgrass 
frontier.”46  The uneven development of U.S. cities after 1950 demonstrates that suburbanization 
exacerbated the effects of depopulation in the Midwest, but it was not the sole cause.  Southern 
and Western cities showed fairly stable growth rates during the last half of the twentieth century 
in spite of their own suburbanization woes.  For cities in the Midwest and Northeast, however, 
suburbanization intensified their loss of capital and population brought about by already shifting 
macroeconomic concerns and regional demographic shifts.  Many of the manufacturing jobs that 
shaped the industrial Midwest and Northeast were automated out of existence or began leaving 
for the reserve labor armies of foreign populations and the less organized and regulated labor 
pools of the U.S. South.  People also sought a “friendlier” climate as air conditioning and 
seemingly endless sources of fresh water made what were relatively sparsely populated areas in 
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the U.S. South and West much more attractive to those who were no longer tied to the regional 
and local economies of the Midwest and Northeast and their often punishing weather.47 
 It would be a mistake to assume that either the fruits of growth of the effects of loss are 
distributed evenly to different cities in the same region.  To put it differently, not all of the Rust 
Belt is equally rusted.  Just as national economic gains are not evenly distributed across regions, 
metropolitan and municipal variations can offset or intensify regional trends.  New York, for 
example, experienced strong growth despite the regional decline in manufacturing and heavy 
industry, and Chicago, Minneapolis, and Kansas City have had modest success in mitigating 
deindustrialization’s effects during the last half of the twentieth century.  Other cities tell much 
more tragic stories.  St. Louis lost 59 percent of its population from 1950 to 2000.  Today that 
figure is closer to 63 percent.  The populations of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Buffalo all 
fell by more than 45 percent over the course of their half century of continuous decline.48  
Several factors account for these intra-regional variations in population trends, but the 
relationship between the municipalities and their larger metropolitan areas appears to have 
played a decisive role in the gains or losses.  For example, of these five cities showing the largest 
median rate of continuous population decline during the final five decades of the twentieth 
century, metropolitan area decline drove much of Pittsburgh’s and Buffalo’s population loss.  St. 
Louis’s and Detroit’s losses were more municipal than metropolitan, while Cleveland’s was a 
combination of both.49  Conversely, the evidence suggests the cities that have either continuous 
population growth or were able to reverse declines during this same time period did so by 
achieving some degree of mutual benefit between the municipality and the larger metropolitan 
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region.  In some cases, cities grew by annexing their former suburbs, while in other cases the 
cities benefited from strong metropolitan area growth that offset municipal declines. 50 I will 
provide a detailed examination of the racial and economic antagonisms between St. Louis and its 
metropolitan statistical area later, but at present, it is worth highlighting the differentiation of 
population growth and decline among and within regions. 
 It is also worth emphasizing that population shifts must be understood as political 
economic shifts rather than mere residential preferences.  Suburbanization was not the result of 
an arbitrary change in lifestyle but of concrete economic incentives flowing from both public 
policy and private accumulation schemes.51  The same can be said of deindustrialization.  
Political economy structures the decisions of individuals and social groups, but it does not 
determine them.  Technological development and class alliances between capital and the state 
make possible the automation and offshoring of the Rust Belt’s manufacturing jobs, but these 
developments are neither “natural” nor inevitable.  They are ideological.  Ideology can limit 
choices, but it cannot make decisions.  The political power that structures uneven development 
around the accumulation of capital is the result of a specific set of class interests.  Different 
configurations of class interests could restructure development according to different 
imperatives, more robust notions of the common good or cooperative rather than competitive 
economics are just a few examples.   
 The relationship between charter school concentration and population decline is complex.  
As I have already indicated, the regional concentration of charter schools in the Rust Belt reflects 
their ability as market actors to exploit growth opportunities particular to that region.  The 
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hypersegregation common to the Midwest and Northeast is one crisis of urbanization that 
strongly correlates to charter school expansion, and so many of the region’s most 
hypersegregated cities are also those that have suffered continual population decline since 1950.  
Moreover, those whose declines seem to be matters of municipal rather than primarily 
metropolitan population instability (St. Louis, Detroit, and Cleveland) all have much a much 
higher concentration of charter schools than those cities in which metropolitan declines were a 
more decisive factor (Pittsburgh – 12 percent charter school market share and Buffalo – 20 
percent charter school market share).   
On the other hand, Indianapolis, which has experienced strong population growth since 
1950, still has one of the nation’s most heavily chartered public school districts at 31 percent.  
What accounts for Indianapolis’s variation from the triad of segregation, depopulation, and 
charter concentration is cause for further investigation, though there is strong evidence that 
Indianapolis’s racial segregation and its state’s charter-friendly legislation have needed no 
assistance from the destabilizing effects of depopulation to create the sort of conditions 
conducive to charter expansion.  Although Indianapolis’s metropolitan statistical area lacks the 
black-white segregation of St. Louis or Detroit, it remains the nation’s fifteenth most segregated 
city in terms of dissimilarity, just above the heavily chartered cities of Washington, D.C. and 
New Orleans.52  Like St. Louis and many other Midwestern cities, Indianapolis Public Schools 
was found liable for violating desegregation mandates in the 1970s.  Like St. Louis Public 
Schools, IPS was brought under a court-enforced interdistrict desegregation busing program in 
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the early 1980s, and just like St. Louis, that program ended in 1998 to be replaced by “school 
choice” as the principal mechanism for achieving educational equity.53   
As for legislation, charter reform advocates consider Indiana a national leader with an 
“A” ranking from the Center for Education Reform.54  Their favor is unsurprising considering 
that Indiana is the only state in the nation that allows its mayors to authorize charter schools.  
From the passage of its charter school law in 2001 to 2015, Indianapolis’s mayors alone 
authorized 25 charter schools.55  Neoliberal education reform advocates have long hailed the 
benefits of mayoral control of public schools,56 but having the mayor’s office act as an 
independent charter authorizer adds a different dimension to those aims.  Arguments for mayoral 
control of all district schools center on claims of streamlining public education bureaucracies and 
greater accountability to the electorate, which tends to turn out in greater numbers and is more 
informed about mayoral elections than for those that constitute local school boards.  Of course, 
local private and corporate interests also prefer running public education from the mayor’s office 
since doing so creates a single point of influence that dispenses with the maneuvering necessary 
to gain majority control over an elected school board.  Besides, local capital—dominated by 
property developers and corporations and organized through chambers of commerce and other 
policy advocacy groups—have long-established relationships with the mayor’s office and 
candidates likely to fill it.  Their ability to influence public policy is, therefore, streamlined.  
Critical scholars have pointed to the corrosive effects of mayoral control on the democratic 
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governance of public education and the myriad ways it burdens low-income communities of 
color.57  With Indianapolis’s mayor as an authorizer, charter interests can appeal directly to an 
office and bypass district bureaucracies entirely. 
Kansas City provides another interesting example of the complexities of racial 
segregation, depopulation, and charter school concentration.  Despite several decades of 
population loss, Kansas City had some success in reversing that trend during the last two 
decades.58  After Missouri legalized charter schools in 1998, Kansas City immediately set to 
work chartering much of its majority-black public school district.  Kansas City’s charter interests 
mobilized so quickly that St. Louis mayor Clarence Harmon lamented the fact that his city had 
not gotten any charters up and running during the year following charter legalization while 
Kansas City already had 17 charters.59  After all, St. Louis elites had been the ones to draft the 
state’s charter law and had restricted charter operations to only Kansas City and St. Louis.  It 
must have appeared to Mayor Harmon that St. Louis was being beaten at its own game.  When 
the National Alliance for Public Charters began tracking the cities with the greatest charter 
school concentration in 2006, Kansas City came in fourth overall with 20 percent market share.60  
During the last decade, it has fallen two spots to sixth overall but has nonetheless doubled its 
percentage to 40.61   
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As with many urban school districts in the Midwest, black students make up a greater 
percentage of Kansas City’s public school district than they do as residents of its geographic 
boundary, even though the district boundary tracks closely to city’s heavily segregated urban 
core.62  The correlation between charter market share as a percentage of the larger public school 
district and segregated black poverty is, therefore, particularly strong in Kansas City since its 
public school district already corresponds to the demographic conditions conducive to rapid 
charter expansion.  The whiter areas of Kansas City lying outside the majority-black district’s 
boundaries do not have a similar concentration of charter schools.63  Put differently, Kansas 
City’s charter schools are concentrated in the black neighborhoods that are concentrated within 
the confines of Kansas City Public Schools.  Both Kansas City charter schools and KCPS’s black 
student population became even more concentrated after a predominantly white area in the 
northeastern part of the district decided in 2007 to annex itself and become part of suburban 
Independence Public Schools.64  The boundary change contributed to Kansas City’s already 
significant charter school market share, which moved from 20 percent in 200765 to 23 percent in 
200866 and as high as 29 percent by 2009, a nine point swing in two years.67  The district’s 
declining population has been a role in charter schools’ doubling of their market share during the 
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last decade.68  In this light, charter schools appear less a phenomenon of choice and more a 
matter of restriction.  With Missouri already restricting charter schools to its majority-black 
districts of Kansas City and St. Louis, Kansas City narrowed that restriction further by keeping 
white residents outside the boundary of KCPS and therefore outside of a district vulnerable to a 
charter school takeover.  Again, majority-white suburban and urban school districts’ interest in 
charter schools seems largely to do with increasing “school choice” for majority-black districts 
and preserving their own “choice” to disassociate themselves from these districts.  
The politics of choice are never purely about racial segregation, at least in any sense that 
such segregation can be thought of separately from class antagonisms.  I have already touched on 
how Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD, now KCPS) became both a symbol and a 
sort of rallying call for the nation’s conservative backlash against federally enforced 
desegregation orders during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly those that found state governments 
liable for creating and operating segregated public schools before and after Brown and imposed 
extensive funding redistribution mandates on them.  To many (white) reactionaries in Kansas 
City’s (and St. Louis’s) suburbs and the vast rural middle of Missouri, KCMSD’s desegregation 
order represented “big government” forcing the state to pour “taxpayer money” into mismanaged 
(black) urban public school districts with little or no meaningful improvements in student 
achievement.  The effect of the Missouri v. Jenkins decision was to shield wealthier and whiter 
suburban districts from their moral and financial obligations to majority-black urban public 
school districts under the guise of “local control.”  Milliken v. Bradley (1974) had already made 
mandatory suburban-urban desegregation incredibly difficult by requiring proof of suburban 
districts’ intent to segregate urban schools.  Unlike St. Louis’s desegregation program, Kansas 
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City’s never involved mandatory interdistrict desegregation, likely because of the difficulty of 
such a measure post-Milliken.  Instead, the judge imposed an expensive educational 
infrastructure and spending program in order to draw suburban white students back into city 
schools.  In a sense, Jenkins finished what Milliken began.  White suburban students could not be 
forced to desegregate urban schools, and white rural and suburban tax dollars could not be 
redistributed indefinitely by the state to desegregate urban schools.  Again, we see the closeness 
of both population and wealth distribution and redistribution, what George Lipsitz refers to as 
“the possessive investment in whiteness.”69 
 
Neoliberalism’s “Free” Markets 
There is something about charter concentration in cities like St. Louis and Kansas City 
that goes beyond racial segregation and beyond even racialized class oppression.  Racialized 
class oppression, after all, predates charter schools and even the idea of public education itself by 
centuries and is a thread woven through the fabric of U.S. history.70  The hegemony of 
neoliberalism is what unites the phenomena of charter concentration, racial hypersegregation, 
and the class politics of deindustrialization.  The market logic embedded in charters’ governance 
models and their expansion and accumulation strategies deviates from previous forms of state-
sanctioned racialized class oppression such as those of post-World War II liberalism.71  The 
American trente glorieuses—the thirty years of national economic prosperity that followed the 
end of World War II—reinforced and exacerbated long-established forms of racialized economic 
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discrimination.  Indeed, the neoliberal era has sanitized U.S. history to such a degree that the race 
and class issues that fueled the Civil Rights Movement and the struggles for black liberation are 
often decoupled.  Neoliberalism’s erasure of class politics from discourses of race is not an 
oversight but the strategic weakening of opposition to political economic oppression.   It is 
important to remember that Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated when he was organizing 
striking black sanitation workers in a majority black city.  Exactly one year before his 
assassination, he had this to say about global political economy:   
the Western nations that initiated so much of the revolutionary spirit of the modern world 
have now become the arch antirevolutionaries.  This has driven many to feel that only 
Marxism has a revolutionary spirit.  Therefore, communism is a judgment against our 
failure to make democracy real and follow through on the revolutions that we initiated. 
Our only hope today lies in our ability to recapture the revolutionary spirit and go out into 
a sometimes hostile world declaring eternal hostility to poverty, racism, and militarism. 72 
 
The transformation of mid-twentieth century social democratic liberalism (capitalism dulled by 
welfare state programs) to neoliberalism’s refusal to understand any facet of life or social 
organization in nonmarket terms is capital’s revolutionary development of what King called the 
“arch antirevolutionary” spirit.  Defining racial progress in terms of a more diverse ruling 
class—or more commonly the ruling class’s greater “sensitivity” or “responsiveness” to the 
oppressions racial minorities endure—preserves hierarchies of class and race.  As for global 
poverty or militarism, neoliberalism can easily accommodate both as market opportunities.73  
Moreover, neoliberalism weakens the possibility that parts of the state apparatus could intervene 
on behalf of oppressed populations, even to protect them from other state apparatuses.  Federally 
enforced desegregation was just such a measure.  The state, acting through the federal judiciary, 
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sought to redress systemic discrimination created and upheld by other state agencies and 
bureaucracies from local to federal levels.  Under neoliberalism, the state’s role is to create and 
preserve markets by deregulating protections and incentivizing market activity, even within the 
state institutions and bureaucracies themselves.  The result is a sort of self-cannibalization by the 
state driven by the logic of accumulation. 
Missouri’s charter schools provide an excellent illustration of neoliberalism’s 
contradictions and cannibalistic nature.  The purposeful concentration of low-income black 
populations within particular public school zones or even the boundaries of an entire urban 
district is the leitmotif of black public education in America.  However, in dialectical fashion, the 
resegregation that has followed the dismantling of federally enforced desegregation programs 
like Kansas City’s and St. Louis’s has not reverted to the same segregation of the past.  Rather, it 
has been commoditized by neoliberalism.  The white flight and redrawing of district boundaries 
in Kansas City, for example, is now accompanied by the privatization of concentrated black 
districts themselves.  These redistributive measures of neoliberalism differ significantly from the 
redistributive measures of social liberalism.  Whereas social democratic liberalism sought to 
equalize opportunity by redistributing people and funds across divisions of race and class, 
neoliberalism makes a market of racialized inequality that effectively redistributes public assets 
and students to for-profit operators directly or through nonprofit entities that are often operated 
by for-profit companies74 or those that function as tax shelters or tenants for rent-seeking 
capitalists.75   
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Neoliberalism’s contradictions make it as profitable as it is unsustainable.  For example, 
charters typically receive state money either directly in the form of state aid payments or as 
“pass-through” funds that flow from the state to the district and then to the charter.  Charter 
advocates frequently argue that these approaches do not drain funds from traditional public 
schools because state aid corresponds to attendance.  If the school does not have the expenses of 
educating the student, then there is no obvious financial loss when those funds follow that 
student to another “public” school.  While this argument ignores economies of scale and the use 
of charter schools as tax shelters, we can set those issues aside and accept the theoretical premise 
of the argument.  Bruce Baker contends, however, that such arguments do not apply in Missouri, 
where “the state…provides direct aid to the charter, but reduces the district aid by the amounts of 
both the state aid that would have been received and the local revenue that would have been 
allocated, per student.”76  The unique charter funding formula Baker references is outlined in the 
following Missouri statute: 
A charter school that has declared itself as a local education agency shall receive from the 
department of elementary and secondary education [DESE] an annual amount equal to 
the product of the charter school’s weighted average daily attendance and the state 
adequacy target, multiplied by the dollar value modifier for the district, plus local tax 
revenues per weighted average daily attendance from the incidental and teachers funds in 
excess of the performance levy…plus all other state aid attributable to such pupils.  If a 
charter school declares itself as a local education agency, [DESE] shall, upon notice of 
the declaration, reduce the payment made to the school district by the amount specified 
in this subsection and pay directly to the charter school the annual amount reduced from 
the school district’s payment.77 
 
Charter schools in Missouri, therefore, impose extraordinary burdens on traditional public 
school districts rather than the ordinary burdens resulting from the loss of economies of scale.  
Charter advocates continually insist that charter schools are public schools in spite of their 
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competitive relationship to traditional public schools and their lack of public oversight of 
funds.78  Mere receipt of public funds, however, does not make an institution public.  If it did, 
purely private institutions would be quite rare as they would have to have avoided government 
subsidies, tax breaks, and contracts to qualify as private to say nothing of indirect forms of 
government assistance.  Though charters’ claims as public institutions are categorically dubious, 
in Missouri they further strain credulity.  Missouri charters are not just a substitution for 
desegregation, a change in the conversation from a costly program of redistribution to a more 
economically efficient path to educational equity.  They are a revanchist response to majority-
black urban districts.  Kansas City’s and St. Louis’s public school districts were not just returned 
to hypersegregated urban spaces; they were returned and systemically weakened in such a way as 
to hobble future claims to suburban-urban or state-urban redistribution.  In replacing 
desegregation with heavily chartered black districts, the St. Louis suburbs were freed from court-
ordered involvement in desegregation and shielded from charter schools by population 
restrictions.  
 Aside from the particularly adversarial relationship between charters and traditional 
public school districts in Missouri, charters pose an existential threat to any urban district facing 
the sort of issues of depopulation I have covered at length.  The truth is that when dealing with 
rapid overall population decline and deindustrialization in urban areas, economies of scale are 
tremendously important.  Moody’s Investors Service warned in 2013 that “The dramatic rise in 
charter school enrollments over the last decade is likely to create negative credit pressure on 
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school districts in economically weak urban areas.”79  The financial services firm highlighted 
four factors that make an urban school districts especially vulnerable to charter schools:  pre-
existing financial pressures and weak demographics; inflexible operational and governance 
structures; location within a larger school choice friendly statutory environment; and integration 
with a dysfunctional or economically struggling local government.  Moody’s points to 
Cleveland, St. Louis, Detroit, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C. as characteristic of such 
factors and, therefore, at a heightened risk when at least one-fifth of their public school students 
are in charters.  St. Louis has the lowest charter school market share among those cities and is 
currently closer to one-third than one-fifth.   
 The risks posed by expanding charter schools in areas of continuous population decline, 
weakened regional and local economies, and historical systemic racial discrimination by public 
and private institutions (St. Louis, Detroit, and Cleveland) should be so obvious that the 
platitudes about “empowerment through choice” and “innovation” fail to gain traction.  Here it is 
important to distinguish between risk and threat.  When the matter pertains to the public as a 
social body concerned with the common good, the two are synonymous.  That which puts the 
public at risk is that which threatens it.  When viewed through the lens of the capital’s 
relationship to the market, however, the word most closely associated with risk is not threat, but 
reward.  Capitalism maintains that the higher the risk, the higher the payoff.  Highly unstable 
public institutions in the depopulated and economically weakened cities of the Rust Belt present 
risk opportunities with significant potential upside.  The analysts at Moody’s certainly need not 
be reminded that lower credit ratings come with higher interest returns, though considering their 
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role in the Great Recession, they perhaps need reminding that systemic risk can also be 
catastrophic.80   
Indeed, scholars specializing in education finance have drawn alarming comparisons 
between the housing crisis and the increasing concentration of charter schools.  The aggressive 
promotion of charter schools by local, state, and federal authorities despite their inherent credit 
risks and with little meaningful oversight strongly resembles the government’s aggressive 
promotion of home mortgages issued by the financial industry and the similar abdication of its 
regulatory responsibilities.81  As with the housing market, though, until the bubble bursts, there is 
money to be made.  Most traditional public schools finance their facilities costs through general 
obligation bonds.  These bonds are inherently low-risk because they are usually only issued 
following an approved ballot referendum and are guaranteed by the municipal government.  
Voter and municipal support means they are typically low-risk, low-return investments for the 
financial firms that purchase public debt.  Because charter schools cannot levy taxes like a local 
school board, their bond ratings are much lower than general obligation bonds and, therefore, 
carry higher rewards (in the form of interest) for their higher risk.82  Baker and Miron argue that 
the interest rate difference between traditional public school bonds commonly rated AA and 
charter school bonds commonly rated BBB- or BB+ is more than 1.5 percent, which can amount 
to substantial sums over time.  Charter schools have financed more than $1.2 billion in BBB-, 
around $1 billion in BB+, and over $4.3 billion in unrated debt since 1998.83  With debt this size, 
a 1-2 percent different in interest rates relatively quickly amounts to millions of dollars in 
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diverted education spending.  Moreover, with most of this debt not set to mature until after 2040, 
there is a substantial risk that the public will be left holding bad debts long after some or many of 
the charter operators that initiated such debts have gone under.84  Whether that debt is labelled 
public or private matters little.  With trillions in public funds used to absorb the fallout from 
reckless investing and mismanagement in the auto, housing, and banking industry, the public has 
little cause for faith that the state will not be called on to absorb the losses and shield the 
fraudulent investors and companies of the charter bubble should it burst.  
The problem is not just with charter schools’ higher financing costs.  As I previously 
mentioned, charter schools concentrating in urban school districts with pre-existing financial 
concerns and struggling local economies place greater burdens on the finances of those already 
struggling traditional public schools, hence Moody’s warning against increasing charter 
concentration in depopulating and deindustrialized Rust Belt cities.  When charters exacerbate 
local public financing issues, those municipalities’ bond rating degrades, and their interest rates 
increase in what Baker and Miron call a “lose/lose deal.”85  Such public financing “losses” 
extend beyond their purely fiscal dimensions.  Voter approval of tax levies proposed by 
democratically elected school boards provide a greater degree of public oversight of public 
funds.  Certainly, there are problems with those funds often coming from regressive forms of 
taxation—those that disproportionately burden low-income people—like sales taxes, lottery 
funds, “sin” taxes, and licensing fees, but there is at least the semblance of local control of 
schools and public oversight of their funding.  Since charter schools are governed by unelected 
boards and often receive money directly from the state, any degree of public oversight is buried 
within the arcane statutes and formulas of state aid disbursements and is hardly consistent with 
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anyone’s definition of local control, which is why the State Supreme Court of Washington found 
charter schools unconstitutional. 
 In addition to the loss of local control and democratic oversight, there are several 
important educational consequences for financing “public” charter schools through higher 
interest bonds.  The most obvious problem is that higher interest rates require a greater portion of 
the school’s budget devoted to nonproductive debt payments (higher interest rates and financial 
transaction fees) rather than to instructional (teachers’ salaries, special education services, 
enrichment and fine arts programs, etc.) or physical infrastructure improvements.  Charter 
schools already enroll fewer students with special needs86 and English Language Learners87 and 
devote a greater portion of their funding to administrative costs than traditional public schools; 88 
therefore, greater interest payments and fees flowing to the owners and brokers of charter school 
debt means that charter schools devote a significantly lower proportion of their budgets on actual 
instructional costs, particularly when those costs involve students who are more expensive to 
educate.  Further, the ELL and students with special needs in charter schools face an increased 
risk of their schools reducing services in quantity or quality to cover higher debt expenses.  All 
charter school students, in fact, face such pressures as charter schools attempt to reduce labor 
costs by hiring less experienced teachers, increasing student-teacher ratios, and reducing the 
number of nonacademic services.89  In theory, the same concerns exist for students in traditional 
public schools, yet those districts typically have lower interest payments, educate more cost-
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intensive student populations,  and have clearer governance structures and paths to legal action 
when traditional public schools fail to provide legally guaranteed services adequately.   With 
charter schools concentrating in areas of racialized poverty where those educational costs are far 
greater than in more affluent suburban and rural areas, the result of charter debt is students with 
the greatest educational needs receive the least in proportional instructional spending.  This 
despite charter school movement’s continual appeals to putting “students first.” 
 In addition to diverting funds from instructional spending toward higher interest rates, 
charter schools incur their high-interest debt largely through higher facilities costs.  Charter 
advocates have argued for greater state and federal funding earmarked specifically for facilities 
costs, but here again, the perennial argument about what constitutes an actual public institution 
reasserts itself.90  Charter advocates want to increase public funding and access to public 
facilities while retaining essentially private governance structures, labor relations, and 
operational opacity.91 Like the ride-sharing darling Uber reclassifying itself as a communications 
company to avoid the regulations imposed on traditional cab companies, charter schools are 
public only so far as such a designation fuels their market growth.  When ProPublica investigated 
a string of charter schools operated by the for-profit Education Management Organization 
(EMO) National Heritage Academies, it found local appointed boards had little understanding of 
how the funds they transferred to National Heritage were spent.  Rather than governing the 
charters, the boards existed simply to lend the appearance of legitimacy and regulation.  State 
auditors, seemingly vested with the authority to audit public institutions like “public charter 
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schools” found much to their surprise they lacked the authority to audit privately-run 
management firms that operated those “public charter schools.”92   
Similarly, in profiling several of the nation’s most charter-saturated education markets 
(Washington, D.C., Detroit, Columbus, Dayton, Cleveland, Kansas City, Newark, and 
Philadelphia), Bruce Baker found many of the country’s most predatory for-profit EMOs 
including National Heritage Academies, White Hat Management, and Imagine Schools have the 
greatest presence in these highly competitive markets.93  Imagine Schools is an especially 
egregious example of how for-profit EMOs profit off of charter school facilities.  Before the 
Missouri Board of Education forced Imagine, Inc. to close its six schools in St. Louis in 2012, 
the for-profit franchise had enrolled 3,800 students or about 10 percent of all public school 
students in the city.  Imagine expanded aggressively in St. Louis, opening one school in 21 days, 
and kept costs down by overcrowding students and neglecting health and safety codes.94  
Imagine used a subsidiary organization called SchoolHouse Finance to acquire properties, 
upgrade the facilities, then flip the properties (for a sizable profit) to a Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) called EPR (Entertainment Properties of Kansas City) that specializes in property 
management of charter schools and movie theater chains.95  Imagine Inc., having already made a 
profit from its original property purchase, would then pay exorbitant rent to EPR using public 
funds that were supposed to be spent educating St. Louis’s low-income black students.  As I have 
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already explained, charter schools already spend more per pupil on infrastructure costs than 
traditional public schools.  Imagine Academy of Careers, Imagine Academy of Environmental 
Science and Math, and Imagine Academy of Academic Success spent 20.6, 16.4, and 14.7 
percent of their respective state revenues on rent.  For comparison, City Garden Montessori, a 
locally-run charter spent 3.7 percent of its state revenue on rent.96   
Imagine Inc.’s dealings in Kansas City are hardly any better.  Between 2007 and 2012, 
Kansas City’s Imagine Renaissance Academy, spent only about 28 percent of its funding on 
instructional costs, well below the 65 percent national average.  Rather than enriching the minds 
of young students, the charter was enriching itself through its subsidiary SchoolHouse Finance 
by obtaining lower leasing rates but continuing to charge the board at a previous higher rate.  The 
board was so clueless about its own regulatory responsibilities that it did not even know 
SchoolHouse Finance was owned by Imagine Inc.  The board’s naiveté was, however, no 
random stroke of luck for Imagine Inc.  Imagine had stacked Renaissance’s board with those 
who would not ask too many questions.  Those who did inquire into Imagine’s dealings were not 
around for long because Imagine had obtained “pre-signed undated resignation letters from board 
members at the time they joined the board so that board members could be expelled at any time 
he or she exerted too much authority.”97  Such is the power of the market to bring innovation and 
“what works” to struggling urban districts.  Surely there are some who would argue the market 
has worked in a sense.  Imagine Inc.’s Kansas City and St. Louis schools were closed, and 
despite the considerable sums they extracted from public coffers through the exploitation of 
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public school children and their families, they failed within those markets.  However, Imagine 
remains one of the largest charter management organizations in the country with over 33,000 
students and maintains a presence in 11 states and D.C., including Rust Belt states such as Ohio.  
In 2015, following the rather embarrassing ruling from the federal judge in the Kansas City case, 
Imagine’s founder, former co-founder and CEO of energy giant AES Corp., Dennis Bakke and 
his wife Eileen “generously gifted their entire ownership of Imagine Schools, Inc. to Imagine 
Schools Non-Profit, Inc., making it possible to complete Imagine Schools to a non-profit 
entity.”98  No doubt the Bakke’s “generosity” will be rewarded by the new non-profit’s CEO, 
Barry Sharp, the former president of Imagine’s property holding company SchoolHouse Finance.  
Struggling urban school districts in the racially segregated, depopulated, and 
deindustrialized Rust Belt can scarcely afford to handle their own various operational and 
funding crises without added threats posed by charter schools’ draining public funds through 
high-interest bonds and property scams.  Even honestly and responsibly managed charter schools 
create redundancies within the “public” school systems and deprive many already overburdened 
districts of potentially necessary economies of scale.  Moody’s, hardly a socialist agitprop 
agency, admits charters are an especially dangerous idea in the economically contracting cities in 
which they concentrate.  Why, then are these Rust Belt cities the very place they concentrate 
when common sense and hard evidence militates against such a location?  As was the case with 
New Orleans, capital thrives on crisis.  Although the charter takeover of New Orleans was a 
unique opportunity brought on by a natural disaster, the Rust Belt presents similar opportunities 
brought on by the slower, but no less severe, ebbs and flows of capital.  Occasionally, more 
forthright motives bubble up through the wash of platitudes of “empowerment through choice” 
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and “innovations that produce results.”  One such example came during the ten-year anniversary 
of Hurricane Katrina.  Betsy DeVos, Michigan’s billionaire school privatization financier and the 
U.S. Secretary of Education was hosting a conference through her dark-money lobbying group 
American Federation for Children.  Rebecca Sibilia, CEO of the education reform nonprofit 
EdBuild, made the following comments during a panel discussion: 
When you think about bankruptcy…this is a huge opportunity for school districts.  And 
this is something that EdBuild is going to focus on.  Like bankruptcy is not a problem for 
kids; bankruptcy is a problem for the people governing the system, right?  So, when a 
school district goes bankrupt all of their legacy debt can be eliminated.  And when we are 
answering questions…like how are we going to pay for the buildings, how are we going 
to bring in new…operators when there is pension debt?  Like if we can eliminate that in 
an entire urban system, then we can throw all the cards up in the air, and redistribute 
everything with all new models.  And so, you’ve heard it first:  bankruptcy might be, like, 
the thing that leads to the next education revolution.99 
 
The Rust Belt is the primary laboratory of neoliberal education experimentation.  Much like 
neoliberal theory coming out of the Chicago school was first tested in the Global South by 
reactionaries like Chile’s Pinochet before Reagan and Thatcher imported it back to its 
birthplaces, the full marketization of public education is being tested first in the majority-black 
space of New Orleans and more systemically in the hypersegregated and deindustrialized spaces 
of the Rust Belt.  Whether it will remain in those spaces is difficult to tell.  However, just as 
Arne Duncan took Chicago’s program of closing traditional public schools in majority-black and 
low-income neighborhoods and replacing them with charters to the national scale as Secretary of 
Education, the Midwestern model of targeting majority-minority districts for privatization 
appears poised to intensify under the Betsy DeVos’s leadership.  As a national leader in school 
choice, Michigan is also a national leader in charter school corruption.100  With her husband’s 
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family’s fortune coming from Amway, a multi-level marketing scheme with a sort of prosperity 
gospel message, and her brother’s success founding and running the mercenary military 
contractor Blackwater USA, DeVos is an ideological thoroughbred of hard-right neoliberalism.  
It is reasonable to assume that, as U.S. Secretary of Education, DeVos will advance a public 
policy portfolio that will not only further the expansion of urban charter schools but also the 
deregulation of public education through various forms of privatization that have been mostly off 
the federal policy table for the last few decades.  In 2000, her family spent $5.6 million dollars in 
their failed effort to expand school choice in Michigan by legalizing public school vouchers. 101  
In promoting a national school voucher program, DeVos has a powerful ally in Vice President 
Pence, who as governor of Indiana, expanded his state’s voucher program to the largest in the 
country at over 32,000 students.102  Ohio has multiple smaller voucher programs that 
cumulatively outnumber Indiana’s voucher recipients, yet Indiana remains the largest unified 
program, followed closely by Wisconsin.103  Taken together, there is every reason to believe that 
Midwestern right-neoliberalism will fashion national education policy according to the 
privatization model it has spent decades forging and testing in the Rust Belt.  Although charter 
schools make up only 6 percent of public schools nationwide, federal education policymakers are 
now the very same people who have helped to push them above 30 or even 50 percent in the 
postindustrial heartland.  Should this remain the case during the next decade, pro-charter 
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consulting group Bellwether Education Partner’s prediction of 20-40 percent of public school 
students in charters by 2035 is certainly possible.104 
In this chapter I have argued that the charter school movement largely retains the rhetoric 
of educational equity and social justice; however, charter schools have a much closer 
institutional resemblance to private corporations that enter markets and grow by creating and 
exploiting opportunities.  Two of those most salient growth opportunities are racial 
hypersegregation and urban decline resulting from deindustrialization.  In exploiting such 
markets for growth, charter schools have threatened the future viability of public education by 
forcing traditional public school districts battling the effects of racial segregation and urban 
decline into market competition.  Such perpetual crises are created and maintained by the state 
through public policy.  Contrast the state’s role in financing and promoting charter growth and 
public education privatization with the previous era of desegregation funding and busing 
programs and you will see two very different approaches to redistribution.  From the Brown 
decision until the Reagan Justice Department’s dismantling of desegregation programs, the state 
created a significant equity-driven redistribution program that, although imperfect and 
inadequate, recognized institutional racism and systemic abuse inflicted on majority-black urban 
school districts.  With the advent of charter schools and their quasi-public financing structures 
and high-interest bonds, the state is similarly engaged in a program of public fund redistribution, 
only this time, the funds are redistributed upward to those who hold charter school debts or the 
properties those debts finance or both.  Harvey posits that this redistributive reversal is 
characteristic of the neoliberal state’s drive toward accumulation by dispossession in which the 
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ruling class recaptures physical, institutional, and conceptual space from lower class gains won 
under regimes of social democracy.  The neoliberal state “does this in the first instance through 
pursuit of privatization schemes and cut-backs in those state expenditures that support the social 
wage.  Even when privatization appears as beneficial to the lower classes, the long-term effects 
can be negative.”105  The conversion of pubic assets (whether funds or physical space) to private 
assets either through higher bond debt or facilities poses an existential threat to traditional public 
schools in segregated and declining urban spaces.  Even if this trend could be reversed—and 
again, evidence points decisively towards intensification rather than reversal—charter schools 
and education privatization has already captured the institutional bureaucracies and conceptual 
space of public education.  By this, I mean that charter schools and neoliberal education reform 
has bipartisan support at every level of bureaucracy.  Conceptually, education reform resembles 
Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal TINA thesis:  There Is No Alternative at the level of public 
policy.  Many charter school advocates undoubtedly have good intentions, and many parents 
who choose charter schools, especially from within circumstances where no real meaningful 
choices exist, are by no means enemies of public education.  However, privatizing education will 
invariably occlude nonmarket justifications of public education.  Indeed, this largely seems to 
have already occurred.  The notion that the state should invest in public education out of a 
commitment to furthering human dignity and the common good is anachronistic and drowned 
out by the chants of “college and career readiness.”  Robust concepts of equity have lost out to 
thin slivers of opportunity.  If a reversal, or more crucially, a new path is to be cleared for urban 
education policy, the paradigmatic neoliberal state must cease to exist.  Urban education policy, 
the anchor for all education policy, inevitably reflects the state’s approach to urbanization writ 
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large.  Before commencing the long march through the institutions to effect change, it is 
necessary to understand the ideology that governs those institutions and shapes and reshapes 
those spaces.  It is to urban neoliberalization that I turn in Chapter Two.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
NEOLIBERALISM, CLASS ACCUMULATION, AND DISCIPLINE 
Neoliberalism has meant, in short, the financialization of everything. 
        -David Harvey106 
 
To understand the effects of urban neoliberalization on public education and charter 
school concentration in St. Louis, it is necessary to bring some theoretical clarity to a concept 
that permeates the previous chapter’s analysis of charter schools and urbanization and will be a 
theoretical touchstone for each subsequent chapter.  Neoliberalism is a term that has come to 
represent myriad and sometimes competing critiques of the ways capitalism has changed as it has 
spread across the globe over the last four decades.  While I will not attempt to give an exhaustive 
account of its major theorists, this chapter will sketch neoliberalism’s major tenets and 
assumptions, its origins in and transformation of free market ideology, its revanchist response to 
the Keynesian liberal or social democratic welfare state, its perpetual mutations, and its 
uncontested status as the paradigmatic form of urban (re)development and governance.  By 
exploring each of these facets of neoliberalization, I ground the previous chapter’s description of 
charter school concentration in Rust Belt cities such as St. Louis in the larger theoretical context 
of late capitalism.  My central claim within this chapter is that neoliberalism’s market 
ideology/idolatry can remain highly differentiated and contradictory without abandoning 
structural concerns of class power and capital accumulation.  In fact, neoliberalism’s 
contradictions and accumulation imperatives help to explain the reckless charter school 
concentration described in the first chapter as well as the broader ideological terrain within 
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which St. Louis’s education and urban (re)development policies have taken place.  These latter 
concerns serve as the basis for the subsequent chapters’ critical policy analysis of St. Louis’s 
public education reforms and urban neoliberalization. 
As its name suggests, neoliberalism is the political economic progeny of liberalism, 
whose founding fathers included social contract theorists like John Locke and free market 
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.  Classical liberal thought holds that human 
liberty is best secured through a social contract with a limited government that provides little 
beyond the necessities of free trade such as establishing a common currency, adjudicating 
contract disputes, and perhaps providing for military defense against hostile foreign or domestic 
powers.  Freedom for classical liberals is inseparable from the right of the individual’s 
autonomous pursuit of self-interest undergirded by the sovereignty of property ownership.  
Individuals are free to enter whatever contracts they see as aligned with their property interests, 
or as Thomas Jefferson would have it, their pursuit of happiness.   
Competing notions of what we mean when we say freedom have driven political theory in 
the modern era and the development of various iterations of liberalism.  Classical liberals favor 
negative freedom, a freedom from rather than what they see as more prescriptive positive notions 
of freedom to.  Interventions by the state or any other institutional body (e.g. religious hierarchy) 
into private life and market transactions infringe upon the individual’s right to define and 
advance his or her political economic interests.  Indeed, the language of rights, specifically 
property rights, lies at the heart of liberalism.  Negative freedom’s maximization of individual 
property rights and minimization of institutional interference is the theoretical basis of free 
market economics.   
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The forefathers of economic liberalism, particularly Smith and Ricardo, were convinced 
that economics was an empirical natural science like Newtonian physics.  The mathematical 
formulae used to describe market forces were, on this view, analogous to equational descriptions 
of gravity.  The freedom to flourish in the market, therefore, corresponds to human nature.  
Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe renders liberal economics as art.  Upon finding himself 
shipwrecked and forced to live in the “state of nature,” Robinson flourishes by economizing his 
island according to the laws of capitalism.  He makes an inventory of his assets, regiments his 
time, and domesticates his environment through primitive agriculture.  His is not a tale of the 
perils of seafaring but of the freedom of man to govern himself and the environment according to 
the “natural” laws and processes of capital accumulation.  Karl Polanyi authoritatively refuted 
the naturalization of liberal economics, arguing that liberal economics had not discovered 
universal market laws.  Rather, liberalism universalized the social relations of productions 
particular to modern capitalist nation-states of Western Europe by ignoring the fact that nearly all 
societies existing in less “civilized” places and times organized themselves differently.  Polanyi 
maintains that economic factors always limit social organization, yet “Nineteenth-century 
civilization alone was economic in a different and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on 
a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly in 
everyday life, namely, gain.  The self-regulating market system was uniquely derived from this 
principle.”107  As liberals (etymologically “those who are free”) reorganized their own 
societies—and those of less civilized peoples—around individual gain within the framework of 
the capitalist nation-state, they did so under a political philosophy that erroneously saw 
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capitalism as a process for raising human kind to its natural state.  To this day, mainstream 
economics remains largely wedded to the idea that its organizing principles reflect the immutable 
laws of nature. 
The problem with mistaking the laws laissez-faire capitalism with the laws of nature, as 
Polanyi exposes, is that the “free market” has never and indeed cannot exist without the help of 
the capitalist nation-state in defining and enforcing the social relations of commodity exchange.  
Commodities are goods produced specifically for sale in markets.  This is not unique to 
capitalism but has been true under every form of political economy in human history.  
Capitalism, however, requires the commoditization of goods that were never previously 
considered commodities, namely land, labor, and money.  These three elements are essential to 
capitalist markets, yet it is obvious to anyone that they were not produced for sale in a market in 
the way a pair of shoes or a loaf of bread is.  For land, labor, and money to be bought and sold as 
other commodities are in a market, the state must first organize society around the regulation of 
these “fictitious commodities,” and the state must continually intervene to maintain and stabilize 
these fictions.  Polanyi contends, “no society could stand the effects of such a system of crude 
fictions even for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its 
business organization was protected against the ravages of [the] satanic mill” of the unregulated 
market.108  Capitalism exhausts resources and thrives on scarcity.  With each capitalist striving 
toward monopolization and market saturation, capitalist competition itself becomes impossible 
without state regulations and interventions.  A truly unfettered market would exhaust both land 
and labor to the point that society could not reproduce itself and money would cease to hold 
value.   
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Once capitalism industrialized, it became clear that the state would have to intervene 
significantly on behalf of the labor commodity, since so many capitalists’ freedom was gained by 
the enslavement (wage or chattel) and degradation of their fellow human beings.  Utopian 
thinkers like Henri de Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, and Charles Fourier attempted to create new 
models of social organization that humanized industrial production, while radical critics such as 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Karl Marx presented robust intellectual challenges to the “natural” 
science of bourgeois liberal economics.  Liberalism itself underwent a change as thinkers like 
John Stuart Mill and later John Maynard Keynes challenged the tyrannical nature of free market 
capitalism.  Freedom for these social liberals, especially Keynes, was conceived as more 
egalitarian and social than unrestricted and individual.  Classical liberalism’s conception of 
human nature was radically decontextualized from actually existing forms of political power.  It 
could hardly be argued that those born into the bondage of slavery and poverty would ever be 
able to exercise their natural human freedom in the same way as the scion of an industrialist.  
Equality of opportunity became the mantra of this new form of welfare or social liberalism.  
   Keynes was especially influential in advancing social liberalism in economic policy.  
Unlike Marx or Proudhon who rejected the necessity of capitalism’s class hierarchies and 
inherent antagonisms, Keynes believed the state could broker a compromise between the 
capitalist class and working class that advanced the interests of both.  Keynesian economics 
posits that it was not the minimally regulated market that brought stable and widespread 
economic gains but the properly regulating and redistributive state that promoted capitalism’s 
stable long-term economic growth.  In a sense, Keynesian economics attempts to save capitalism 
from capitalists by maintaining a well-regulated social order that provides capitalists with things 
they both need and cannot maintain without state intervention:  effective demand and social 
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stability.  Capitalists need both laborers and consumers to generate profits.  They can increase 
profits by lowering wages, but if all capitalists pay poverty wages, then no one will have the 
money to continue producing and consuming goods.  When massive swaths of society cannot 
purchase necessities, revolutionary conditions arise that are, to say the least, bad for business.  
Capitalist competition, though, discourages voluntary increases in wages and standard of living; 
therefore, state regulations (e.g. labor laws or a minimum wage) allow capital to preserve 
competition without eroding effective demand.  Also, during times of financial crisis, the state 
can inject money (e.g. Fed policy following the Great Recession) and create jobs (e.g. the Works 
Progress Administration) when capital contracts to preserve individual and institutional wealth.  
In exchange for a portion of its surpluses redistributed by the state through taxation and social 
programs, capital enjoys social stability and benefits from state expenditures like education and 
infrastructure.  With social liberalism, the core of capitalism’s beloved rights discourse and 
individualistic pursuit of gains is preserved, but following the Great Depression and the 
widespread adoption of Keynesian policies, it was “embedded” within “a web of social and 
political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other 
instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy.”109  The embedded liberalism of the 
Keynesian compromise dominated the middle of the twentieth century from the end of the Great 
Depression until the stagflation of the 1970s and the ascendency of neoliberalism.   
Although social liberalism held sway in federal policy for much of the twentieth century, 
it never fully eclipsed free market theory.  While the U.S. was applying Keynesian solutions to 
dig out of the Great Depression and fuel the broad economic growth of the American trente 
glorieuses (1945-1975), Europe faced competing forms of totalitarianism in fascism and 
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Stalinism.  Free market economists Ludwig von Mises and his intellectual successor in what 
became known as the Austrian School of economics, Friedrich Hayek saw classical liberalism’s 
minimal state and maximal “freedom” as a counter to both leftist and rightest totalitarian 
regimes.  Whether Keynesianism was capable of increasing GDP, it relied on a strong state’s 
intervention in the market, which on their view, was an inevitable threat to human freedom.  
Attempting to find a synthesis between classical liberalism’s free market individualism and the 
failure of capitalism to respond to pressing social needs like poverty and housing, a colloquium 
convened around the American intellectual Walter Lippmann in 1938 for the purpose of 
reconstructing Western liberalism.  Both Von Mises and Hayek were influential at the Colloque 
Walter Lippmann, but the onset of World War II put a hold on the wider dissemination and 
policy instantiation of what had begun to be called neoliberalism.110  After the war had ended, 
Hayek convened a similar meeting in 1947 in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, from which a think 
tank and free market policy advocacy organization called the Mont Pelerin Society emerged.   
Hayek’s views on the antagonistic relationship between state power and individual 
freedom had found a receptive audience in the economics department at the University of 
Chicago.  The University of Chicago Press had published what would become Hayek’s most 
influential work, The Road to Serfdom, in 1944 after three publishers had rejected the 
manuscript.111  When Hayek established the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947, University of 
Chicago economists Milton Friedman and Frank Knight were among its founding members.  The 
Austrian School of economics had taken root in the U.S. as the Chicago School of economics, 
but Keynes’s influence and social liberalism was still dominant in the policy frameworks of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and later Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.  Following 
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Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 right-wing coup in Chile—supported by U.S. Cold War strategies of 
paramilitary support and antidemocratic socialist containment—the “Chicago Boys” had their 
first national stage on which to test their free market theories.  Ironically, it took the intervention 
from a foreign state (the U.S.’s CIA) and a brutal dictatorship notorious for suppressing 
dissidents for the “free” market to flourish in Chile.  After an initial economic boost from foreign 
investment in the new capital friendly country, Chile’s economy faltered during a regional debt 
crisis, and neoliberalism’s free market adapted by becoming increasingly reliant on an 
authoritarian state to manage the chaos of a now fully global capitalist market.112  With the 
election of Ronald Reagan in the U.S. and Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, the free market 
experiment that had been planned in the Global North and tested in the Global South was 
reintroduced back into the U.S. and Great Britain.113  
The reintroduction of neoliberalism in the U.S. and Great Britain was a repudiation of 
Keynesian policies.  Capital had become discontent with the Keynesian compromise and 
believed the state had become too bloated and labor too powerful.  Government programs and 
higher union wages, both of which had been instrumental in preventing a working class 
revolution during the Great Depression, were now seen as a drain on profits.  Technological 
improvements in transportation and communication made capital more mobile than ever before.  
Effective demand was, therefore, less of an issue for capital, since it had become much easier to 
tap into labor and consumer markets all over the globe.  Social liberalism had once again come to 
infringe upon capital’s right to seek unrestrained dominance in the market.  The rollback of 
Keynesian civil protections and social redistributions that began in the mid-1970s has continued 
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largely unabated whether the party in power is the Democrats or Republicans.114  Capital’s 
global consolidation of power and the waning potency of organized labor in the U.S. has made 
neoliberal the unchallenged policy paradigm for the last four decades, a timespan that has now 
surpassed Keynesian social liberalism.  It is now the socially redistributive Keynesian state that 
is the aberration and neoliberalism the new norm of capitalism.  
 
Ideological Flexibilization  
How then do we define neoliberalism when it is so shiftless and contradictory?  Why is it 
that the “free market” keeps tending toward either a “conservative” authoritarian state’s heavy 
use of military power or a “liberal” interventionist state’s privatization of nonmarket goods and 
services under the banner of equalizing opportunity?  David Harvey holds that neoliberalism is 
fundamentally “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade.”115  Essentially, these are the features of classical liberalism.  The neo, therefore, in 
neoliberalism, pertains, in part, to the often contradictory role of the state and the various 
methods it deploys to maintain the primacy of markets through centrally planned monetary 
policy (e.g. the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank), de/reregulating existing markets, 
and creating markets where they have not traditionally existed.116  For classical liberals, the state 
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by its very nature was an impediment to the natural order of markets and ought to play as small a 
role in the social relations of production and the markets as is possible for the maintenance of 
capital accumulation.  For neoliberals, perhaps even to the dismay of foundational thinkers like 
Von Mises and Hayek, the state takes an active role in deregulating and regulating the market in 
such a way that social redistribution of wealth is preserved.  The difference with neoliberal 
redistribution though is that it flows upward as the state assumes an active role in capital’s 
accumulation processes. 
The contortions of free market ideology in the neoliberal age are inevitable.  Free market 
theorists have no credible explanation for why concentrated authority in state bureaucracies 
threatens individual freedom while concentrated power in a capitalist class does not, especially 
when the capitalist class can redefine and redeploy state bureaucratic power to accumulate 
capital and increase wealth disparity.  The neoliberal era is, after all, marked by an explosion of 
repressive public-private partnerships such as private prisons, military contractors, and a 
collusive national security surveillance apparatus.  It is important, therefore, to see neoliberalism 
as more than just a political movement built around free market principles.  Instead, 
neoliberalism’s inherent contradictions are best understood as a flexible and pragmatic “project 
to achieve the restoration of class power.”117  If capital sees a way to restore the powers it 
compromised under Keynesianism and increase its profits by deregulating markets, it will do so.  
If it sees a path toward accumulation that depends on state intervention and state funding, it 
moves in that direction.  Harvey’s description of the tension between theoretical and practical 
neoliberalism is worth quoting at length:  
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The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has…primarily worked as a system of 
justification and legitimation for whatever needed to be done to achieve [restoration of 
power to elites].  The evidence suggests, moreover, that when neoliberal principles clash 
with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or 
become so twisted as to be unrecognizable.  This in no way denies the power of ideas to 
act as a force for historical-geographical change.  But it does point to a creative tension 
between the power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that 
have transformed how global capitalism has been working over the last three decades.118 
         
Viewed in the light of Reagan’s corporate tax cuts, the titans of the automotive and financial 
industries no doubt applauded his famous statement that the nine most terrifying words in the 
English were I’m from the government, and I’m here to help.  Did they still harbor those views 
when the Obama administration injected trillions of dollars into both industries in the wake of 
the 2008 recession?  Paradoxically, yes.  Rather, it is more accurate to say that both instances are 
manifestations of the same larger relationship between capital and the neoliberal state.  Both are 
examples of the state’s assistance in capital’s processes of accumulation and restoration of class 
power.  For Reagan, that help came in the form of deregulation and tax cuts that tore large holes 
in the safety net of social liberalism.  For Obama, that help came in the form of massive federal 
protections against criminal prosecutions and the loss of wealth for the one percent in the wake 
of the largest economic crisis in the U.S. since the Great Depression.  Such protections came at 
the expense of millions of working class Americans, especially those in nonwhite communities, 
who lost their homes and savings.  Reagan Era neoliberalism enshrined trickle-down economics 
wherein the economic benefits of deregulation would eventually make their way down to the 
working class.  The Obama administration’s response to the Great Recession was a sort of 
trickle-down rescue.  Rescuing the class and industries responsible for the crisis would protect 
the working class against further devastation if those industries were allowed to collapse, or so 
the argument went.  The social safety net stretched across the bottom of society was no longer 
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the apt metaphor to describe state intervention in times of crisis.  Neoliberal state intervention is 
more of a lifeboat that removes priority passengers off a sinking ship.  In its final analysis, 
neoliberalism’s market ideology is the ideology of revanchist class accumulation, not the 
ideology of individual liberties realized in a free market protected against state interference.   
 
Neoliberalism and Racialized Class Discipline 
Considering that neoliberalism is a means of consolidating class power and redistributing 
public resources as well as an ideology that legitimates those processes, it becomes clear why 
neoliberalism has come to mean so many things within academic discourse.  A totalizing system 
of class accumulation will look different depending on when, how, and where such accumulation 
occurs.  This is a crucial point for understanding the highly differentiated growth and crises 
tendencies of charter school concentration in St. Louis and throughout the Rust Belt.  The growth 
opportunities are at once locally specific and regionally thematic.  Put differently, neoliberalism 
is broadly consistent and narrowly adaptive.  It thrives in contradiction.  For example, charter 
concentration and neoliberal education privatization rely on the very system of public education 
they threaten to dismantle.  The threats of long-term instability are not a deterrent to short-term 
exploitation because capital will simply adapt its tactics will preserving its strategy of 
accumulation.  Wendy Brown captures neoliberalism’s Janus-faced contradictions and pragmatic 
opportunism in saying: 
This dappled, striated, and flickering complexion is also the face of an order replete with 
contradiction and disavowal, structuring markets it claims to liberate from structure, 
intensely governing subjects it claims to free from government, strengthening and 
retasking states it claims to abjure…It seeks to privatize every public enterprise, yet 
valorizes public-private partnerships that imbue the market with ethical potential and 
social responsibility and the public realm with market metrics.  With its ambition for 
unregulated and untaxed capital flows, it undermines national sovereignty while 
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intensifying preoccupation with national GNP, GDP, and other growth indicators in 
national and postnational constellations.119 
 
To this catalog of contradictions, I would add that neoliberalism relies on and abhors class-based 
politics, though under neoliberalism, it is the capitalist class that acts in revolutionary solidarity.  
The systematic dismantling of Keynesian social welfare policies and the aggressive subjugation 
of nonmarket facets of public and private life to market conditions and the profit imperative 
could only be the work of well-coordinated class politics.  Mobilized in constellations of industry 
and policy advocacy groups and able to dominate electoral politics at every level, the politics of 
late capitalism’s upper classes is contradictorily highly competitive and highly cooperative.  
Such organized political action, nevertheless, is the work of men and women (mostly men) 
extolling the virtues of individualism: personal responsibility and the sacrosanct rights to the 
fruits of their radically decontextualized labor.   
The famous Powell Memo, written in 1971 by former corporate lawyer and eventual 
Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., is as good an illustration of neoliberalism’s 
collective individualism as any.  The diligent stewardship of his own company’s affairs, Powell 
argues, is no longer sufficient to protect the capitalist’s prosperity and honest way of life against 
a tide of barbaric and largely ignorant leftists radicalized by their university education in the 
liberal arts.  Independent actions against such a tide would ultimately prove futile for the 
capitalist class.  Instead, “Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and 
implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of 
financing available only through joint effort, and in the political power available only through 
united action and national organizations.”120  Powell called for the collective financing of 
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political action to be coordinated through national and regional groups like Chambers of 
Commerce, which grew from a base of about 60,000 firms around the time of the Powell memo 
to over a quarter of a million a decade later.121  Realizing the importance of creating widespread 
ideological support for a class politics that by necessity pertains only to a small heavily 
privileged segment of society, Powell called for the establishment of pro-capitalist think tanks 
and the strategic placement of ideologically aligned professors in American universities. 122  He 
also pointed to the judicial branch as an underutilized resource for business, remarking that “with 
an activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary may be the most important instrument for 
social, economic and political change.”123  To bring the broader culture on board, he suggested 
strict monitoring and enforcement of pro-business programming or at the very least “equal time” 
given to proponents of free-enterprise to counter its critics.  With most of television 
programming under the control of a handful of corporations, coordination on that front would 
present few challenges, and the communication industry has since become increasingly 
consolidated in spite of the assumed fracturing and differentiation the internet makes possible. 
Harvey’s assessment that it is difficult to determine Powell’s direct influence on the 
propagation of neoliberal ideology seems correct as does his cautiousness in underestimating the 
memo’s influence.124  As a lawyer in a well-respected corporate law firm, Powell was surely in a 
position to advance capitalist coordination, and his subsequent appointment by Nixon to the 
Supreme Court—a seat he held for fifteen years (1972-1987) during the entrenchment of 
neoliberal policy at the federal level—put him in a prime position to make the courts useful to 
such a project.  Given the accuracy of the Powell memo in describing how the capitalist class 
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would coalesce around neoliberal politics, it is tempting to read the memo as the epicenter of 
capitalism’s tectonic shift.  What is more likely is that Powell was one of many who recognized 
the myriad opportunities for mobilizing the capitalist class against the Keynesian state.  His 
blueprint for how to do so and his position of influence in and outside of government were 
perhaps rare and highly effective but not entirely unique.  The class compromise of the New 
Deal was one of pragmatic self-interest, not beneficence or a sense of civic responsibility.  By 
the 1970s, the possibility for a different sort of response to social unrest arose.  For those who 
shared Powell’s class position and political perspective, social liberalism had emboldened the 
varied and often successful populist movements of the 1960s and the growing radicalism 
surrounding anti-racist and anti-imperialist politics.  It was not a class compromise but class 
discipline that would emerge as neoliberalism’s paradigmatic solution to social unrest.  
Class discipline can come as a carrot or a stick, and neoliberalism makes use of both.  
The dramatic rise in incarceration and the prison-industrial complex exemplify the repressive 
side of neoliberal class discipline and its particularly devastating effects on communities of 
color.  The withdrawal of the material benefits provided by the Keynesian state intensified the 
brutality of the neoliberalism’s reliance on carceral class discipline.  During the decade of the 
1990s, the number of families enrolled in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) fell 
50 percent while the prison population rose by 50 percent.125  This was not coincidence.  The 
message was clear: either the poor make themselves useful to capital accumulation by accepting 
the poverty wages of low-skill industries, or they will be subjected to the penal system, which 
had itself become a lucrative industry.  Soss, Fording, and Schram maintain that “welfare and 
criminal justice operations now function as integrated elements of a single system for managing 
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marginal populations.”126  Marginality here pertains to the inseparable dimensions of race and 
class, but as I argued in the first chapter, racial and class-based politics are also spatial politics.  
The political class carries out management and discipline of racialized class hierarchies through 
geographically specific policy regimes.  While it is true that neoliberalism has become the 
paradigmatic form of governance from local to global levels, it has done so in a highly 
differentiated manner.   
The tactical rollback of Keynesian federal protections has intensified this differentiation 
by creating space for local regimes to discipline the underclasses.  In other words, the absence of 
a centralized authority willing to protect marginalized groups and preserve the gains they 
achieved under Keynesian social liberalism has left those marginalized groups vulnerable to 
regional and local political blocs wishing to reassert their political and economic dominance.   I 
will return to neoliberalism’s relationship to geography later in this chapter, but for now, it is 
useful to show how neoliberal discipline, whether repressive or ideological, is geographically 
situated.  Soss, Fording, and Schram offer the following description of neoliberal class 
discipline’s spatial dimension: 
The disciplinary turn was driven by political mobilization and, in states and localities, 
took on different forms depending on who controlled political institutions.  Labor market 
conditions were equally important.  From the 1970s to the 1990s, benefit cutbacks and 
restrictive [ADFC] waivers were pursued most vigorously in states where benefit levels 
encroached on wages for low-skilled workers.127 
 
Low-skilled labor had no incentive to accept the conditions of low-wage jobs when the benefits 
of those jobs were comparable to those the welfare state offered.  Such wage encroachment was 
highest in areas with large populations of low-skilled workers and weak labor organizations that 
would otherwise drive up wages.  Rather than raise wages to make low-skill work more 
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attractive, capital was able to preserve its profit margins by getting the state to decrease those 
benefits, making remaining benefits conditional on accepting the poverty wages, and increasing 
the threat of incarceration when the first two incentives are insufficient.  Destitution and prison 
are persuasive disciplinary tools.  Anyone wishing to avoid them had to accept whatever 
conditions the market demanded. 
 We can see variations on this theme by looking at the geography of labor history, which 
can serve as a useful proxy for capital’s perennial need to discipline the working class.  When the 
U.S. Congress overrode President Truman’s veto to pass the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, capital 
had taken its first step in rolling back the labor gains under Roosevelt’s New Deal.  The first 
states to pass right-to-work laws were the former Confederacy and a few states in agricultural 
economies of the Midwest and Great Plains.  The historical reasons why these states espoused a 
political conservatism that championed their right to regulate their own labor pools free from 
federal intervention is self-evident.  Following the federal shift from Keynesian social liberalism 
to neoliberal class discipline, right-to-work has experienced a “great migration” up from the 
South.  The states that have passed right-to-work laws since the welfare and criminal justice 
reforms of the 1990s are Oklahoma (2001), Indiana and Michigan (2012), Wisconsin (2015), and 
West Virginia (2016).128  Ohio is yet to pass statewide right-to-work legislations, but as of 2016, 
local governments are free to pass similar laws.  Missouri’s Republican officials have had their 
past attempts at statewide right-to-work legislation thwarted by Democratic Governor Jay Nixon 
but have found success with Republican Governor Eric Greitens in 2017.129  With the exception 
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of Oklahoma, we see neoliberal wage discipline prospering in the same soil from which U.S. 
labor activism sprang: the industrial heartland and Appalachian coal country.  Excepting West 
Virginia and Oklahoma, we also see class discipline concentrating in the very same 
hypersegregated Rust Belt states in which charter schools have concentrated most heavily.  The 
racialized class discipline associated with “no-excuses” charter schools is, thus, strongly 
correlated with neoliberalism’s larger project of racialized class discipline.   
  Neoliberalism’s political devolution or decentralization of power down to state and local 
disciplinary regimes should not be understood as the federal government’s abdication of power.  
Rather the federal government is instrumental in propagating the discourse and policies of 
racialized class discipline utilized at the lower levels.  The Reagan administration’s systematic 
rollback of the Keynesian welfare state—the deregulation of business and finance, the tax cuts, 
the dismantling of civil rights legislation—was preceded by the candidate Reagan’s campaign 
promises to discipline the “welfare queen” driving her Cadillac and “young fellow” (modified 
from his Southern stump speech of “strapping young buck”) buying a T-Bone steak with food 
stamps.130  The thinly-veiled rhetoric was not the only thing sending a clear message that the 
federal government would clear the path to restore the power of local governments to discipline 
their racial underclass.  Reagan launched his campaign from Philadelphia, Mississippi, a town 
made famous by the Klan’s lynching of three civil rights activists: Michael Schwerner, Andrew 
Goodman, and James Chaney.  Lest repressive neoliberal discipline be mistaken for a partisan 
phenomenon, it is worth noting that Bill Clinton delivered strikingly similar messages, though 
with more temperate rhetoric, during his presidential campaigns.  He bolstered his candidacy by 
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highlighting his record as a tough-on-crime Southern governor who also promised to end 
“welfare as we know it” once he became president.131  In terms of policy, Clinton was even more 
successful than Reagan in utilizing welfare and criminal justice reforms to discipline the lower 
classes.  His 1994 Violent Crime Control and Prevention Act was the largest crime bill in the 
history of the federal government.  With his signature, Clinton laid the groundwork for the 
largest expansion of the U.S. prison population to date.132  The bill provided $10 billion in 
federal funding for new prison construction while eliminating federal funding for inmate 
education.133  Welfare reform came as promised in 1996 with the eminently neoliberal Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  PRWORA remade 
ADFC from a means-tested entitlement program into the time-restricted Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF), which the federal government disbursed as block grants to states that 
could set their own restrictions and sanctions for noncompliance.134  By replacing welfare with 
workfare, the federal government and subsequently state and local governments “reimagined 
[assistance] as a way to immerse the poor in a market experience and teach them self-discipline 
through paternalist direction and supervision.”135  Like education reform, welfare and criminal 
justice reform are thoroughly bi-partisan because they are essential components of class 
discipline, which transcends party affiliation in the neoliberal era.   
The genesis, growth, and concentration of charter schools mirrors the broader political 
devolution and consolidation of class power.  Like right-to-work legislation and the transition to 
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block granting development funds, charter schooling furthers the consolidation of local capital 
and political power.  Keynesian social protections slowed such consolidation through regulation.  
During the era of enforced desegregation, local economic and political elites were not as free to 
define an adequate public education as they were before and immediately after Brown.  As with 
the above examples of neoliberal deregulation and devolved policy frameworks, the federal 
government has assumed an active role in promoting decentralized charter growth and regional 
concentration.  In other words, the federal government did not just remove restrictions on 
subordinate political and economic powers, it facilitated their redefinition of social justice and 
educational equity in accordance with state and local interests.  As Chapter Four of this 
dissertation makes clear, Missouri’s power bloc of political conservatives vehemently opposed 
federally enforced desegregation busing in St. Louis and Kansas City.  Following the emergence 
of neoliberal education policy in the 1990s and its subsequent intensification, those same 
conservatives have joined with political liberals to facilitate charter school growth and the 
federal interventions that support it.  Conservative principles about the limited role of 
government are flexible insofar as government remains useful for consolidating class power and 
accumulating capital.  Likewise, the political center-left has fully capitulated to corporate 
interests, forsaking its unrealized goals of universal protections of public goods like education in 
favor of opportunities to assimilate marginalized populations into the very mechanism of their 
marginalization: the market.  Neoliberalism’s bi-partisan class alliance across levels of 
governance has eroded both the capacity to imagine and realize a common educational space.  
By transforming public education into a semi-private marketplace, citizens become either 
consumers or entrepreneurs.  Both these roles have historically been a burden rather than a 
means to empowerment or emancipation precisely because they subject marginalized populations 
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to the tyranny of the market.  Quality public education becomes a commodity the market agent 
must pursue rather than a right the public citizen demands.  Like all commodities, its value 
becomes tied to scarcity and its reform tied to the cycles of devaluation and revalorization.  This 
provides an important link to St. Louis’s policies and processes of urban educational and 
neighborhood revitalization explored in the third and fourth chapters. 
 
We Are All Entrepreneurs Now 
Always brand conscious, neoliberalism moderates its overtly brutal forms of repressive 
class discipline with discourse and tactics that are more positive and socially palatable, though 
no less ideologically ruthless.  Here the mantra of personal responsibility and atomized notions 
of freedom are particularly effective.  The neoliberal state disempowers forms of working class 
collective political action with one hand while promoting the narrative of individual 
responsibility for problems and concomitant solutions that are necessarily social.  The narrative 
of neoliberal individualism devolves class discipline all the way down to the individual.  The 
human being as a political animal, the homo politicus, is remade as homo oeconomicus the 
economic animal.  The struggle to direct the polis toward human flourishing is replaced by 
atomized individuals struggling to maximize their self-interest within markets.136  In this way, 
neoliberal governance, what Foucault called governmentality, subsumes politics within self-
regulating ideologies of control and discipline that permeates social relations and even self-
understanding. 137  In transforming social relations to market relations, neoliberal logic jumps its 
banks of a mode of statecraft and takes on epistemological and ontological qualities. 138  Truth 
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itself becomes contingent on its market viability, and as rational market actors, human beings 
reshape and reorient their lives around the fluctuations of such market “veridiction.”139  To 
borrow a phrase from Henri Lefebvre, neoliberal rationality is capital’s colonization of everyday 
life.140   
This dissertation argues the problem with neoliberal rationality is that it frames complex 
social issues like concentrated poverty in terms of radically decontextualized individual choices 
as though such choices were not conditioned by historical, political, and spatial factors that lie 
outside any individual’s control.  By individualizing politics, neoliberalism offers those born into 
concentrated poverty little beyond ideological fantasies of escape, the so-called “ladders of 
opportunity” which the poor must use to rescue themselves from their historical conditions.  
During his second inaugural address, President Obama invoked America’s civil religion of 
capitalism in stating, “We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty 
knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else, because she is an American; she 
is free, and she is equal, not just in the eyes of God but also in our own.”141  In light of such a 
statement, what could the bleakest poverty possibly mean except the geographic concentration of 
individuals who fail to understand properly their own Americanness, and by extension, their 
inherent freedom and equality?  Clearly, poverty is no obstacle for anyone who knows, really 
knows, she is American and, therefore, has the same chance to succeed as anyone else.  To be 
American is to be so radically free and equal as to cloak the myriad forms of unfreedom and “the 
bleakest” material and social inequalities with a threadbare sort of nationalism.  Here we see the 
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truth of Althusser’s claim that “ideology has no history.”142  The bleakest of poverty described 
here exists without having been produced.  It is a hazy backdrop from which the star, an 
American girl, emerges.  Time and space are paradoxically necessary and irrelevant.  
Americanness as described by Obama obliterates the historical political struggles that are 
supposed to provide the very ideational content of the trope of American perseverance in the face 
of severe obstacles.  The geography of her poverty is inconsequential, but the geography of her 
nationality is paramount.  This girl born into the bleakest of poverty need not concern herself 
with the injustice of her circumstances since the benefits of real and imagined struggles against 
injustices in the past are transferred to her by birthright as an American.  Obscuring the historical 
and geographic determinants of class is arguably the most effective form of class discipline.  
Less physically brutal than repressive forms of class discipline, dissolving the causes and 
solutions for poverty into tepid patriotism and individualism is also less honest.  Discipline 
achieved through the threat of starvation or prison is unequivocal about class relations.  
Discipline achieved by obliterating notions of class altogether is psychological class warfare. 
Devolving responsibility for poverty to the individual furthers the project of restoring 
class power by absolving elites from their responsibilities to the common good and by fostering 
ideological conformity to market logics.  When everyone thinks like an entrepreneur, there is 
little that could threaten the capitalist’s place atop the social hierarchy.  Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc 
Waquant refer to neoliberal discourse as “the new planetary vulgate,” noting the ubiquity of 
terms like globalization, flexibility, and the new economy and the telling absence of words like 
capitalism, exploitation, inequality, and domination.143 These omissions are instrumental in 
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maximizing the scope of neoliberal rationality that positions fairness and justice equal 
opportunity to advance individual economic interests within a highly exploitative class hierarchy 
while disregarding the evidence that, out of necessity, capitalism generates as much inequality as 
it does wealth.144  Shallow forms of labor and identity politics thrive under a regime of market 
rationality.  Political constituencies of race or class no longer demand participatory democracy 
and a more egalitarian economy.  They instead acquiesce to the logic of late capitalism and 
hustle for a spot among its upper echelons and better “choices” as citizen-consumers.145  
Neoliberal logic erases the demarcations of who (or what) are entrepreneurs and within 
what spheres they practice their entrepreneurialism.  After creating a wave of new regulatory 
agencies (e.g. the EPA and OSHA) and advancing Clean Water and civil rights legislation, 
Richard Nixon remarked, “We’re all Keynesians now.”146  Perhaps that might have seemed like a 
fitting description for very moment at which Keynesianism was making its last stand, but as a 
prediction, Nixon’s claim could hardly have been more inaccurate.  Following the neoliberal turn 
that Nixon facilitated and that characterized his successors in both parties and has come to 
permeate all levels of government, we might say instead, “we’re all entrepreneurs now.”  Having 
made markets the ubiquitous arbiters of value and extended their reach beyond traditional 
proprietary goods and services to all facets of life, neoliberalism requires both institutions and 
individuals to demonstrate their worth as quantitative return on investment instead of notions of 
justice or individual and common goods.  For example, early childhood education is good 
because it leads to more productive future workers and saves taxpayer money on remedial 
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education and incarceration.147  Neo-imperialist wars of aggression waged in petroleum 
producing countries are bad—at least after the first five years when broad economic benefits of 
defense spending have dissipated—because their costs leach into other sectors of the 
economy.148  No doubt those who make such economistic arguments would point to other more 
human benefits or harms, yet in the realpolitik of neoliberal statecraft and policy implementation, 
return on investment is the guiding principle. 
Within the entrepreneurial framework of neoliberal education policy, public schools 
justify their own institutional existence in market terms of efficiency and the returns of a 
workforce that is sufficiently college and career ready.  In other words, their viability as 
institutions is predicated on their capacity to produce what Louis Althusser would call properly 
interpellated neoliberal subjects.  Althusser in fact claims that schools are the most powerful of 
the several ideological apparatuses at the state’s disposal, having displaced the Church as most 
influential vehicle for perpetuating capitalist social relations.  Only schools, argues Althusser, 
have “the obligatory (and not least, free) audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist 
social formation, eight hours a day for five or six days of seven.”149  At the individual level, the 
state reinforces the ideal of homo oeconomicus who sees education only in terms of career 
                                                 
147 “The Economics of Early Childhood Investments” (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/early_childhood_report1.pdf.  
148 Dean Baker, “The Economic Impact of the Iraq War and Higher Military Spending” (Washington, DC: Center 
for Economic  and Policy Research, May 2007), 
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/military_spending_2007_05.pdf.  
149 Althusser, The Reproduction of Capitalism:  Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, 252.  Althusser’s claim 
that schools are the dominant ISA is no longer tenable given the power of communication technology and popular 
culture, which Althusser lists among the various forms of ISAs, to shape the subjectivity of young people.  For 
evidence, one need only look at the degree to which schools vacillate between championing and controlling 
students’ use of technology and social media in the classroom.  In many cases, individual and institutional efforts to 
integrate technology come off as rather desperate attempts to remain relevant both to capital and to the students 
themselves.  In this sense, schools are following rather than leading the dominant ideological apparatus.  While 
Althusser is correct that schools have a captive and impressionable audience for a considerable block of time, 
ubiquitous entertainment culture and mobile technology is never off.  Schools remain the primary vehicle for 
credentialing, and as such, have a sort of regulatory role in reproducing capitalist relations, but when it comes to 
identity/subjectivity formation, they simply cannot compete with communication technology and media influence.   
 82 
 
advancement.  By shifting higher education costs proportionally away from public sources 
toward private tuition and fees, the state decreases the viability of a university education for 
enlightenment purposes or any other reason outside of developing what Gary Becker refers to as 
human capital.150  The cultivation of the habits of life-long learning becomes less about the 
richness of one’s intellectual life and more about maintaining viability for an economic future 
defined by precarious employment, little or no labor protections, and the steady withdrawal of all 
protections previously provided by the welfare state.  A recent report from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research argues the U.S. has significant unmet work capacity within its aging 
population, with men between ages 70-74 working 39 percent less than the researchers estimate 
to be the capacity level.151  The researchers conclude that their findings could have significant 
implications for social security reform, confirming Brown’s argument that patriotic sacrifice for 
neoliberal subjects requires that they “bear up uncomplainingly in the face of unemployment, 
underemployment, or employment unto death.”152  As a consequence, formal education no 
longer justified as an endeavor to cultivate cognitive and social development for the flourishing 
of the individual and the broader society.  It is repurposed as a form of on-demand training by 
which the individual can develop and redevelop as human capital at all stages of life.  
Neoliberalism governs institutions according to merciless market logics that it governs 
individuals.  Organizing and governing nonmarket institutions in line with market demands 
naturalizes competition and places tremendous importance on even the most blatantly arbitrary 
systems of ranking.  Holding entrepreneurship as a supreme ethic leads to a false and socially 
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catastrophic faith that market competition inevitably clears out the weak or insufficiently flexible 
individuals and institutions like some sort of cleansing brushfire that makes way for new growth.  
Economist Joseph Schumpeter argued this was a natural cycle of capitalism transformation that 
“incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old 
one, incessantly creating a new one.  This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact 
about capitalism.  It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to 
live in.”153  On the institutional level of education policy, the neoliberal state facilitates this 
process of internal revolutionizing by creating and managing the perpetual threat of public 
school failure through the popular tools of austerity or accountability regimes.  The state brings 
schools that do not produce results according to the desired (if also continually shifting) metrics 
of accountability in line through threats of closure or takeover.  While both are real possibilities, 
the threats themselves are enough to discipline schools into conforming to and even embracing 
policies that do very little or nothing at all to address structural social issues like poverty, racism, 
and sexism that were manifest in the schools’ struggle to “perform.”   
 
Neoliberalism as a Global Process of Local Politics 
Marx opens the fourth chapter of Capital with a simple sentence that contains a complex 
idea: “The circulation of commodities is the starting point of capital.”154  Marx’s point here is 
one that runs throughout Capital.  Capital is not a fixed and stable thing; it is a process.  
Capitalism certainly holds to some basic ideological commitments and is characterized by 
regular patterns of development and social relations, but what is most regular (that is, most 
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reliable) is that development and social relations will be marked by unevenness and inequality.  
Capital’s stark geographic differentiation is evident in the disparities that often exist between the 
points of production and consumption, between the Global North and South, between the urban 
and suburban, and even between those who live on one side or end of a given street and those on 
the other.  This is because capitalism is not one uniform process but a dynamic system in which 
many different processes shape and are shaped by differing geographic and political 
circumstances.  As the dominant phase of capitalism, neoliberalism operates according to the 
same global processes of local differentiation. 
Neoliberalism stands in relation to globalization, but it the two terms are not 
synonymous, even if neoliberalism in all its iterations is what is exported across the globe.  Mark 
Olssen correctly states that “should neoliberalism not have replaced Keynesianism as the 
dominant economic discourse of western nations, [globalization] would still constitute a 
significant process.”155  One difficulty in understanding neoliberalism’s relationship to space is 
distinguishing local from global interests.  During capitalism’s Fordist phase, globalization was 
well underway, but industrial production anchored local economies and seemed as though it 
always would.  Manufacturers produced goods for a global market, but much of the production 
process was regionally embedded in parts manufacturers, assembly lines, and distribution hubs.  
This embeddedness profoundly affected how people within these regional economies understood 
public schooling and what they saw as, to use Weber’s term, their life chances.  Although part of 
a global economy, their local economy seemed stable and comprehensible.  The rise of 
neoliberalism and exodus of a regional manufacturing economy that had arisen only a few 
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generations before – imbued with both a psychological and architectural sense of permanence – 
has left many deindustrializing cities scrambling to define themselves for a less predictable 
global economy.  Brenner and Theodore argue, “Paradoxically, much of the contemporary 
political appeal to the ‘local’ actually rests upon arguments regarding allegedly uncontrollable 
supralocal transformations, such as globalization, the financialization of capital, the erosion of 
the nation state, and the intensification of interspatial competition.”156  The process of relatively 
rapid deindustrialization shows that local manufacturing economies were never as controllable 
as they seemed, but a heavily financialized economy is even less predictable and controllable 
than the Fordist economies of the twentieth century.   
The financialization of capital occurs when economic activity increasingly moves from 
circuits of productive capital to circuits of money capital.  In the productive circuit, capital is 
invested in the processes for producing commodities for sale.  This requires a great amount of 
fixed capital—investments required for the production process that are not used up and are often 
geographically anchored (e.g. a factory).  Finance capital is much more fleet-footed than its 
productive relative because it invests in other financial commodities (e.g. bonds or the notorious 
mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps) rather than in the production process itself, 
and in doing so, it avoids fixed capital costs and relative immobility.  In bundling mortgages and 
municipal bonds into investment products for sale across the world, finance capital further 
enmeshes the local and global economies.  The absurdity of this process was evident following 
the collapse of the housing market in 2008 when homeowners whose property values were under 
water tried to determine who actually owned their mortgage, which is another way of asking who 
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actually owned their house.157  Those who logically thought it was the bank that issued the loan 
were likely quite surprised to discover that their debt (and by extension, their house) was owned 
by a baffling array of institutions and investors all over the world.   Unencumbered by fixed 
capital and exchanging commodities that can circle the globe at speeds impossible for physical 
commodities, finance capital puts down very shallow roots in the local economies in which it 
concentrates.   
When local political entities compete with others to entice businesses in the neoliberal 
economy, they are increasingly courting highly mobile capital likely to stay only until a more 
favorable offer comes along.  This incentivizes ever more drastic forms of inter-spatial 
competition in the form of states and municipalities suppressing the labor costs of their own 
population and offering a host of tax incentives and zoning (de)regulations (e.g. abatements, TIF-
funded development projects, enterprise zones) that drain funds from public coffers.  This limits 
the ability of the public sector to provide quality essential services like sanitation, public health 
programs, safety, and education, which in turn becomes further justification for their 
privatization.158  Although attracting national and international businesses to invest in local 
economies seems like it would be a local municipality’s interest, when the process degrades 
rather than enhances the public infrastructure, it becomes clear whose interests are actually being 
met. The result is the vicious cycle of neoliberal austerity, which furthers neoliberalism’s project 
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of restoring class power through the upward distribution of public assets.  This dissertation’s 
third and fourth chapters illustrate this process in St. Louis, where over the last five decades, city 
officials have vigorously courted capital to the detriment of social stability and the longevity of 
its public school system.  Moreover, these chapters demonstrate that educational austerity is not 
just a consequence but an integral component of urban revitalization under neoliberal 
governance. 
As with all forms and phases of capital, understanding neoliberalism is a matter of 
understanding its processes.  For this reason, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell prefer 
neoliberalization rather than neoliberalism because the former, like globalization, emphasizes 
the phenomenon as a contingent process rather than a fixed state.159  Understanding 
neoliberalism as contingent, or path-dependent, foregrounds the importance of existing political 
institutions, local and regional economies, demographic uniqueness, historical conflicts, cultural 
practices, and myriad other ways neoliberalization works on and through a given space.  
Brenner, Peck and Theodore emphasize the difference between path-dependency and “purely 
‘ground-up,’ inductive or self-consciously ‘low-flying’ approaches to studies of neoliberalization 
that are sometimes associated with poststructuralist modes of analysis.”160  In other words, the 
complexity and heterogeneity of political economic structures should not be understood in such 
radically contingent terms that critiques of neoliberalization require the process be re-
conceptualized in every instance, nor is it sufficient to graft one critique onto a different context 
simply because both are manifestations of neoliberalism.  Harvey refers to path-dependent 
analyses of neoliberalism as acts of constructing a “moving map” that accounts for patterns and 
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stability as well as flux.161  In their efforts to synthesize neoliberalism’s global and hegemonic 
rationalities, patterns of uneven development, and policy transfers with poststructuralist concerns 
for multiplicity and contingency, Brenner, Peck, and Theodore theorize “variegated 
neoliberalization,” (VN) which:   
encompasses two foundational aspects of contemporary regulatory transformation: (a) the 
uneven development of neoliberalization—the differentiation and continual 
redifferentiation of market-oriented regulatory forms; and (b) the neoliberalization of 
regulatory uneven development—the constitution and continual reconstitution of 
marketized macro-spatial institutional frameworks, or rule regimes, which govern 
processes of regulatory experimentation and cross-jurisdictional policy transfer.162 
 
In paying attention to the ways that neoliberalization, as a mode of governmentality, develops 
unevenly as it moves through various political geographies containing different governing 
networks, variegated neoliberalization captures the nuance and heterogeneity poststructuralists 
find lacking in orthodox and many neo-Marxist analyses.  Additionally, VN takes seriously the 
ways in which capital structures uneven development through policies issuing from the macro-
level as part of its accumulation process.  Neoliberalism’s regulatory frameworks, therefore, 
reflect the same sort of dynamic processes and multiplicity of forms as capitalism.  Both change 
shape as they move across time and space, but that movement is, itself, reflective of class 
relations and profit motives that are totalizing and structural drives.  Both reflect contradiction as 
well as continuity. 
 One expression of neoliberalization’s continuity is the family resemblances of policies 
that have been transferred to different contexts.  A simple explanation for this phenomenon is 
that, in many cases, the same organizations and even individual actors move across multiple 
governance networks, bringing their policy tool-kit (perhaps more accurately catalog) with them 
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and adapting their solutions to fit (or not) the specificities of the problems at hand.  Individual 
actors move laterally (from one city to the next) or vertically (from city to state or federal) 
through contexts.  An example of the former who will be pertinent to later discussions of St. 
Louis is William Roberti, who went from “Chief Restructuring Officer” of St. Louis Public 
Schools in 2003 to a similar advisory role with Orleans Parish School System shortly before and 
after Hurricane Katrina and later to a public debt consulting position with the City of Detroit in 
2010.  The federal cabinet position of Secretary of Education provides examples of vertical 
movement through policy networks.  Arne Duncan scaled up his neoliberal restructuring of 
Chicago Public Schools to the national level, and Betsy DeVos is poised to bring Michigan’s 
privatization policy portfolio to the U.S. Department of Education.  Institutions similarly enjoy 
both lateral and vertical movement.  KIPP’s expansion from Houston to cities all over the 
country shows the lateral expansion of an education franchise, while Teach For America’s 
scaling up to a position of international influence as Teach For All demonstrates vertical 
movement.  
Peck and Tickell locate another explanation in the deliberate shortening of the time 
between articulating policy “problems” and enacting policy “solutions,” which leads to “a 
growing propensity to adopt ‘off-the-shelf,’ imported solutions in the place of the (usually 
slower) process of in situ policy development.”163  The manipulation of crises and real or 
contrived urgency is, no doubt, beneficial to policy elites who stand to profit either politically or 
financially or both from using in network providers when enacting these readymade policies. 164  
When this expedited form of politics goes awry, as it so often does, there is diminished 
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accountability within the complex networks of hired consultants, appointed managers, local and 
state regulatory agencies, philanthropic influencers, and the ground troops of bureaucracy who 
end up enforcing policies they played no role in creating and, in the case of teachers, are those 
most professionally vulnerable to the fallout.  Those most personally and politically vulnerable to 
the fallout are inevitably those who are furthest from the network actors politically and 
professionally: the (mostly) poor and non-white populations who are the perpetual targets of 
policy experimentation and so often its victims.  Lacking the economic and political power 
necessary to influence policy construction, these populations similarly struggle to find justice in 
the wake of its fallout.  
 
The Entrepreneurial City and the Politics of Urban “Revitalization”  
I have already touched on the fact that financialization of capital increases inter-spatial 
competition and destabilizes the long-term economic health of cities, but it is worth taking a 
closer look at the consequences of entrepreneurial rather than political urban governance.  With 
globalization eviscerating the U.S. labor movement, political elites—even or especially those 
aligned with the left—have embraced entrepreneurial solutions to local political struggles.  
Doing so has divorced electoral politics from class politics, since elections in the neoliberal era 
are contests of whose ruling class networks get to govern rather than struggles for working class 
access to the instruments of state power.   
 Neoliberalization naturalizes institutional and interspatial competition within the public 
sphere; therefore, institutional failure and local economic instability are presupposed rather than 
collectively resisted.  Robert Goodman presciently observed in 1979 that “As governments 
assume more and more of business’s financial risk, business, using government regulations, low-
 91 
 
cost government loans, and government contracts for its products, has been able to move toward 
greater concentrated power and more peaceful and cooperative ways of redistributing the 
country’s wealth among its own community.”165  This led Goodman to argue that it is not 
corporate capitalists but city governments—drawn into fierce intercity competition for the favor 
of corporations—that are the last entrepreneurs of late capitalism.  Goodman’s insight is 
important but only partially correct.  Neoliberalization preserves competition within the private 
sphere; it just devolves it down to individuals, or concentrates it within a few global providers 
(e.g. the communication industry, specifically internet service providers).166  Still, Goodman 
rightly points out that when governments (whether local or federal) assume responsibility for a 
huge portion of capital’s risk, they upwardly distribute the private profits from those ventures 
while socializing the consequences.   
When elected officials engage in entrepreneurial (rather than political) governing, the 
public-private partnership becomes their class weapon of choice.  Loading up the public side of 
the partnership with the risk and the private with the rewards means that the city itself must 
pursue economic development whatever its political or social costs.  To do otherwise would risk 
losing support from both capital and the public.  Harvey argues that this leads to a preference for 
place-based rather than territorial development.  The difference, in his view, is that territorial 
development focuses on the broader conditions that enhance local quality of life for citizen-
residents (e.g. quality affordable housing stock, good schools, reliable public transportation, 
pollution controls), whereas place-based development focuses constructing enticements for 
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capital investment, tourism, and citizen-consumers (e.g. industrial parks, sports arenas, shopping 
centers).167  Development of place over territory fits with the short-term cycles of elections and 
capital investment projects, and despite its usefulness as advertising fodder for campaigns and 
chambers of commerce, it often does little for long-term territorial improvements.  Many of the 
social issues city entrepreneurialism aims at addressing are decades in the making.  Short-term 
development of place usually leaves the underlying structural issues of the political economy 
intact, making civic entrepreneurialism ineffective but highly lucrative for those in finance, 
construction, and real estate who can position themselves to profit from each successive wave of 
tax-supported urban revitalization.  Whether or to what degree place-development benefits some 
residents is not the central point.  The larger consequence is that the urban environment is 
remade to satisfy the demands of capital and consumerism rather than stability, sustainability, 
and justice within the political economy.   
Shifting the focus from entrepreneurial place development to political territorial 
development would require elected leaders to confront the structural issues of capitalism that 
foster the racism, inequality, and uneven development at the heart of territorial instability.  Very 
few political leaders have the popular support to sustain such a confrontation of entrenched 
power regimes.168  Entrepreneurialism instead rewards those most willing to subordinate local 
interests to national and global interests that come and go as they please.  Peck and Tickell 
describe the tragic futility of this process:  
In selling themselves, cities are therefore actively facilitating and subsidizing the very 
geographic mobility that first rendered them vulnerable, while also validating and 
reproducing the extralocal rule system to which they are (increasingly) subjected…Thus, 
elite partnerships, mega-events, and corporate seduction become, in effect, both the only 
games in town and the basis of urban subjugation.  The public subsidy of zero-sum 
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competition at the interurban scale rests on the economic fallacy that every city can win, 
shored up by the political reality that no city can afford principled noninvolvement in the 
game.169  
 
Civic entrepreneurialism relies on the mobility of capital during its courtship phase; it must woo 
capital from where it is or where it was otherwise planning to be and convince it to relocate.  Yet 
capital is restless and disloyal, and the mobility that brought one city its favors is the same that 
will seek what it can elsewhere after the honeymoon phase is past.  Even success within the 
intense competition of urban entrepreneurism disempowers local leaders and incentivizes only 
more extreme forms of competition.  The analogy of addiction and withdrawal comes to mind.  
What eases the pain is the fix that makes the addict more vulnerable and dependent and less 
healthy over time.  In either case, with tax incentives and low labor costs being the most 
common ways municipalities sell themselves to capital, those who are already most devastated 
by deindustrialization or an otherwise struggling local economy are those who shoulder most of 
the burdens of civic entrepreneurialism.  It is their neighborhoods, their public institutions, their 
municipal services, their health and general quality of life that are risked in order to attract 
capital that will likely bring few if any tangible improvements to their lives, even when civic 
entrepreneurship succeeds.      
Although unstable in the long-term, civic entrepreneurialism seems almost too beset by 
its own contradictions to function even in the short-term.  Even in the finance-heavy economy of 
late capitalism, people still need to buy and sell physical commodities and local services for 
cities to sustain and reproduce their populations.  If cities disciplined wages and reduced public 
services to such a degree that they became almost unlivable, businesses would not build there no 
matter how sweetened the tax-incentives.  Some balance is necessary to continue to attract 
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business as well as consumers to relocate to a given city since a city without tax revenue cannot 
bear any entrepreneurial risk and is without funds to assist with capital’s relocation or startup 
costs.  But this is not a new problem.  It is not even essentially a problem unique to 
neoliberalism.  In fact, it is the very same contradiction Marx describes between capital’s relation 
to labor.  Capitalists maximize profits by minimizing the wages they pay to laborers, yet laborers 
make up most of the buyers of commodities and, therefore, are the source of profits at the point 
of consumption as well as production.  Increasing profits by decreasing wages ultimately 
decreases profits by diminishing purchasing power.  Marx further elaborates on the 
contradiction:   
the periods in which capitalist production exerts all its forces regularly turn out to be 
periods of over-production, because production potentials can never be utilised to such an 
extent that more value may not only be produced but also realised; but the sale of 
commodities, the realisation of commodity-capital and thus of surplus-value, is limited, 
not by the consumer requirements of a society in general, but by the consumer 
requirements of a society in which the vast majority are always poor and must always 
remain poor.170   
 
As I previously explained, Keynesian economics tried to overcome this issue by using state 
redistributions and worker protections to increase effective demand.  Capitalism, however, does 
not depend on profits but on growth of profits.  When it could no longer achieve profit 
maximization through compromise, it disciplined labor through mobility (e.g. offshoring or 
intranational relocations) or technology (e.g. automation) after the neoliberal turn.  Effective 
demand was propped up by growth through credit rather than wages, which led to even shorter 
cycles of boom and bust.  But it also meant that capital turned to rent-seeking practices and 
public sector privatization and the devalorization/revalorization processes of neoliberal urbanism 
to increase its rate of profit.  To simplify, capitalism’s growth imperative and mobility creates 
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poverty and then recycles that poverty through new cycles of reproduction with the help of the 
state.  What the “spatial turn” in critical theory exposes is that this production-consumption 
relationship does not just pertain to commodities like shoes and chairs but to urban space itself.  
Harvey writes, “Production here means the production of space, and realisation takes the form of 
capital gains on land rents and property values, thus generally empowering the developers and 
the rentiers as opposed to other factions of capital.”171  When the product is urban space itself, 
the same class processes lead to the same results.  The lower classes, who by necessity account 
for the greater population in the relations of production (i.e. workers must significantly 
outnumber capitalists) do not see the greatest benefits of and are vulnerable to their own 
overexploitation through the valorization process.  The state must intervene to manage 
overproduction and overexploitation.  When production centers on urban space itself, the 
neoliberal state’s intervention consists in assisting capital in extracting value from the city. 
 
Urban Neoliberalization’s Tools of the Trade 
Entrepreneurial cities court capital by subsidizing the costs of construction in several 
ways including infrastructure investments and zoning laws, but a dizzying array of tax incentives 
have become the hallmarks of neoliberal urban revitalization.  Among the most popular of these 
are tax-increment financing (TIF), tax abatements, and enterprise zones.  TIF occurs when a city 
issues debt in the form of bonds (long-term) and notes (short-term) for redevelopment projects 
within a designated area.  The bond money is used to subsidize upfront infrastructure, land 
acquisition, and construction costs.  The property tax rate is frozen for a given period of time 
(usually around 20 years), and a portion of the increased tax revenues that resulted from the 
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redevelopment is used to pay off the long-term debt.  In essence, the city borrows from future 
long-term tax revenues to pay for the short-term costs of redevelopment intended to revitalize the 
local economy and increase tax revenues.  TIF is more advantageous to the developer than a tax 
abatement, which simply reduces the developer’s tax obligation for an agreed upon amount of 
time.  With TIF, the benefits of the subsidy are upfront, while the developer must wait the length 
of the abatement term to realize the deal’s full benefits.172  Finance capital prefers TIF to tax 
abatement because TIF bonds can be bundled and sold on financial markets—yet another way to 
link local development with global capital.  Enterprise or Empowerment Zones (EZ) are 
redevelopment districts in which investors receive tax credits and abatements according to the 
size of the business investment in terms of both profits and jobs added.   
All three forms of tax incentives demonstrate the interdependence of capital and the state 
under neoliberal redevelopment regimes, but TIF requires even closer coordination in the 
accumulation process.  Because TIF borrows from future earnings to fund upfront costs, timing 
is far more crucial than with abatements, which involved fixed incentives regardless of the future 
rise or fall of property values.  Rachel Weber explains: 
If TIF designation occurs at both (a) the nadir of the value curve and (b) when there is 
initial speculative interest in the properties, TIF can maximize the surplus appropriated 
from the property.  Only a coalition of municipal officials and affiliated real-estate 
capitalists possesses both the local knowledge and the police powers to be the first 
movers in such a small window of opportunity.173 
 
Here the interwoven facets of neoliberal repressive and ideological forms of discipline are laid 
bare.  Urban revitalization is as ideologically driven and as disingenuous as neoliberalism’s 
                                                 
172 Kenneth P. Thomas, “A Primer on TIF:  What It Is, Why It’s Controversial” (The Sierra Club, November 2006), 
2, https://sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/sce/eastern-missouri-group/committees/TIFPrimer.pdf. 
173 Rachel Weber, “Extracting Value from the City:  Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment,” in Spaces of 
Neoliberalism:  Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe, ed. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 188. 
 97 
 
discursive fantasies of pure meritocracy and American exceptionalism.  Urban neoliberalization 
is about making cities more profitable, not more livable.  The collusion between the state and 
property redevelopers exists both during devaluation and revaluation.  The state’s subsidization 
of suburban development, racially restrictive zoning policies, racially specific policing practices, 
and various other practices define and devalue racially segregated working class space.  The state 
then works closely with capital to subsidize and revalorize that same space at the exclusion and 
expense of the people it confined there during accumulation’s first phase.  TIF requires that city 
officials and city developers become even more deeply involved and coordinated in this process 
because the processes of creative destruction are sped up.  Accumulation waits for no one.      
As public subsidies for private enterprise, all three of these neoliberal redevelopment 
tools have a prima facie contentious relationship to public school financing since every public 
dollar directed toward place redevelopment is a dollar that does not go toward public schools and 
other territorial developments that would mitigate systemic issues schools confront (e.g. 
childhood poverty, domestic or community violence, homelessness).  The counterargument is 
that, when place development is successful, the local economy improves and the quality of life 
for all residents (not just those who benefited directly from redevelopment) advances as new 
businesses spring up around redeveloped sites and tax revenues increase – a variation on the 
perennial “rising tide lifts all boats” argument.  The fallacy of this argument for at least two of 
these redevelopment tools should be obvious.  Enterprise zones issue state (and sometimes 
federal) tax credits for jobs added through that development as well as local property tax 
abatements.  Considering that around 90 percent of school funding comes from state and local 
taxes (with the local taxes primarily in the form of property taxes) abating those taxes for two 
decades or more is hardly a sound plan to increase school funds.   
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TIF projects are not very different in this regard.  Property taxes are frozen at a base 
level, so while they are not abated below the threshold of the year of the project they remain 
fixed for a period of 15-25 years despite inflation and rising public education costs as schools 
take on greater technology costs, more extracurricular social services like health care and 
nutrition programs, and a revolving door of state and federal accountability mandates.  Consider 
the rising costs that schools have incurred over the timespan of a 20-25 year TIF project 
completed in 2016.  Since the early to mid-1990s, schools have had to build and upgrade their 
entire technological infrastructure multiple times.  Expectations for a few computer labs have 
given way to expectations of one (or as close to one as is feasible) computer per student as well 
as an array of courses in programming, robotics, CAD, and other technology heavy offerings, all 
of which have had to be replaced multiple times over the last two decades.  Setting aside state 
accountability mandates, schools have had to adjust to two major federal overhauls of education 
policy since the 1990s, both of which have required massive investments in standardized testing 
materials and training.  Most states have seen an explosive growth of charter schools and neo-
voucher programs that redirect students and funds away from the traditional public school 
system.  In addition to these and many other curricular and policy shifts, schools have weathered 
the largest recession in eighty years.  The Great Recession led to sharp declines in state funding 
for education, funds which have still not been restored to their pre-recession levels.  Increased 
property tax revenues (the increment of TIF) resulting from the TIF development went directly 
into paying off the development’s debt, and any revenues beyond bond payments were folded 
back into a special allocation fund reserved for TIF projects.  In short, education costs ballooned 
while educational funding within TIF developed areas was stuck in the 1990s. 
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In addition to freezing property tax levels and redirecting the benefits of redevelopment 
away from public services and towards property developers, corporations, and financiers, TIF 
has drastically reshaped the built environment of cities and suburbs to reflect rather than mitigate 
inequality.  To maximize the benefits of TIF, city entrepreneurs look to development projects 
that are likely to generate the greatest incremental returns.  There is far less benefit in turning a 
blighted area with rock-bottom real estate values into a slightly better low-income neighborhood 
than there is in speculating on transitional neighborhoods with the potential for a surge in real 
estate value.  As Rachel Weber argues, “municipalities have had better luck demonstrating blight 
and engaging in redevelopment activities when they do not seek to implicate use values but 
instead focus on those areas where rent gaps are wide and where potential for revalorization is 
great.”174  One consequence of this is publicly owned properties in transitional neighborhoods 
become ideal opportunities for maximizing TIF’s benefit to developers since they exist as use 
value rather than exchange value, meaning they are unproductive as far as capital is concerned.  
Property, whether real estate or other assets, that could be generating profits but is not, is 
anathema to neoliberal logic.  When neoliberalization suffuses the public sphere with an 
entrepreneurial ethos, public property itself begins to look like wasted space.  Another 
consequence is that developers seek TIF incentives in neighborhoods where they already have a 
high probability of return rather than in those that TIF incentives are theoretically supposed to 
redevelop.  Developers can utilize TIF incentives for projects in already gentrified 
neighborhoods to reduce initial costs and maximize longer-term rental income in an environment 
of rising property values.  Such actions violate the “but for” provision of TIF agreements since 
development was almost guaranteed to happen and be profitable without the tax incentives, yet 
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as St. Louis illustrates, local developers’ capture of the political process ensures that neoliberal 
redistribution of public funds flows toward greed rather than need. 
In sum, the apparent chaos of neoliberalism’s many contradictions becomes intelligible 
when viewed as part of capital’s larger and ongoing project of accumulation.  In terms of 
statecraft, neoliberalism is the result of the capitalist class’s coordinated and reactionary response 
to the protections and provisions of Keynesian liberalism.  The retreat of the state from social 
welfare provisions and the rise of a hardened social Darwinian form of market idolatry suggested 
to many a sort of transitional or even schizophrenic state.  In 1992, around the dawn of the Third 
Way governments of center-left neoliberalism, Bourdieu claimed that “the left hand of the state 
has the sense that the right hand no longer knows, or, worse, no longer really wants to know 
what the left hand does.  In any case, it does not want to pay for it.”175  Such an analysis was 
plausible following the Reagan and Thatcher governments’ characterization of the Keynesian 
state as an incompetent behemoth trampling on the individual’s freedom and poised to rob 
Western nations of their economic vitality with their bloated entitlements programs.  But 
following the Third Way reforms of the 1990s, critical theorists began to see the left and right 
hands of the neoliberal state working in a sort of symbiotic relationship.  The two sides were 
certainly not ignorant of each other, and although their relationship appeared antagonistic, these 
antagonisms were the contrapuntal voices of capitalism’s endless opera.  The rollback of the 
Keynesian state through deregulation was the first phase that preceded the rollout phase of new 
forms of market governance and regulatory regimes designed to manage neoliberalism’s 
contradictions.176  Deregulation allowed for the creative destruction of public institutions and 
socially redistributive programs, which cleared a space for new “depoliticized” modes of 
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managerial or technocratic governance and upward redistribution of public funds in the form of 
public-private partnerships, austerity-privatization cycles, and capitalist welfare (e.g. bailouts, 
tax incentives, and fines in lieu of prosecution and imprisonment).  Instead of Hayek’s and 
classical liberalism’s free markets, both traditional markets and newly created marketplaces (e.g. 
public education or government healthcare programs) must be “engineered through explicit 
forms of political management and intervention and new modes of institution-building designed 
to extend the neoliberal project, to manage its contradictions, and to secure its ongoing 
legitimacy.”177  In this way, the left and right hands of the state are both integral parts of capital’s 
accumulation.  Peck and Tickell describe this process as a form of “‘metaregulation,’ a rule 
system that paradoxically defines itself as a form of antiregulation.”178  Capitalism has always 
relied on the state for its legitimacy and regulatory necessities, but the technological, geographic, 
and political complexities of the late 20th and early 21st centuries have forced the state into new 
logical contortions and perverse relationships in order to maintain the fictions and manage the 
contradictions of free market ideology. 
Although neoliberalism’s rhetoric is highly depoliticized and couched in the supposedly 
neutral and unquestionably virtuous language of market rationality, neoliberalism seeks to 
discipline the class and political constituencies that Keynesian economics and social democratic 
reforms had sought to shelter from the often biased and brutal “free” market.  Repressive 
disciplinary policies such as gutting welfare and food assistance, increasing incarceration, and 
closing “underperforming” schools in low-income and majority-minority neighborhoods exist 
alongside policy regimes seeking to obliterate critical analysis—particularly at the class-race 
nexus—by deploying fantastical meritocratic discourses laced with words like opportunity and 
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achievement and devoid of terms like oppression and exploitation.  Race and class, if they come 
up at all, are categorically separated and reconstructed within the discourse of human capital 
development within a pure meritocracy.  The result is a totalizing and self-rationalizing system in 
which ethical categories like justice or value are subsumed within market imperatives.  Appeals 
to the protection of human dignity against either exploitation or destitution are unintelligible 
outside of the market-oriented metrics of growth and return on investment. 
The “spatial turn” in critical theory developed by Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, and 
others has shown how market logic, capital accumulation, and class discipline structure and are 
structured by urban space.179  In theorizing spatial processes of class discipline and capital 
accumulation such as gentrification, Neil Smith describes neoliberal urbanism as form of 
revanchist politics.  Smith borrows the term from the French authorities’ brutal reactionary 
response to working class uprising against Napoleon III and the Second Empire, which 
culminated in the Paris Commune.  The short-lived but highly symbolic success of the Commune 
elicited a response from the state that went beyond seeking victory or even suppression of 
dissent.  It sought revenge.  Smith draws a parallel between right-wing populist nationalism of 
fin-de-siècle French urbanism, which sought to retake the city from the lower classes, and the 
neoliberal urbanism that has characterized Western cities since the 1970s.  In both instances, the 
state and capital colluded not to pacify the working class by making the cities into more humane 
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spaces.  Instead, they sought to retake urban space by force and discipline those who dared to 
challenge their authority.  Physical power clears the city, but ideological power remakes it.   
Neoliberal education reform, which I contend cannot be understood outside of neoliberal 
urbanism, follows this narrative arc.  After being forced to surrender its control over the physical, 
social, and political space of urban public education as a result of desegregation and socially 
liberal redistributions, the capital’s ruling class sought not just to retake that space but to 
restructure it according to its will.  In St. Louis, the deregulation and abandonment of civil rights 
mandates aimed at educational equity cleared the way for new regulations (e.g. charter schools 
and positivistic growth measurement and accountability regimes) aimed not at redistributive 
equity but at meritocratic opportunity.  Having chastised desegregation programs like magnet 
schools and busing as needlessly expensive and hopelessly bureaucratic, officials replaced these 
programs with what Kenneth Saltman refers to as new market bureaucracy.180  Despite neoliberal 
reformers’ and the revanchist political class’s rebuke of public schools for being beholden to 
“special interests,” it was property redevelopers who drafted and campaigned for the charter 
school legislation, which they saw as a new tool for neighborhood revitalization.  The new 
decentralized market bureaucracy has less transparent oversight and democratic accountability 
than ever before.  Charter entrepreneurs, property developers, and financiers have found myriad 
ways to divert public education funding from instructional spending to private accumulation, and 
the operation of parallel systems of public education has creative massive redundancies and 
inefficiencies in an era of public sector austerity.  Private accumulation and class discipline are 
the only efficient parts of the process.  While I do not wish to suggest that those who work in or 
send their children to charter schools are actively, consciously, or culpably participating in the 
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political class’s revenge against redistributive social liberalism, I am suggesting that charter 
schools as a national phenomenon and particularly within the context of St. Louis function for 
the purpose of disciplining public schools and their students and furthering the accumulation of 
capital and the restructuring of urban space according the market imperatives.  In support of such 
claims, I turn to critical policy analysis and a close examination of the end of desegregation in St. 
Louis and the attendant rollout phase of neoliberal regulatory regimes directed toward the class 
accumulation and consonant processes of spatial revitalization.  In doing so, I provide evidence 
of how education policy fits within a larger policy ecology of neoliberal urbanization, which in 
turn, provides an explanation for the concentration of charter schools in St. Louis and perhaps 
the broader interrelated phenomena of urban hypersegregation and postindustrial decline.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CRITICAL POLICY ANALYSIS AND URBAN SCHOOL REVITALIZATION 
 
 Having described charter schools’ concentration and market saturation in 
hypersegregated and deindustrialized cities in the first chapter and neoliberalism’s revanchist 
response to the Keynesian state in the second, I turn now to methodological concerns and 
analysis of the “actually existing neoliberalism” of public education reform in St. Louis, 
Missouri. 181  As the first two chapters evince, I maintain that movements to reform public 
education cannot be understood outside of political economy and neoliberalism’s effects on 
modes of governance and spatial restructuring of cities.  But how, where, and why 
neoliberalization occurs is a complex affair that sweeping generalizations about capital 
accumulation or governmentality do little to illuminate.  Eventually, critical responses to 
neoliberalization as a political project must contend with processes of neoliberal policymaking.  
But is there an important difference between politics and policy?  Of Europe’s global 
languages, only English makes a strong distinction between the two words.182  Policy is 
otherwise understood in terms of the procedural, statutory, or managerial forms of politics.  This 
closeness in meaning is sensible in terms of political economy.  If the modern democratic state 
has always been necessary for regulating and organizing the social reproduction of capitalism’s 
class relations and commodity production processes, then the symbiotic state-capital relationship 
is expressed through policy.  In other words, Marx’s claim that the state is nothing more than the 
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form and organization of the bourgeoisie depends upon policy as the practical instantiation of 
that theoretical arrangement.183  With the state taking a more active role in managing the 
contradictions of capital accumulation in the neoliberal era, academics have increasingly turned 
their attention to policy analysis.  After all, policy is integral to neoliberalism’s rollback and 
rollout phases.   
Policy studies as an academic discipline has not, however, always subscribed to Marxian 
conceptions of the state, nor has it shared Marxian modes of analysis.  Policy science emerged as 
a corollary of the Keynesian welfare state’s desire to rationally govern an expanding network of 
social services through social science research.184  Such traditional notions of policy analysis 
presumed that social problems had relatively straightforward causes in need of rationally 
developed and efficiently deployed solutions.  Policy science was, therefore, epistemologically 
positivistic and oriented toward increasing bureaucratic competence and value-neutral problem 
solving at the hands well-trained and informed specialists.  In this respect, policy sciences under 
the Keynesian welfare state and those of technocratic neoliberalism share an epistemology as 
well as a manager’s distrust of populist models of governance.  The difference lies primarily in 
their view of a just society and the state’s responsibilities and roles therein. 
A very different approach to academic policy analysis had emerged in Germany during 
the early twentieth century.  Marxist scholarship had found a home at Frankfurt University 
following the Russian revolution and its ripple-effect throughout continental Europe.  Under 
Max Horkheimer’s leadership and propelled by the brilliance of theorists such as Walter 
Benjamin and Theodore Adorno, the Institute for Social Research synthesized Marxian critiques 
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of the historical social relations of capitalism with cultural analysis.  Not exclusively or 
simplistically concerned with policy analysis as a discrete academic discipline or science, the 
Institute explored the nexus of politics (and by extension policy) and culture.  Following the rise 
of Fascism, the Institute—better known as the Frankfurt School—moved to the U.S., where the 
descriptor of Marxist or Marxian was strategically dropped in favor of critical theory.  The 
Frankfurt School confronted issues with orthodox Marxism—its insufficient theorizing on 
superstructural forces like culture’s influence on base relations of production, for example.  The 
Frankfurt School also endeavored to explain why some historical materialists’ seemingly 
formulaic predictions of socialism’s revolutionary overthrow of capitalism never fully, well, 
materialized.  In theorizing these two sets of issues, the Frankfurt School bequeathed to the 
humanities and social sciences two gifts of inestimable importance:  1) robust theories of the 
mutually constitutive relationship between social relations under capitalism and the production 
of culture, and 2) robust theories for why and how capitalism continually adapts those social 
relations in a seemingly perpetual revolution.  Douglas Kellner sketches the quasi-
methodological contours of critical theory as follows: 
Critical Theory strives to provide both a substantive social theory of the present age and a 
meta-theory concerning theory and method.  On the one hand, it involves a set of ways of 
looking at theory and the world and a set of investigative, research, textual and political 
practices.  On the other, it provides a substantive, comprehensive theory of the present 
age, as well as a methodological orientation for doing social theory and research and for 
relating theoretical work to radical politics.185   
 
Critical theory is “supradisciplinary” rather than “interdisciplinary” because it attempts to 
synthesize multiple disciplines within a larger project of social critique rather than utilizing them 
as isolated tools that can be borrowed and politely returned to their respective departments when 
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the researcher is finished with them.186  Strict adherence to the methods within each and every 
relevant discipline would not only be logistically difficult, it might actually prove theoretically 
incoherent.   
 Critical theory’s supradisciplinary nature means that it has become associated with many 
different theorists and expanded to account for different ways to conceptualize social critique 
and radical politics (e.g. the spatial turn).  It nevertheless shares some fundamental assumption 
about how numerically small groups exercise power over much larger groups by controlling 
economic relations and/or maintaining a rationalizing ideological system that supports their 
hegemony.  Critical theory as an intellectual tradition has sometimes played an active role in 
political movements, yet in other contexts, it has assumed a more detached, some would say 
aloof, praxis.  In any case, critical theory holds political emancipation via critique of modernity 
as its end in view.   
 The centrality of hegemony and ideology within critical theory’s critique of the 
assumptions and practices of modernity made public education—with its normative discipline, 
mass enculturation, and emphasis on reproducing capitalist social relations—fertile ground for 
critique.  Paulo Freire’s synthesis of critical theory and Catholic liberation theology as a praxis of 
emancipatory education opened the door to what would become known as critical pedagogy.187  
Explorations of public education’s relationship to hegemony and ideology188 and reproduction 
theory189 soon followed and laid a foundation for critical theoretical analyses of education.  
                                                 
186 Ibid., 7. 
187 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2000). 
188 Michael W. Apple, Ideology and the Curriculum, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Henry A. 
Giroux, Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981). 
189 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America:  Education Reform and the Contradictions 
of Economic Life (Chicago: Haymarket, 1976); Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Culture (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1977); Jean Anyon, “Social Class and the Hidden 
Curriculum of Work,” Journal of Education 62 (1980): 67–92; Peter McLaren, Life in Schools:  An Introduction to 
Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education, 6th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
 109 
 
Critical theory and education are similarly structured in the sense that they are both at once 
process and outcome oriented.  In other words, they focus on what is happening in the present 
but always with a view to a better future for the individual and society.  Kellner touches on this 
similarity in stating: 
The Marxian sense of systematically criticizing the assumptions of an established 
hegemonic discipline, as in Marx’s critique of political economy, and the construction of 
an alternative theory and practice, suggest the need for radical criticism of existing 
ideologies and practices of education and the need for far-reaching transformation to free 
individuals from the fetters of consumer capitalism and to help make possible a free, 
more democratic and human culture and society.190 
 
Embedded within Kellner’s remarks is critical theory’s rejection of a false value-neutral position 
in education or within any other political spaces.  Education has long been and remains plagued 
by a deeply ideological value-neutrality masquerading as non-ideological assemblages of facts 
and skills.  Such assumptive practices have thrived in the age of neoliberalism, which itself so 
often takes the form of politics disguised as apolitical technocracy exercised according to 
supposedly universal “best practices” of self- and social governance. 
 Critical theory’s rejection of value-neutral positions and modes of evaluation transformed 
the field of policy analysis.  As I have argued, the traditional policy sciences were in line with 
positivistic and technocratic assumptions present within the Keynesian state.  Following critical 
theory’s influence on both policy analysis and education scholarship, education policy scholars 
split policy analysis into a binary of analysis of policy and analysis for policy.191  Distinguishing 
between analysis of historical or current policies and analysis that seeks to be of use to current or 
future policies either as a source of advocacy or improvement can be helpful in describing the 
relationship between politics and policy.  As Bob Lingard explains:   
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Research that has the most direct and immediate effect on policy is that commissioned by 
policy-makers for a purpose and framed by a problem-solving disposition.  This is 
research for policy.  Interest groups often sponsor this type of research as well.  However, 
the more academic exercise, research of policy, fits within a critical framework and seeks 
to deconstruct the problem as constructed by policy and to deconstruct many of the ‘taken 
for granteds’ of the contemporary world.192 
 
Taken as a form of existing policy advocacy, research for policy benefits from and reinforces 
neoliberal ideology education practices.  Simply put, analysis of policy critically examines the 
political processes, assumptions, interests, and outcomes of creating and implementing policies 
within education or any other area of statecraft, while analysis for policy seeks to streamline or 
clarify those political processes without acknowledging or examining their ideological content.  
Although politics effects everyone, policy is created by elites and therefore is inseparable from 
hegemony.  Theoretical reflection on the distance between policy and polity in terms of social 
class and political power distinguishes traditional from critical policy analysis.193 
 As I have already mentioned, critical theory never relied on methodological orthodoxy, 
partly because rigid methodologies were far too siloed within respective academic disciplines to 
be of much use to critical theory as a supradisciplinary project.  Critical theorists also made 
significant contributions to Marxian analysis by incorporating influences from philosophy’s 
peripheral disciplines of sociology (e.g. Weber) and psychology (e.g. Freud) as well as 
reinterpretations of Nietzsche, Hegel, and many others from the canon of Western philosophy.  
Critical policy analysts today also eschew methodological orthodoxy, which they regard with 
considerable suspicion for its supposed totalizing and or positivistic commitments.  Diem and 
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Young nevertheless offer five common concerns gleaned from their meta-analysis of critical 
education policy scholars:  
(1) concern regarding the difference between policy rhetoric and practiced reality; (2) 
concern regarding the policy, its roots, and its development…(3) concern with the 
distribution of power, resources, and knowledge as well as the creation of policy 
‘winners’ and ‘losers;’ (4) concern regarding social stratification and the broader effect a 
given policy has on relationships of inequality and privilege; and (5) concern regarding 
the nature of resistance to or engagement in policy by members of non-dominant 
groups.194 
 
Here we see the critical theory’s commitment to analyzing how the state, in tandem with other 
capitalist apparatuses, exercises power over some groups and on behalf of others.  We also see 
critical theory’s commitment to political struggles for emancipation.  In their meta-analysis, 
Diem and her colleagues, however, describe the landscape of critical policy analysis as marked 
by “theoretical and methodological eclecticism” and “epistemological variety.”195  Such 
complexity and heterodox approaches to analysis offer counter-explanations and counter-
narratives to neoliberal technocracy’s overly simplistic discourse and apolitical framing of the 
genesis and purpose of policy.  Diem, et al. explain: 
Two features…set the work of critical policy analysis apart:  the theoretical frames from 
which critical policy analysts draw and the purposes for which critical policy analysts put 
their scholarship to work.  Scholars reasoned that multi-theoretical and interdisciplinary 
approaches to policy analysis enable deeper and broader understanding of educational 
issues, such as why certain changes are occurring within the field of education, why 
certain options tend to be chosen as policy options and solutions, and how such pathways 
have impacted or are likely to impact children and their communities.  The resulting 
analyses of educational policies, they argue, have more depth and breadth than traditional 
methods and theoretical frameworks allow.196 
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 Here I see an important rupture from the original concerns and purposes of critical theory.  
While critical theory from Horkheimer’s leadership of the Frankfurt School on has sought 
theoretical distance from the deterministic economism of some orthodox Marxists, the 
foundational thinkers of critical theory never lost sight of the fact that the interdependence of a 
multiplicity of social relations and cultures is still an interdependency that exists under 
capitalism, which is a totalizing system that affects social relations and cultures.  Although 
capitalism has proved highly malleable, highly differentiated, and subject to myriad non-
economistic cultural forces, it is not poststructural.  The thought is incoherent.   
Diem and her colleagues’ use of interdisciplinary sheds light on what I see as a major 
problem with the landscape of critical policy analysis today.  Its methodological eclecticism and 
suspicion of objectivity has significantly weakened critical policy analysts’ capacity to be critical 
and political.  I will take each of these claims separately.  First, critical theory should rigorously 
interrogate truth claims, but it should not reject them on the grounds that they are truth claims.  
When it does, it loses the capacity to criticize oppression.  Either oppression objectively exists, 
or it does not.  Critical policy analysts who suppress or reject notions of objectivity for its 
positivistic assumptions or totalizing notions of truth, vacate the ground from which they must 
launch critiques of power and its policies.  Second, the refusal to locate politics within reach of 
the social relations of production and the reproduction of society and culture (i.e. the realm of 
economy), similarly evacuates politics of any coherent meaning.  Lester Spence offers a clear 
definition of politics as “the group competition over scarce resources, as well as the various 
activities that comprise this competition.”197  Those resources cannot be simplistically reduced to 
money, but they nonetheless must stay within the logical boundaries of political economy if 
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politics is also to retain its conceptual coherence.  Surely there are coherent nonpolitical 
explanations of oppression (e.g. the varied accounts for the existence of evil), but these do not 
depend on group competition for scarce resources within a social sphere.198  In vaunting 
interdisciplinarity, critical policy analysis has lost its supradisciplinarity, which was 
methodologically diverse but oriented toward a coherent critique of the historical development of 
capitalism and culture.  Indeed, Kellner describes a similar problem within the trajectory of 
critical theory as a whole, arguing that, following the deaths of its foundational theorists, it “has 
frequently been deficient in empirical and historical research, and has often failed to provide 
clear historical presentations of its theoretical positions.”199  While I agree with Kellner’s claim 
that “This has been the result of academization of Critical Theory,” I disagree with his claim that 
such academization was born of “an excessive focus on its foundations and philosophical 
components at the expense of developing radical social theory and cultural critique connected to 
transformative politics.”200  I take the opposite view in fact and contend that critical policy 
analysis (and perhaps also critical theory) has focused too closely on developing a cultural 
critique and transformative politics that in many instances blinds it to the philosophical 
foundations of a coherent social theory.   
 
Foucauldian Poststructuralism and Neoliberal Accumulation 
In part, critical policy analysis’s issues with interdisciplinarity and theoretical eclecticism 
is a problem of academic work, which is predicated on what Thomas Kuhn described as the 
                                                 
198 For example, even a committed Marxist like Terry Eagleton will reject economic explanations of evil in a book 
called On Evil and follow it up a year later with a book called Why Marx Was Right.  Terry Eagleton, On Evil (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011). 
199 Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity, 232. 
200 Ibid. 
 114 
 
processes of doing “normal science.”201  Methodologies are various tools that scholars can take 
out and put back according to the strategies and tactics of academic publishing.  But part of the 
lack of and even distrust of theoretical coherence comes from the dominance of postmodern and 
poststructural theories within the humanities and social sciences.202   
I do not have the time or space to cover sufficiently the perennial debates between 
Foucauldians and assorted forms of postmodernists and poststructuralists and Marxists and the 
various subcategories of neo-Marxist.  Some familiarity with this debate is, however, useful to 
this dissertation since neo-Marxist critiques have tended to downplay or ignore the role of policy 
development and implementation in neoliberalization.  Critical policy analysis, especially within 
the field of education studies, has been heavily influenced by poststructuralism.  While 
poststructural policy analysis has highlighted the importance of policy as a discourse of 
neoliberal legitimation, poststructural critiques have tended to downplay or ignore altogether 
neoliberalism’s capital accumulation imperative and class politics.  Because my analysis weds 
structural concerns with critiques of neoliberal policy and legitimation processes, background in 
this debate is useful to advancing the claims in this dissertation.   
Foucauldian critiques of neoliberalism focus on its governmentality or modes of 
governing and disciplining the self within systems of rationality that are related to but not 
dependent on economic relations.  Criticizing Marxist and neo-Marxist explanations of 
neoliberal rationality as the logic of capital accumulation and revenge on the Keynesian state, 
Dardot and Laval claim: 
we cannot make do with the teaching of Karl Marx or Rosa Luxemburg to reveal the 
secret of neo-liberalism’s peculiar ability to extend itself everywhere, notwithstanding its 
crises and the rebellions it provokes the world over.  For fundamental theoretical reasons, 
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the Marxist interpretation, howsoever ‘updated,’ proves patently inadequate here.  Neo-
liberalism employs unprecedented techniques of power over conduct and subjectivities.203 
 
For their part, Marxists (and more heterodox Marxian scholars) struggle to find a coherent 
explanation of the state or of political power in general within Foucauldian notions of bio-power 
and the many schools of postmodern and poststructuralist thought.  Power just seems to sort of 
exist as a fundamental property of biology or the universe that coalesces into regimes of 
veridiction that are harnessed and deployed by the state.  Liberation thus becomes a matter of 
individually re-appropriating one’s own biopower.  Marxists have never held that class power 
and accumulation occur monolithically, and Gramsci among many others have offered rich 
accounts for how capitalist hegemony disseminates ideological methods of rationalization. 204  
Moreover, Engels himself refuted the notion that Marxist thought was overly determined 
economism in claiming, “the ultimately determining element in history is the production and 
reproduction of real life…Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is 
the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless 
phrase.”205  Discussing the debate between Marxists and postmodernists and poststructuralists 
within urban theory, Neil Smith argues: 
The postmodern and poststructuralist concern with subject positionality began as a very 
useful and necessary means to “decenter” the universal subject in social, political and 
cultural discourse.  In some treatments, however, thee postmodern turn has come full 
circle…In the appropriation of postmodernism as a script for gentrification, “postmodern 
urbanism” has for many passed into a vehicle for the radical recentering of the subject on 
the author him- or herself.  If decentering taught us that the author was in the world rather 
than somehow above it, and encouraged us to see the world in the author, a rather 
reactionary version of postmodernism flips the equation: “we are the world.”206 
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Although not within the Marxian tradition, Wendy Brown echoes Neil Smith’s critique of 
Foucault and postmodernism’s hyper-individualistic tendencies in claiming that the language of 
Foucauldian governmentality reflects “an oddly liberal idiom…There is no political body, no 
demos acting in concert (even episodically) or expressing aspirational sovereignty; there are few 
social forces from below and no shared powers of rule or shared struggles of freedom.” 207  Thus, 
for all its rhetorical commitment to political emancipation and struggle, the eclecticism of 
postmodern and poststructural academic discourse and research significantly hobbles its 
significance for organizing and mobilizing political movements against forms of oppression.208 
 The debates between Foucauldian poststructuralism and postmodernism and Marxism 
have occurred within educational policy studies as well.  Contrary to Brown’s and Smith’s 
assertions, Mark Olssen and Michael Peters claim that Foucault’s conceptual differentiation 
regarding forms and manifestations of power and oppression aid rather than detract from 
postmodernism’s usefulness for democratic struggles.  Foucauldian notions of individuated 
subjectivity and truth, they claim, are more amenable to local sites of resistance and notions of 
liberation that are ignored by Marxism’s totalizing explanations of oppression and repressive 
utopian visions of emancipation.209  Moreover, they argue that Foucauldian differentiation 
accords to a “new political economy” that combines the ambition of nineteenth century political 
economy with the analytical tools of contemporary social sciences.210  In line with Diem et al, 
Peters and Olssen maintain that the Foucauldian poststructuralist and broadly postmodern 
academic praxis offers “an integrated analysis that draws on a range of concepts and 
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methodologies without favoring adherence to one particular school, method or theoretical 
approach.”211  This new postmodern political economy has a peculiar relationship to ethics and 
social justice.  Because postmodernism rejects Christian ontology and ethics and Marxist 
conceptions of social justice on the grounds that both are totalizing systems, postmodernism is 
left with the task of developing: 
a different set of precepts to guide action…however, such rules will not dictate or define 
conduct for each individual for every situation.  While the tasks and requirements of 
survival will dictate some general, although historically specific, precepts and “rules,” 
different contingent imperatives at different times and places will also operate, so the 
individuals’ mode of ethical comportment will also reflect decisions, choices and 
commitments which only he/she can decide in particular situations.212  
 
What then is the point of critical policy analysis or, indeed, any critical poststructuralist approach 
that purports to aid in political struggles?  Even setting aside the fantasy that poststructural 
and/or postmodern scholarship will produce a coherent set of “rules” (a word these authors 
cannot even commit to) that inform hyper-individuated political struggles, those struggles, while 
carried out in a social arena, are in their final instance matters of radically contingent individual 
choice.  It would seem we have arrived back to a model that curiously resembles the market 
theories of classical liberalism, albeit dressed up in the language of radical politics.  Liberal 
economic theory holds that there is no just way to rank individual preferences and interests, so 
the mechanism of the market (the invisible hand) would determine value according to laws of 
supply and demand and the aggregate interests of rational individual actors.  At least such a 
system was arranged around the buying and selling of commodities and services.  Poststructural 
ethics as presented by Peters and Olssen amounts to radical relativism, and like liberal market 
theory, remains agnostic regarding an individual’s ethical judgements.  Like the rational market 
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actor, only the poststructural/modern individual can decide if he or she is acting ethically, since 
only he or she is capable of knowing the relevant contingencies, the historical situatedness of his 
or her positionality.  Anything else would be too totalizing.  This is liberal individualism, not 
radical politics.     
 For Peters and Olssen, it is education that holds the potential to unite individuals and 
various groups scattered like the people of Babel amidst all this wreckage of poststructural 
contingency.  The authors cite Foucault’s claim that “After all, we are all members of the 
community of the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity.”213  Odd that when it 
comes to political organization, Foucault speaks in a distinctly Marxist register of class-
solidarity, only here there is no mention of class, since that term is too economistic, too rigid, too 
totalizing.  It is education, Peters and Olssen argue, that can link the radically contingent 
individual and local struggles to a larger global struggle for emancipation.  What are the grounds 
for solidarity within all that contingency?  Emancipation from what?  Poststructuralism in 
general and these authors in particular have already rejected Christian ontology and ethics that 
supply the theological and philosophical content for global solidarity across local contingency.  
They have done the same for Marxism’s class analysis, which provides the philosophical and 
sociological content to link localized oppression to global movements for emancipation.  
Education here functions as a conceptual necessity void of any actual content.214  Presumably 
education is as radically individuated as ethics, but somehow it unites atomized individuals not 
just to each other but across the globe in a process of liberation from governance that itself 
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resists any definition outside of its own solipsism.  Poststructuralism provides only a conception 
of oppression devoid of any notion of the common good.  It cannot provide a conception for the 
common good because it rejects the existence of the common good as anything more than a 
totalizing and rationalizing discourse that elevates some at the expense of others.  Marx retains a 
conception of the common good that is dependent on but irreducible to the elimination of 
capitalist models of alienation and exploitation, but to be fair, it lies mostly within his early work 
and centers on his undertheorized and nebulous concept of species-being.215  Nevertheless, the 
economic analysis provides at least something of a unitive function that Foucauldian 
poststructural and otherwise postmodern analyses are powerless to account for.  It is at least 
theoretically possible that education could play a role in uniting local and global resistance 
movements against neoliberalization (there have in fact been limited successes from Chilean 
student uprisings to various European protests against neoliberalism’s austerity cuts to the opt-
out movement against standardized testing in the U.S.), but such resistance has not and cannot 
coalesce around hyper-individuated political struggles at the expense of coherent theories of 
neoliberalism’s strategies and tactics of class accumulation. 
 
Stephen Ball’s Contributions to Critical Policy Analysis 
 Within critical policy analysis, Stephen J. Ball has made the greatest contributions to a 
coherent critique of neoliberal governance via Foucauldian notions of governmentality.216  He 
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has done so by returning again and again to descriptions of the ruling class regimes of neoliberal 
statecraft.  Ball accomplishes this by drawing connections between Foucauldian critiques of 
performativity found within common practices of teaching and learning and local, national, and 
international class-based education governance networks that instantiate and disseminate those 
rationalizing discourses within the creation and transfer of policy.  Ball describes his work in the 
early 1990s as “his first attempts to explore the precarious ontological hinterland which separates 
ethnography from Foucauldian post-structuralism—that is, the speaking subject from discourse, 
agency from subjectification.”217  Ball has continued to develop this line of thought in more 
recent books in which he and his colleagues “seek to have [their] ontological cake and eat it too 
[by] mov[ing] promiscuously between creative agency of teachers…and the ways in which 
policy discourses and technologies mobilise truth claims and constitute rather than reflect social 
reality.”218  Parallel to this theme of the discursive construction and reconstruction of subjectivity 
within and through policy, Ball has sought to develop a coherent critical framework for how 
policy discourse and modes of neoliberal rationality and governance are at once contextually 
distinctive and global in scope.  Ball explains: 
While it may well be possible to discern a set of principles or a theoretical model 
underlying policy—neoliberalism, new institutional economics, public choice theory or 
whatever—these rarely if ever translate into policy texts or practice in direct or pristine 
form.  National policy making is inevitably a process of bricolage:  a matter of borrowing 
and copying bits and pieces of ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon and amending locally 
tried and tested approaches, cannibalising theories, research, trends, and fashions and not 
infrequently flailing around for anything at all that looks as though it might work.219 
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It is perhaps fitting that we see a parallel to the theoretical eclecticism of critical policy analysis. 
In other words, if policy is forged in such highly differentiated contexts, if policy is bricolage, 
then it could be argued that critical policy analysts would draw from such a multiplicity of 
theoretical and methodological frameworks from which to fashion their critiques.  Indeed, in an 
admiring and gently critical way, Michael Apple describes Ball himself as “a bricoleur, drawing 
theoretical perspectives from both structural and poststructural traditions.”220  I agree with 
Apple’s evaluation of Ball’s work on two accounts.  First, Ball’s work in mapping the 
constellations of power and influence within regimes of neoliberal governance that are global in 
scope has helped a great deal in illuminating “the ways in which neoliberalism actually works as 
a movement.”221  Ball’s recent work has been particularly useful in exploring education policy as 
a global industry222 and neoliberal statecraft as a deeply political form of networked post-
political governance.223  Secondly and perhaps most importantly, I agree with Apple that 
“Postmodern and poststructural approaches are not replacements for more structural 
understandings.”224  I will not speak for Apple—though I suspect he would agree—but I have yet 
to come across a Foucauldian poststructuralist explanation for national and supranational 
governance that adds anything consequential to Gramscian or neo-Gramscian concepts of 
hegemony.225  The same is true of Foucauldian governmentality and broadly Marxian theories of 
ideology. 
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 Among Ball’s more recent methodological contributions to the eclectic field of critical 
policy analysis has been his development of “network ethnography.”  Neoliberalization has 
relied on post-political—that is, unelected, unaccountable, and often unknown—networks that 
govern locally, nationally, and internationally.  In distinction from notions of democratic and 
representative government, neoliberal governance is comprised of ruling class constituencies and 
interests that form and implement policy from within networks or dense nests comprised of 
individuals, non-governmental institutions (NGOs, often fueled by corporate donors), quasi-
governmental institutions (QUANGOs or public-private partnerships), for-profit corporations, 
and the remaining apparatuses of the Keynesian welfare state.   Rather than having a stabilizing 
effect, these diverse networks are “made up of a set of more or less unstable methods and 
relationships which, if they do not work as expected, can be dispensed with and replaced.”226  
Because network governance provides a sort of shadow state, there are few if any lasting 
consequences for those who craft and work to implement neoliberal reform policy.  Those in fact 
most vulnerable to blowback from policy failure are not the philanthrocapitalist foundations or 
individual actors who can move on to other projects in the wake of policy failure but the 
government bureaucracies formally responsible for developing, implementing, and regulating 
public policy.227  I say government institutions suffer rather than elected individuals because, 
even when voted out of office as a result of blowback from policy failure, government officials 
rely on their neoliberal networks to “fail upwards” into new and often far more lucrative 
positions in the corporate for-profit and nonprofit world.  The institutions, however, remain and 
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are subjected to the public’s deep and often warranted distrust and ire.  Such ire provides fuel for 
the further neoliberalization by the same or similar ruling class coalitions responsible for 
previous policy failure.  Hence, the rollback and rollout phases are both orchestrated by 
capitalism’s political class.  Ball’s notions of post-political governance and the class politics of 
neoliberal crisis management and manipulation is particularly useful to the context of neoliberal 
policymaking and implementation in St. Louis’s public education reforms.  Public-private 
partnerships effectively shield class interests from the negative effects of education reform and 
urban revitalization efforts while leaving low-income black families and public schools 
vulnerable.  Similarly, the significant public expenditures on revitalization and stagnant or 
declining quality of life for most residents shows the public-private partnership shields the most 
vulnerable populations from any benefits produced by the partnership and revitalization.  
Moreover, the issues of an unelected, unaccountable, and unknown shadow-state are magnified 
under global neoliberalism and the opening up of public policy—and as is the case with charter 
schools, public school infrastructure financing—to the governance networks of global capitalism.  
 For all his rich description of neoliberal governance Ball’s work has a curious relation to 
class analysis.  As I mentioned, a strength of his analysis has been in describing network 
governance—the dynamism of it constellations of power and policy that break apart and are 
reconstituted across time and space—but Ball keeps the concept of class at arm’s length.  He 
focuses instead on how these networks wield power and demand performativity from the 
subjects upon which they are imposed.  Apple praises Ball’s more recent work that has turned to 
issues of race and neoliberal discipline, while arguing Ball’s analysis “is largely [a] Foucauldian 
reading of this process, one that at times I wish was grounded in more structural ideas about the 
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racial state and the political economy of empire.”228  This criticism of insufficient structural 
concerns regarding race and the political economy of empire applies to class as well.  Ball’s 
application of ethnography to neoliberal policy analysis is a novel and interesting approach, but 
what Ball never seems to address head on in a sufficient way is that the various actors that 
comprise these neoliberal governance networks differ in race, gender, religious affiliation, sexual 
orientation, nationality, yet the one sociological category that undoubtedly share is class.  The 
various elected officials, NGO directors, and philanthrocapitalists may not all have equal wealth, 
but this is inconsequential.  Neither do corporate CEOs.  Marxian notions of class reach beyond 
Bourdieuan habitus to describe one’s position with respect to capitalist relations of production 
and the reproduction of society.  That is not to say that habitus or Ball’s work on network 
ethnography are not useful as heuristics for understanding ideology and cultural reproduction of 
class position within respective classes, but when those analyses fail to account for class position 
within capitalism’s relations of production and the reproduction of those political economic 
conditions, then they offer little beyond descriptive analyses of social and political power.  Ball 
comes frustratingly close to discussions of capital accumulation, but inevitably veers off to 
Foucauldian concepts of performativity and market logics as rationalizing discourses, which to 
be clear, are only problematic when delinked from a concept of class accumulation of capital.   
Two examples:  Ball and Nikita discuss the global reach of school choice policies in 
relation to the emergence of a global middle class, yet their analysis is confined to middle class 
consumer behaviors and cosmopolitan mobility.229  Only a scant paragraph touches on the 
economic dimensions of both of those sociological concepts.  The authors admit, “this 
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orientation towards cosmopolitan values and identity also needs to be located back into 
economic capital, everyday experience and shared frames of reference and indeed the 
fundamental questions as to whether the [global middle class] is a ‘well-formed class’ in the 
structural, cultural and relational senses,” only to conclude, “In other words there is much to 
do.”230  I agree, and that work will never be done by confining class analysis to performativity 
and consumptive habits.    
Similarly, Ball’s network ethnography explores the enormous influence of what he and 
Junemann call “new philanthropy,” otherwise referred to as philanthrocapitalism or venture 
philanthropy.  By default, this is a ruling class phenomenon, since while the underclasses give a 
greater percentage of their income to charity than the wealthy, their giving does not grant them 
access to the levers of political power.231  Ball and Junemann describe the new in new 
philanthropy as “the direct relation of ‘giving’ to ‘outcomes’ and the direct involvement of givers 
in philanthropic action and policy communities.”232  Those outcomes surely take a number of 
forms, but they ultimately and quite literally cash out in capital accumulation.  Ball and 
Junemann go on to describe the involvement of Goldman Sachs and other financial firms in 
crafting education policy, only to arrive at a discussion of philanthropic discourse the governance 
of the public sector according to market logics.  Goldman Sachs, no doubt, has a diverse and 
complicated array of interests, but Ball and Junemann’s analysis seems to put the cart before the 
horse in suggesting that the raison d’etre of those interests is the legitimation and diffusion of 
capitalist market logics.  Goldman Sachs’s (or any other node of global capitalism’s governance 
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networks) interest is first and foremost in capital accumulation.  Whether that might reflect some 
sort of Nietzschean will to power or Foucauldian governmentality is a secondary concern.  
Neoliberal market logic functions within the processes of capital accumulation.   Ball and 
Junemann describe the logic that underlies the diverse (except in class) assemblages of 
networked power as exhibiting “a certain regularity or unity between statements, objects, 
concepts, in a rule-governed set of material practices.”  Citing Foucault, they conclude, “The 
engine of knowledge here is not the individual actors but the discursive community that works to 
ensure that only some speakers are privileged and ‘get heard’ within the transformation of the 
public sector.”233  Here again, those who “get heard” are of a common class because they share a 
similar position in relation to the production processes and reproduction of late capitalism’s 
social relations.  That “rule-governed set of material practices” is capitalism, which by definition, 
means that those who control capital have an outsized ideological and political influence over 
the various rules that govern the social relations that exist within that political economy.  It is no 
wonder that capitalists have used such control over social relations to increase their own capital 
and concomitant social and political power.  While I agree that the “engine of knowledge here is 
not the individual actors,” I disagree that the discursive community is sufficient explanation for 
what does drive new philanthropy and neoliberal governance.  The notion that finance capital has 
captured the political process to spread and legitimate its governance logic—which accords to 
the logic of market competition—rather than as a function of its ruling class ideology that 
legitimates its own accumulation practices and primacy of place within global capitalism strikes 
me as absurd.   
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Such a conclusion is derived from critiques of Marx’s insufficient theorizing of 
capitalism’s internal dynamism.  Those are valid critiques.  Marx’s model of base-superstructure 
and theorizing of historical materialism, as nuanced as they were, did not fully account for the 
historical movement of much of the proletarian class up into the bourgeoisie, especially into the 
swollen professional managerial class of the post-Fordist neoliberal era.  The movement from 
traditional commodity production and consumption to the global knowledge economy has also 
demanded much updating within the Marxian tradition, but it is easy to forget—as Ball seems 
to—that such developments have come through technological innovation and the creation of new 
proletarian classes across the globe.  In other words, capitalism has grown quite adept at moving 
both its wealth and its wreckage across time and space.  Nevertheless, the fact that those who 
wield power within Ball’s discursive communities always levy that power for capital 
accumulation (e.g. through speaking fees, consulting jobs, and the various examples of “failing 
upward”) should be enough to illuminate an important and underdeveloped structural dynamic 
beneath Ball’s analyses of neoliberal network governance.  
 I should not be mistaken as unjustly discounting Ball’s valuable theoretical and 
methodological contributions to critical policy analysis.  His work provides key sociological 
insights into the formations, behaviors, and logics that underlie neoliberalism’s political (or 
policy) class.  Ball also adroitly articulates the often clumsy and always complex processes, 
logics, and interests behind neoliberal statecraft.  Policies are not just crafted in situ as rational 
responses to straightforward social and political issues.  Rather they are borrowed and bought, 
hacked apart and sewn together, innovated and plagiarized, as they transform over time and are 
scaled and rescaled vertically and horizontally across space.  Across these various contexts, 
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neoliberal governance shows a family resemblance of policies, yet like Freud’s theory of das 
Unheimliche (the uncanny), they are at once familiar and foreign.   
Ball himself points to recurrent spatio-temporal gaps in critical policy analysis.  
Providing an insider’s meta-analysis of the state of CPA through 1997, Ball admits that “in 
practice, most education policy research lacks any sense of time,” the result of which is “a 
rampant ahistoricism.”234  For Ball, this “dearth” of historical analysis within the field is a 
significant obstacle to theorizing any continuity or even dialectical rupture with policy 
(re)formation/circulation or political governance structures prior to the 1980s, as though 
neoliberal governance structures and power relations sprang from the head of Zeus.  Ball goes on 
to describe how “Policy research lacks a sense of ‘place’; either in not locating policies in any 
framework that extends beyond the national level, or in not accounting for or conveying a sense 
of the locality in analyses of policy realisation.”235  As with its ahistoricity, CPA’s spatial lacuna 
inhibits richer analysis on policy differentiation and multivalent development under 
neoliberalism.  Here too there is the problem of theorizing both continuity and rupture, a problem 
with understanding the family resemblances in relation to the geographically specific derivations.  
Much of this, Ball contends, is a problem of moving from the global to the national and vice 
versa.  Neoliberalism is a nationally differentiated global phenomenon.  Figures like Reagan and 
Thatcher are often appropriately linked, but no one would or should argue that neoliberalism has 
produced effects in the U.S. identical to those in Great Britain, Chile, China, or anywhere else it 
has dramatically altered the political economy and the daily life of those subjected to its rule.  
Moreover, differentiation occurs at the local level as well.  Ball laments, “a great deal of 
                                                 
234 Stephen J. Ball, “Policy Sociology and Critical Social Research:  A Personal Review of Recent Education Policy 
and Policy Research,” British Journal of Educational Studies 43, no. 3 (June 1997): 266. 
235 Ibid., 267. 
 129 
 
education research dislocates schools and classrooms from their physical and cultural 
environment.  The second aspect of locality relates to this latter point: that is, the failure of 
policy research to convey a sense of region, or community or setting.” 236  The local level 
provides the political topography for exercising neoliberal power.  It, therefore, bears a different 
though no less important relation to power and neoliberal governance as the national or global 
levels.  Capitalism, of course, works the same way.  Local economies do not move in lock step 
with national and global policies or economic shifts.  Regions and even cities can experience 
economic recession/growth during phases of national growth/recession, with the same applying 
at the national and global levels.   
Ball’s own work has not overcome these gaps in the two decades since he exposed them.  
His innovation with network ethnography reflects this very spatio-temporal problem.  As useful 
as network ethnography is for capturing and describing the dense nests of interests and 
relationships that constitute policy networks, Ball and Junemann point to policy networks as 
perpetually evolving, disintegrating and reconstituting themselves over time.  They admit that 
this constitutes “both an analytical and representational problem.  The representational problem 
arises inasmuch that network diagrams are very inadequate and misleading devices for capturing 
and representing networks and network relations.  They freeze movement and evolution and are 
always out of date.”237  Similarly, Ball has recently theorized neoliberal differentiation from the 
national to global level238 as well as at the local level,239 but these analyses are largely confined 
to the same register (itself a legitimating discourse) of Foucauldian governmentality.  Ball moves 
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up and down planes of neoliberal governance in analyzing the various effects of its rationality 
and the performativity of its actors and subjects, but he remains locked within the flattened 
discourse of governmentality.  In other words, his approach to spatial differentiation focuses on 
the differentiation of the formation and effects of policy at different levels, but it fails to offer a 
three-dimensional spatial analysis of differentiation that is not just concerned with governance 
planes and policy boundaries (i.e. local, national, global) but with neoliberalism’s larger 
geographic processes of uneven development and capital accumulation.  He does not resolve his 
earlier issues with space and time because his theoretical framework treats them as distinct 
categories within policy studies.  By this, I mean that he can analyze policy over time (though his 
network ethnography does not), and he can analyze spatial differentiation (though he reduces 
space largely to policy boundaries and hierarchies or planes of performativity), but he cannot do 
them both at once.  In sum, Ball maintains a troubling gap between policy and political economy.  
His theoretical contributions to critical policy analysis and the heterogeneity of policy across 
time and space are crucial advances in the field.  But in leaning so heavily on Foucauldian 
poststructuralism in general and governmentality in particular, Ball offers a coherent though 
incomplete account of neoliberalism’s processes (i.e. the geography of their structural and spatial 
development) and purposes (i.e. capital accumulation through rather than for governance).  
Critical geography has synthesized both these concerns.  The political and the physical structures 
and processes of capital accumulation and class power are manifest in space as is their 
transformations over time.  These structures of class power depend on policy not just as a 
discourse for legitimating power and propagating ideology.  Policy is also the process through 
which ruling class networks devalue and revalorize urban space.  As I demonstrate in the 
remainder of this chapter and the entirety of the next, the policy ecology of urbanization 
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(including but not limited to desegregation and charter school policy) does not just legitimate 
power regimes and govern behavior.  It is, rather, the means by which physical and social space 
is made and remade in the image and likeness of capitalist social relations.   
 
St. Louis and the Spatio-Temporal Turn in Critical Policy Analysis 
Few if any have had as great an influence on theorizing the spatial dimensions of 
accumulation that characterize the neoliberal era and previous epochs of capitalism as has David 
Harvey.  I have already covered Harvey’s central claims that neoliberalism is 1) a revanchist 
project to restore class power by dismantling the Keynesian welfare state and reconstituting it as 
a market-interventionist neoliberal state; and 2) a form of political economy that structures, 
destroys, and restructures spaces (e.g. political, social, geological, etc.) through its processes of 
circulation and accumulation of capital over time.  I will, therefore, limit my discussion to the 
ways in which his Marxist theoretical framework of accumulation by dispossession provides a 
critique of neoliberalism superior to that of Ball’s Foucauldian poststructuralism in that it 
overcomes the persistent spatio-temporal obstacles Ball himself acknowledges and only partially 
addresses.  Ball’s contributions to critical policy analysis are, however, too valuable to discard, 
and while I do not wish to synthesize his work with Harvey’s, it will be useful to borrow some of 
Ball’s analytical tactics that Harvey tends to ignore in his tectonic structural critiques.     
First, as I previously discussed, grounding political power in the social relations of 
production and processes of capital accumulation places the Marxian tradition of critical analysis 
on much firmer ground than governmentality and theories of competing and seemingly sui 
generis regimes of knowledge production and veridiction.  The role of the state, the nature of 
ideology, the persistence of nationalism and its supportive if contradictory relationship to global 
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capitalism all require that models Marx developed in the nineteenth century be updated through 
reformulation and heterodox approaches to analysis.  These heterodox methodologies must 
address capitalism’s perpetually mutating modes of production and culture’s influences and 
quest to legitimate those social relations and political power dynamics.  But in a sense, 
heterodoxy is Marxist orthodoxy, since Marx himself argues, “In every epoch the ideas of the 
ruling class are the ruling ideas, that is, the class that is the ruling material power of society is at 
the same time its ruling intellectual power.”240  Thus, the morphing intellectual regimes of 
neoliberal legitimation—the knowledge economy and corporatization of sites of knowledge 
productions like universities; the ubiquity of modes of class and self-discipline (Ball’s and 
Foucault’s performativity); the (re)structuring of political and social institutions (e.g. public-
private partnerships, government contracting, charter schools); and so on—these are the 
intellectual and organizational expressions of the material structures and drives of neoliberal 
capitalism.  Capitalism is a dynamic relational system, not a fixed entity.  Modes of analysis 
must adapt but without losing sight of the material necessity of capitalism’s social relations of 
production and reproduction. 
Thus, if capital accumulation is the subterranean force of neoliberalism (understood as 
the most recent phase of capitalism), then we need to examine how such a force shapes the 
physical, political, and ideological terrain of urbanism.  Here I follow Harvey and other critical 
geographers who view urbanism as a process of political economy.  Although the focus of 
urbanism tends to be on cities, urbanism is the manifestation of the social relations and 
circulation of commodities and surpluses within entire political economy.  Urbanism, therefore, 
also involves rural areas.  For example, it is impossible to imagine building and sustaining a city 
                                                 
240 Marx, “The German Ideology,” 129.  
 133 
 
wherein people and capital are concentrated without relying on the vast farmlands and sites of 
fossil fuel extraction and processing (wherein people and capital are not concentrated) that 
provide the food and energy that sustains and reproduces those cities.  There have always been 
political, ideological, and cultural antagonisms between urban and rural societies, but as Harvey 
puts it, “it is only with industrialization and the penetration of market exchange into all sectors 
and areas that the antagonism between town and country is finally overcome.  City, suburb and 
rural area are now incorporated within the urban process.”241  Although these various 
geographies are all fully incorporated into urbanism, the fissures and stresses among them have 
intensified under neoliberalization.  Such intensification is evident in population mobility.  
Massive swathes of the population moved from the country to the city under early 
industrialization and from the city to the suburb under peak industrialization.  Under 
deindustrialization and the intensified spatial competition of neoliberalization, suburbs compete 
with each other and with the city to attract people and capital, effectively turning space itself into 
both a site of production and a site of consumption.242  Rural life, meanwhile, becomes more 
difficult to sustain as the raw materials of commodity production are sourced from global 
markets and their cheap labor and technological advances increasingly automate production 
according to the profit imperatives of agricultural and petrochemical corporations.  Moreover, 
rural communities lack the capital and infrastructure to effectively compete in the production and 
consumption of space.  Rural life tends to be a more difficult and less sexy commodity.  
Having clarified urbanism as the reflection or manifestation of the totality of political 
economy, it is necessary to turn to the relationship of space and time to urbanism and capital 
                                                 
241 David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Revised edition (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 307–8. 
242 Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, ed. Elizabeth Lebas, trans. Eleonore Kofman (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1996); Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1991). 
 134 
 
accumulation.  Harvey’s entire corpus theorizes capitalism’s spatio-temporal processes, but he 
distills his work into a few central components: market exchange, the coercive laws of spatial 
competition, geographical divisions of labor, monopolistic competition, speed-up and the 
annihilation of space through time, physical infrastructures for production and consumption, the 
production of regionality, the production of scale, territorial systems of political administration, 
and the geopolitics of capitalism.243  While I maintain that neoliberal education reforms like 
charter schools cannot and should not be understood separately from the broader processes of 
political economy with which they are interwoven, neither do I want to dissolve them into 
abstracted theories of neoliberalism.  I will, therefore, briefly discuss charter schools through the 
lens of each of these facets of capital accumulation in space and time, keeping in mind that these 
are not discrete but mutually reinforcing processes. 
Market exchange is predicated on growth opportunities that arise in specific localities and 
shift over time.  In Chapter One, I described at length how charter schools went from an idea 
proposed by union leader Albert Shanker, to an experiment in Minnesota, to the most significant 
urban education reform movement in recent history in less than three decades.  I showed the 
correlation between charter school concentration and deindustrialized and hypersegregated urban 
space, arguing that such a correlation was the result of the charter movement’s market logic and 
corporate isomorphism.  Charters, particularly the corporate-funded CMO and for-profit EMO 
franchises, achieve growth in either market share or quite literally capital accumulation by 
exploiting real and perceived institutional and political weaknesses common to hypersegregated, 
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low-income communities.244  Both the geographical public school boundaries and the 
governmental policy boundaries are frequently drawn and redrawn so as to isolate middle class 
white children from low-income children of color within public school systems and to open up 
those racially segregated public school systems to the privatizing forces of the charter school 
movement.  There is hardly a better example than in Missouri’s restriction of charter schools to 
St. Louis and Kansas City, wherein the cross-boundary policies of urban-suburban desegregation 
busing were replaced by fixed boundaries of charter school operation only within majority-black 
and low-income urban districts.  Even though St. Louis’s desegregation transfer program carried 
on at a voluntary and drastically reduced scale, weakening suburban-urban transfer was 
necessary to get the charter market off the ground.  It was not just school choice that was 
needed—desegregation had already provided choice—it was a particular kind of choice fostered 
by the creation and maintenance of a new form of education market, one that needed a less 
mobile population to thrive.   
The coercive laws of spatial competition function as a sort of social and economic 
Darwinism.  Capitalist entities survive through competition, which necessarily has a spatial 
component in access to resources and markets as well as geographies of power.  The rise of 
charter schools is predicated on the rollback of equitable funding provisions for low-income 
schools and the rollout of charter legalization alongside regimes of public school accountability 
and the perpetual threat of “turnaround” or closure.  Legal victories for public education equity 
addressed spatial inequality that resulted from disparate educational funding through property 
taxes as well as myriad educational inequities stemming from concentrated and racialized 
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poverty.245  Those victories set in motion or further intensified a revanchist response that 
reframed the causes and solutions for educational inequity within neoliberal market logics.  As 
Harvey claims, “The coercive laws of competition…produce perpetual instability within the 
geographical landscape of capitalism.”246  The same is true for educational spaces embedded 
within their geographical and political landscapes.  Public schools in wealthier areas—at least 
those that actually serve those communities rather than poorer children bused to those areas—
have the financial and sociopolitical resources, the competitive advantages to resist vicious 
cycles of austerity and privatization.  Schools serving more vulnerable populations and located in 
areas bereft of political and economic power are instead subjected to reconstitution and closure, 
which themselves produce more instability.  Recall from Chapter One that even Moody’s argues 
that charter concentration in economically unstable and depopulating cities like those in the Rust 
Belt is an illogical and potentially disastrous way to address public education’s structural 
issues.247  With over 30 percent of public school students in St. Louis, over 40 percent in Kansas 
City, and over 50 percent in Detroit and Flint, the only conclusion one can reach is market 
concentration is an intentional practice of creative destruction through intensifying privatization 
and regimes of competition. 
By geographical divisions of labor, Harvey means the spatial concentration of capital and 
specific industries whether through endowments of natural resources (e.g. Houston’s oil 
industry) or social construction (e.g. San Francisco and Silicon Valley).  Recently, an important 
redevelopment trend for deindustrialized cities has been to rebrand as tech hubs in order to 
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attract young professionals, what Richard Florida describes as the creative class, in order to drive 
up local real estate values and stimulate consumer spending, especially when those young 
professionals have disposable income and/or no children in the public school system.248  Billions 
of dollars of public funds diverted from public schools and other services and funneled toward 
subsidizing the construction of sports stadia, the redevelopment of abandoned factories and 
public schools as chic lofts, and the relocation and expansion of desired industries, often those in 
the healthcare and technology sectors.249  This process is the production of space as a consumer 
commodity for individuals and for corporations.  Already lucrative and heavily subsidized 
sectors like healthcare and technology enjoy even more public funding, and depending on the 
phase of gentrification, what used to be or still are low-income, nonwhite neighborhoods are well 
on their way to becoming middle or upper-income, majority white neighborhoods.   
St. Louis’s own Cortex Innovation District, formed in 2002 as a consortium of nearby 
universities, a healthcare provider, and the Missouri Botanical Gardens, was modeled on Kendell 
Square in Cambridge, Massachusetts.250  Cortex’s stated goal is to turn what was post-industrial 
blight into shimmering glass and steel of startup incubators and research and development hubs 
targeted to the intersection of technology and bioscience industries.  Cortex’s stated purpose is 
not just technological and medical innovations for the public good.  Rather it blends tropes of 
technocracy, the breathless devotion to anything “innovative” or “disruptive,” with a lifestyle 
                                                 
248 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Richard Florida, Cities and the 
Creative Class (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
249 David Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism:  The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late 
Capitalism,” Geografiska Annaler.  Series B, Human Geography 71, no. 1 (1989): 3–17; For an historical emphasis 
on St. Louis and its racial dynamics, see Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline:  St. Louis and the Fate of the American 
City (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); George Lipsitz, How Racism Takes Place 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011). 
250 Dustin C. Read, “Case Studies in Innovation District Planning and Development” (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia 
Tech and NAIOP Research Foundation, July 2016), 13, http://www.naiop.org/en/Magazine/2016/Fall-
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appeal to youthful and hip innovators and disruptor.  Cortex seeks to be the cyborg brain of the 
city, but also “an innovation community” that likes to market itself as “where our best and 
brightest live and work.”251  The city is adjacent to the already heavily gentrified Central West 
End, but in St. Louis, one can stand on a street corner and see three phases of gentrification at 
once.252  Cortex is a tax exempt 501(c)3 that has received hundreds of millions of dollars in 
public funds to purchase and redevelop the land in its jurisdiction, but even more importantly, 
the city cut out the middle man (itself) in 2006, when it granted Cortex “zoning authority, 
eminent domain power, the ability to offer tax abatements and permission to enter into binding 
development agreements governing the use of land.”253  Cortex transcends Robert Goodman’s 
claims about city’s being the last entrepreneurs.  The city of St. Louis gives Cortex tax incentives 
while also giving Cortex the ability to give itself tax incentives.  Not only does this affect public 
school financing, but the similar tropes (Ball’s discourses of legitimation) are deployed within 
the charter world, for example a STEAM K-2 charter school called The Biome that opened in 
2015 in the Central West End and a nearby K-12 system of STEM charters called the Gateway 
Science Academy.  Ball’s work goes a long way toward theorizing the policy transfer and 
discourses of legitimation, but his theoretical framework and methodologies do not capture how 
institutional governance and policy landscapes and geographical landscapes are restructured 
under neoliberalization.  Put differently, the built space of the city is in a sense also performing 
the ideology of neoliberalization.  As Harvey reminds us, geographical divisions of labor 
intensify rather than mitigate spatial economic inequality, a lesson worth keeping in mind when 
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considering the application of its logic to public education under the banner of equalizing 
opportunity over and against its geographic limitations. 
Monopolistic competition has clearly been the historic form of capitalism despite past 
and present idealizations of the small business entrepreneur and the innovative startup.  The 
richest figures in history (Rockefeller, Gates, Carnegie) have all faced and quashed legitimate 
legal battles over their monopolistic accumulation.  Harvey reminds us that these tendencies 
should always be analyzed with a view to their spatial components.  Before modern 
transportation and communication technology, natural monopolies arose because of the difficulty 
of transporting goods across distances.  Given the state of transportation and communication 
technologies today, capitalists have turned to intellectual property and their partnerships with the 
state to ensure their exclusivity or at least decrease their competition.  Recall from Chapter One 
Baker’s finding that several of the most heavily chartered urban districts in the Rust Belt were 
dominated by a few charter organizations.254  Their dominance has certainly not always been due 
to their stellar reputation and performance record, but in many cases has arisen from close 
relationships with regulators, a lack of much or any meaningful regulatory oversight, and 
connections to capital flows from either private sector property developers (Imagine, Inc.) or 
philanthrocapitalist foundations and governmental policy apparatuses (KIPP’s relationship to the 
Gates, Walton, Fisher, and other foundations as well as local, state, and national education 
bureaucracies).  In 2013, KIPP and St. Louis Public Schools struck an exclusive agreement that 
allowed the charter organization exclusive access to vacant district properties in exchange for 
SLPS’s use of KIPP’s student data (test scores, graduation and attendance rates, etc.) within its 
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own score reporting.  The district stood to benefit from KIPP’s tendency to “produce” high 
scores since it was struggling to boost its own scores and regain the accreditation it had lost in 
2007.255  The district also benefited from using KIPP’s student data to stanch its declining 
enrollment figures that had been steadily plummeting due both to St. Louis’s unrelenting decline 
and the concentration of charter schools in the city.  Although St. Louis was just restored to full 
accreditation by the state board of education in January of 2017, during the decade of 
unaccredited and provisionally accredited status, it was not allowed under Missouri law to be a 
charter school authorizer.256  As Baker argues, Missouri education funding law creates a 
relationship between charters and traditional public schools that is more adversarial than most.257  
As charters took ever greater market share of public education, SLPS lost more than pass-
through funds—its own state funding declined significantly.  For its part, KIPP got even more 
than free access to SLPS property; the district to date has kicked in more than a million dollars to 
renovate the two buildings KIPP uses, and while the charter organization exchanges its data as a 
bizarre form of currency for access to physical real estate, KIPP retains its total regulatory 
authority over its operations.258  Thus, capital (and data) flows merge with state and local 
regulatory regimes to redevelop and reimagine public space under monopolistic educational 
neoliberalization. 
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Harvey develops an idea Marx proposed in the Grundrisse about how the perpetual 
search for newer and faster ways to move commodities across geographic distance amounts to 
“the annihilation of space by time.”  Modes of transportation illustrate the principle.  Distances 
that took years to cross by horse and wagon took days to cross by train and hours by plane.  As 
non-physical commodities like intellectual property (e.g. a line of code) and finance capital (e.g. 
bond debt) take up an ever-greater share of economic activity within the “knowledge economy,” 
space is nearly annihilated by time.  Such commodities circle the globe in seconds.  Knowledge 
economy workers, as I explained regarding the geographic division of labor, are less rooted in 
place than those involved in forms of commodity production that require massive amounts of 
fixed capital in the built environment (e.g. the now abandoned factories in Detroit and St. Louis).  
That built environment must be redesigned to attract and retain those workers and are thus 
oriented to consumption of a place as well as commodity production within a place, resulting in 
more intensive forms of city-capital courtship (e.g. Cortex).  This relationship among space, 
time, and commodity circuits also exists within the dynamics of moving from school transfer to 
school choice as a model for educational equity.  By eliminating student transfer desegregation 
programs (i.e. busing and magnet schools) like those in Indianapolis, Kansas City, and the largest 
and longest running of all, St. Louis,259 and replacing them with charter schools restricted to or 
largely operating within the space of those sending districts, policymakers developed a new form 
of commodity choice that did not depend on traversing urban-suburban distances.  St. Louis 
Public Schools was closing schools rapidly during the 2000s while charter schools were showing 
explosive growth.  With a falling number of traditional schools and an increasing number of 
charter schools, students could be shuffled among old and emerging options in the city instead of 
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transported to stable suburban districts.  With Republicans gaining the governorship in Missouri, 
the state’s Speaker of the House Todd Richardson has already “vowed to expand charter schools 
and virtual schools and to explore education savings accounts.”260  Virtual schools have come up 
in past bills vetoed by outgoing Democratic governor Jay Nixon, who as Missouri’s Attorney 
General in the 1990s had fought for and oversaw the end of St. Louis’s historic desegregation 
program that resulted from the 1983 Settlement of Liddell v. Board of Education.  Virtual charter 
schools would further erode the importance of space within education policy by removing 
schooling from the built environment altogether.  Virtual charter school operators would be able 
to enter St. Louis’s and Kansas City’s already saturated charter school markets without even 
needing to secure or renovate physical space.  Such an advantage would likely result in further 
school closures and more vacant public education infrastructure available for redevelopment and 
accumulation according to the laws of creative destruction.  
 I have already explained Harvey’s position regarding the role of physical infrastructure as 
fixed capital or the effects of capital on the land in relation to increasingly mobile capital, but it 
is important to note how, once that capital is fixed in space, it is prone to deterioration and 
requires continual reinvestment.  This is particularly important for public space, which as public 
space, requires civic reinvestment from taxing surplus capital rather than private reinvestment 
that would be paid for out of its own surpluses.  In other words, public institutions must use 
public funds to maintain physical infrastructure, while private entities should (but under 
neoliberal governance often do not) use only their own private funds to maintain their physical 
infrastructure.  Such an arrangement is already beneficial to private capital even without 
neoliberalism’s intensifying public subsidization of private profits because the public sector has 
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always subsidized private enterprise through the building of roads, the establishment of currency, 
the enforcement of laws, and the myriad bureaucratic necessities capitalism demands. 261   
Before moving on to the next of Harvey’s categories of capital accumulation in space and 
time, I want to stay with this category of physical infrastructure.  Understanding its importance is 
key as this concept is central to this entire dissertation.  If the built environment of the city is a 
physical instantiation of the social relations of production under capitalism as Harvey, other 
critical geographers, and numerous theorists within critical or Marxist schools of thought have 
posited, then public educational space itself provides an indispensable site of analysis of social 
relations under neoliberalism and the literal concrete manifestation of those social relations and 
the ideology that governs them.  This is a crucial point Ball is missing in his critical policy 
analyses of neoliberal governance.  Ideology does not merely happen within physical space and 
time.  It structures physical space and time.  Ball is correct that ideology governs behavior, or to 
use his preferred term performativity, within either institutional spaces (e.g. schools) or 
jurisdictional spaces (e.g. the think tanks, legislatures, law offices responsible for policy 
creation), but it also shapes and is shaped by those spaces themselves.  Harvey adapts Lefebvre’s 
concepts of material space (concrete sensate space), representation of space (ideologically 
inflected conception and representation of space), and space of representation (everyday life 
within those spaces) by adding his own categories of absolute, relative, and relational space.262  
These additions he derives from Marx’s theories of capital circulation through time and space.263  
Absolute space corresponds to the material and geographical setting.  Relative space corresponds 
to the circulation of people and commodities in time and relational space to the social and 
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political dynamics and their transformations over time.  Each influences the other and cannot 
exist in isolation.  Although Harvey’s and Lefebvre’s categories appear very arcane, they are 
immediately recognizable in familiar contexts.  Religions throughout human history have 
constructed sacred spaces in such a way as to reflect their belief systems and the social relations 
of their doctrinal practices.  The U.S. Capitol manifests America’s civil religion in its 
neoclassical design and civic institutions in its bicameral structure.  The Chrysler Building 
embodies the Art Deco aesthetic of its time as well as the early twentieth century hegemony of 
the automotive industry with its ornamentation designed to look like hub caps and hood 
ornaments.  It is a small step to extend these concepts from individual buildings to the larger 
urban spaces themselves.  The neoliberalization of urban space and the neoliberalization of 
education through policy should not, therefore, be analyzed in isolation from one another.   
While KIPP’s use of vacant SLPS property represents one form of neoliberalizing 
physical infrastructure, SLPS’s many other vacant properties have taken another form.  In 2015, 
SLPS formed a real estate entity called the Building Revitalization Collaborative, the purpose of 
which was to find either buyers or uses for its current inventory of around 35 closed schools.  
The BRC solicited both community input and potential buyers, though it filtered community 
input through its technical advisory committee (TAC).  The TAC is comprised of nearly 50 
members whose areas of expertise include architecture, finance, historic preservation, 
construction, law, economic and housing development, and education.  Among them is Vincent 
Schoemehl, who was one of St. Louis’s youngest serving mayors when he began the first of his 
three four-year terms in 1981.  Schoemehl was and remains a major force for civic 
entrepreneurialism and urban neoliberalization.  During his tenure as mayor, Schoemehl was 
known for his enthusiastic embrace of public-private partnerships and his focus on historic 
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preservation.  He was, however, less enthusiastic about low-income housing, especially within 
the concentrated racialized poverty of St. Louis’s northern neighborhoods.  Schoemehl steered 
federal community development block grants (CDBGs)264 away from the abject poverty of the 
north side and toward already gentrifying neighborhoods like the Central West End.  Keeping 
development funds from poor, nearly exclusively black neighborhoods was necessary, 
Schoemehl argued, because new housing in the city’s poorest neighborhoods would turn St. 
Louis into “the region’s final repository of all the poor, underemployed and undereducated.”265  
Schoemehl preferred the federal monies go toward developing market-rate rather than public 
housing in keeping with neoliberalism’s tendency to preserve vestiges of Keynesian welfare 
programs by redistributing public funds upward as welfare for the middle and capitalist classes.  
By the late 1980s, his office had totally cut off the flow of CBDG funding to public housing.266   
Among the seventeen sold properties the BRC describes as its “success stories,” ten have 
already been or are scheduled to be converted into market-rate apartments and condos.267  Of 
those ten, eight are the work of famed late nineteenth and early twentieth century architect 
William B. Ittner, who was St. Louis’s Commissioner of School Buildings.  Ittner designed over 
fifty schools for St. Louis’s rapidly growing population.  His designs were copied across the 
country for more than 400 schools and were often described as public education’s civic temples.  
Several of his buildings, including some in St. Louis that are now chic lofts marketed to young 
professionals in gentrifying areas, are on the National Register of Historic Places for their 
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innovative interior designs and the beauty of their exterior brickwork.  Clark School (Figure 3) is 
one such Ittner school built in 1907.  SLPS sold the building in November 2016 for $500,000 to 
a developer who plans to convert Clark into 44 market-rate apartments.268   
As a city, St. Louis reached its population peak in the 1950s at over 850,000.  Its public 
school population peaked in the 1960s at over 115,000.  The city is under 320,000 now, with the 
school district below 23,000.  The mobility and circulation of both people and capital out of the 
city—often fueled by racial discrimination—illustrates Harvey’s concepts of how relative and 
relational space-time effect absolute space.  The schools are fixed capital that was built with 
bricks and mortar (material/absolute), using taxed capital surplus (relative space-time), for the 
purpose of educating a public (relational space-time).  But public schools—at least traditional 
public schools—are fixed capital for use-value rather than exchange-value.  That is, they are 
built for use outside of market exchange.  Yet SLPS, struggling to maintain use-value amidst 
declining revenues and students, endeavors to convert its fixed capital into liquid capital, and in 
doing so, it converts the buildings use-value into exchange-value.  The developers—among them 
the powerhouse of neoliberal mixed-income development, the firm McCormack, Baron, and 
Salazar—utilize historic preservation tax credits, federal monies, and other tools of civic 
entrepreneurialism in tandem with market-rate rental income to generate profits that, due to the 
tax incentives do not flow back into the school system that built the properties in the first place.  
The BRC captures this ideology in advertising its schools with taglines like “Historic Buildings 
ready for New Life” and “Embrace the Past for the Present.”269  Harvey fittingly sums up the 
dynamics of physical infrastructure and capital accumulation in saying, “Clearly, there is 
abundant opportunity here for tensions between factions of capital as well as for crises of 
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devaluation in the built environment.”270  Property redevelopers in St. Louis rely on capital’s 
mobility to create the opportunity for property revalorization and the conversion of use-values to 
exchange-values.  Yet capital mobility and the constitution and reconstitution of urban space has 
created an environment weighted toward exchange-values without the stabilizing effects of 
public spaces or use-value property upon which capital accumulation has depended. 
 
 
Figure 3: Clark School 
 
 The production of regionality encompasses many of the components of capital 
accumulation I have already laid out such as civic entrepreneurialism and the production and 
marketing of urban space for consumption.  However, territorial governance by local political 
and economic alliances is a messy affair, especially in St. Louis.  When political and economic 
crises occur, both people and capital move resulting in new alliances as well as different 
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boundaries and modes of governance.  St. Louis has not been able to expand its territory like 
other cities that successfully reversed population declines during the last half of the twentieth 
century271 because St. Louis City has been isolated from suburban St. Louis County since 1876.   
Missouri’s birth as a state was quite literally a compromise between Northern and Southern 
political economies.  During the decades following the Civil War, the industrializing St. Louis 
had a strained relationship with the rural political bloc that controlled state government.  While 
St. Louis was not a bastion of cosmopolitanism and racial tolerance, its location on the banks of 
the Mississippi made it a convergence point for Northern industrialists, European immigrants, 
and the first waves of former slaves desiring to live and work in cities.  These groups had little in 
common with the Southern ideologies of the rural leadership in state government.  In an effort to 
wrest control over what was becoming an economic powerhouse, St. Louis political and business 
elites established home rule in 1876, which erected a political and geographic barrier between 
the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County that exists to this day.272  Instead of consolidating its 
power, St. Louis’s isolation from St. Louis County made the city vulnerable to its opposition.  
Although the law prohibited a town from incorporating within two miles of another in the same 
county, home rule had meant that the City of St. Louis was not in St. Louis County, which led to 
the proliferation of municipalities formed largely for the purpose of taking advantage of St. 
Louis’s wealth and increasing industrial capacity while dodging the responsibility of providing 
services for a rapidly growing and diversifying population.  Six incorporated municipalities had 
sprung up by 1900 and 18 by 1930.  There were over 80 by the 1950s, and today there are 90.273  
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In St. Louis, wealth protection and local governance are often matters of racial exclusion or 
oppression or both.  The explosive growth (in terms of population, wealth, and number) of St. 
Louis’s suburbs from the mid twentieth century to the present has been fueled by zoning 
restrictions such as those prohibiting multi-family housing.  Class oppression here is inseparable 
from racial oppression.  Not only have the suburbs poached and protected much of the wealth of 
the city, but as St. Louis’s black population also fled the deteriorating urban space, it was largely 
funneled into equally segregated northern suburbs following further white flight.274  Within these 
majority-black suburbs, new forms of economic and legal oppression emerged to unite soft and 
hard forms of neoliberal discipline as Ferguson has made evident to the world.275  The effect of 
this balkanization on regional public education are difficult to overstate.  In short, St. Louis’s 
regional class-based and racial alliances formed and reformed over time for the purpose of 
preserving and improving site-based and territorial benefits at the expense of overall regional 
development both within the city and in its suburbs.  Neoliberal urbanism and the racialized 
balkanization of the Keynesian era differ in terms of policies and tactics, but they both show 
capitalism’s tendency to engage in capital accumulation by racializing wealth and poverty.276  In 
the next chapter, I will explore the consequences of St. Louis’s unstable production of regionality 
for school and housing desegregation in greater detail.  At this point, it is sufficient to show how 
St. Louis’s regional antagonisms of class, race, and geography provide a long and troubling 
historical backdrop to suburban-urban desegregation and its replacement by urban-only charter 
schooling—another policy boundary between the city and its suburbs.   
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  The production of scale is closely associated with the production of regionality since 
regionality is one of multiple spatial dimensions, for example common geographic scalar terms 
like municipal, regional, state, national, and international.  Most of Ball’s work from the late 
1990s to more recent is very insightful in elaborating the various scalar mutations as policies and 
the networks that form them spread horizontally and vertically.  In fact, Ball’s 1998 “Big 
Policies/Small World” cites Harvey throughout, and Ball seems poised to embark on a strong 
spatial and structural economics turn in his theorizing of critical policy analysis, but for the most 
part, Ball has stayed within discourse analysis and governmentality studies.277  While Harvey’s 
contributions to theorizing capitalism’s uneven development,278 neoliberalism’s project to restore 
class power through capital accumulation and class discipline,279 and elaborating the 
contradictions inherent to capitalism280 are unparalleled, he is largely uninterested in policy 
analysis.  He seems to presume policy networks like those Ball maps exist because they must 
exist.  Capitalism demands a ruling class, and neoliberalism knits that ruling class together as a 
tapestry of NGOs, corporate actors, elected officials, state bureaucracies, and so on across 
multiple geographic scales.  Mapping those relationships, for Harvey, is apparently unnecessary 
since we can simply see and to some extent predict their class interests realized in the built 
environment and in the modes of governance they create.  These latter points of analysis offer 
not the policy snapshots of network analysis but a robust account of capitalism’s scalar 
transformations in time and space.   
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Critical geographers other than Harvey have successfully incorporated spatial concerns 
with governmentality.  Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore paid much closer attention 
to the effects of neoliberal policymaking on uneven development.  As I discussed in Chapter 
Two, their theory of variegated neoliberalization incorporates the scalar uneven development of 
neoliberal policies as well as the neoliberalization of the market-oriented regimes that drive 
uneven development through policy transfer.281  The framework of variegated neoliberalization 
addresses the “blind-spots” within three different approaches to critical policy analysis:  varieties 
of capitalism (e.g. akin to Ball’s work on policy transfer282); historical materialist international 
political economy (related to Harvey’ critique of global neoliberalism but overcome by his 
attention to local and regional differentiations283); and governmentality approaches (Ball’s 
network ethnography284).285  In paying close attention to policy’s role within neoliberal statecraft, 
these theorists elaborate on the governance practices Harvey presupposes without losing sight of 
the structural political-economic and geographic concerns missing from Ball’s work on 
governmentality.  Peck and Theodore argue that local environments “are not inert backdrops to 
policymaking,” nor are they only “an interconnected web of behavioral practices, or a zone of 
rational decision making.”286  Physical landscapes and policy landscapes are always related and 
in tension, or as Peck and Theodore put it, “‘Mobile’ policies…dynamically reconstitute the 
terrains across which they travel, at the same time as being embedded within, if not products of, 
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extralocal regimes and circuits.”287  Such a dialectical tension between local and supralocal 
policy regimes is evident in the diversity of state laws for charter schools,288 in the global reach 
of “locally-oriented” education reform movements like TFA (now Teach for All),289 and the 
local and regional dominance of national CMOs and EMOs like KIPP and Imagine, Inc.290  Even 
though Missouri’s state education board closed down St. Louis’s Imagine schools after their 
disastrous experiment in rapid growth, KIPP is poised to open its first high school in the city in 
the fall of 2017.  It will then operate two elementary schools (KIPP Victory and KIPP Wisdom 
Academies), two middle schools (KIPP Inspire and KIPP Triumph Academies), and one 
secondary school (KIPP St. Louis High School)—a self-contained and self-governing parallel 
school district that has free access to vacant district properties.  Both KIPP and Inspire illustrate 
approaches national entities take to exploit local systems to maximize growth—even if Inspire 
clearly overplayed its hand.   
KIPP has been masterful at leveraging its national brand, while continually marketing 
itself as a local, even grassroots movement.  KIPP first entered the St. Louis market in 2009 after 
having rejected earlier attempts by a local 501(c)3 called SUTAK (St. Louisans United to Attract 
KIPP) to court the CMO.  KIPP was wise to play hard to get.  After holding out for 18 months, 
KIPP received pledges of over $500,000 from the Regional Business Council which in turn got 
to shape KIPP’s governing board of directors.291  From the start, KIPP planned to open five 
schools to create a fully integrated K-12 system serving around 1,500 students by 2017.  With 
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around 1,300 currently and a high school set to open in the fall of 2017, they are right on track, 
and their free access to unused district property and district funds for renovation has simply 
greased the skids of KIPP’s growth strategy.  KIPP’s national support for facilities and other 
operational costs from the likes of the Walton, Gates, Broad, and Fisher foundations as well as 
the federal Department of Education is well known.  But in addition to such national 
contributions and the “assistance” of SUTAK and the Regional Business Council, KIPP received 
considerable financial assistance from Illinois-based Midwestern community development 
consultant IFF in tandem with the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.  The St. Louis Fed hails the 
efforts of IFF CEO Joe Neri who partnered with KIPP to revitalize St. Louis’s long-struggling 
Fox Park neighborhood.  IFF’s St. Louis branch secured a leasehold loan with KIPP that would 
allow KIPP to redevelop its first property, the DeSales facility, a shuttered Catholic school.  
Leasehold loans are similar to TIF financing in that developers do not have to assume full 
upfront construction costs but can pay both rent and debt service once the project starts 
generating income.  Essentially, both offer immediate spatial restructuring that relies on temporal 
flexibility for capital/debt circulation.  The St. Louis Fed and IFF highlight the transformation of 
Fox Park’s social relations in the wake of KIPP’s absolute and relative transformation of 
DeSales: 
Beyond the academic benefits to its students, neighbors say the KIPP charter school has 
become a catalyst for community revitalization. The success of KIPP Inspire has 
extended beyond the school grounds and engaged the entire community in a shared sense 
of purpose. Crime is observed by residents to be down, housing is being renovated and 
there is a renewed sense of pride in the air. As an anchor, the school is attracting more 
middle-class families and businesses to invest in the Fox Park neighborhood.292 
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Setting aside KIPP’s nebulous and intangible benefits of shared senses of purpose and the 
verifiable but unverified observations regarding crime, the structural economic benefits—the 
tangibles—of KIPP’s expansion are apparent.  KIPP and other charters are deployed within 
deindustrialized and racially segregated urban spaces in order to revalorize property that local 
capital regimes, in coordination with regional and national capital regimes, can market to 
middle-class families or professionals as a form of tactical spatial “revitalization” within the 
larger capital accumulation strategy of urban neoliberalization.293  IFF also partnered with, and 
stood to benefit from, its loans to other local development organizations and national grocery 
chains to “revitalize” Fox Park.   
IFF is not just focused on neighborhood revitalization via charter school construction in 
St. Louis.  The firm offers its construction, financing, and consultation services within the 
following states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas (St. Louis and 
metropolitan Kansas City), Ohio, Wisconsin, and Iowa—essentially the hypersegregated, 
deindustrialized, and charter saturated cities of the Rust Belt.  IFF manages the “Indiana Charter 
Schools Facilities Fund, a statewide revolving loan to assist charter schools with facilities 
financing.”  About Missouri, IFF lists its following triumphs: 
IFF has made 150 loans to nonprofits and charter schools in Missouri and Kansas. In 
2015, we celebrated reaching a $50 million lending milestone in the city of St. Louis. We 
offer real estate consulting in the Kansas City and St. Louis metropolitan areas, and have 
done research on schools in St. Louis and Kansas City, with a focus on growing the 
numbers of high-performing seats in the highest-need areas. Most recently, with grants 
from The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, we are supporting quality charter schools 
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in Kansas City through research, financing, and real estate consulting and 
development.294 
 
Such ideological transposition of neoliberal market discourse onto educational spaces is 
staggering.  However, “growing the numbers of high-performing seats in the highest-need areas” 
transcends discourse.  It is a matter of restructuring urban educational space within and through 
the physical and ideological processes and mechanisms of urban neoliberalization.  IFF and 
similar local, regional, and national entities in urban neoliberalization markets do not just focus 
on charter schools.  Rather, they situate charter schools within the totality of urban 
neoliberalization, which involves a larger ecology of services and restructuring such as 
healthcare, food, housing, sustainability, historic preservation and other areas to which civic 
entrepreneurialism directs its attention and its tax incentives.  This is precisely why critical 
policy analyses cannot rely on discourse, even with attention paid to the scalar mutation of 
discourse.  Charter schools are not just about reforming urban education.  They are about 
reforming urban life according to the logics, circuits, and relationships of urban 
neoliberalization.  Franchising CMOs and EMOs like KIPP and Imagine, Inc.; local, regional, 
and national developers and redevelopment firms like IFF and McCormack, Baron, Salazar; 
elected officials and bureaucrats; and nonprofits and corporate foundations all benefit from urban 
neoliberalization, each from its respective scalar position. 
 The production of scale and the restructuring of urban space depends upon the 
reorganization territorial systems of political administration.  Charter school growth has been 
fueled by such reorganization of educational governance at all scales.  At the national scale, for 
example, the federal government restructured territorial educational administration at both the 
state and local levels by capitalizing on the disaster of the Great Recession.  With the help of the 
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Gates and Broad foundations, the Obama administration bribed or “incentivized” states to pass 
pro-charter legislation, adopt the Common Core State Standards, and implement approved 
regimes of student, teacher, and school accountability metrics for a chance to receive federal 
monies they desperately needed after their own budgets were gutted by austerity cuts and the 
economic downturn.295  The federal government’s strong-armed incentivizing would seem to be 
at odds with state sovereignty over education, especially for those on the political right, but the 
Obama administration’s structural reforms in Race to the Top were merely the ideological 
continuation and tactical shift from the Bush administration’s punitive compliance mandates 
established in No Child Left Behind.  Thus, federal education policy perfectly mimics the 
rhythms of neoliberalism—the rollback/rollout phases, the alternating hard and soft exercising of 
neoliberal discipline.  While the political right might have publicly decried federal overreach, it 
privately celebrated the federal support for the very privatization policies it had been developing 
and regionally deploying in places like the Rust Belt.  As I have maintained throughout this 
dissertation, Midwestern urban education policy is federal education policy and is likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future.  Arne Duncan’s restructuring of Chicago Public Schools 
(and Rahm Emmanuel’s current influence over that system) preceded his restructuring of the 
nation’s public schools.  Mike Pence and Betsy DeVos are positioned to continue the scalar 
expansion of Rust Belt education restructuring as policies tested in Michigan’s and Indiana’s 
urban spaces mutate at the federal level and are redeployed down to individual states and cities.  
I will say more about the reorganization of educational governance in St. Louis in the next 
chapter, but for now it suffices to say that the concentration of charter schools in St. Louis 
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depended upon the restructuring of governance for St. Louis Public Schools from a 
democratically elected school board to an appointed board of neoliberal managerial governance, 
a process that has proven highly effective while also being replete with contradiction. 
 Lastly, we arrive at the geopolitics of capitalism.  Harvey draws attention to the 
dialectical tension between capitalist logics and territorial governance regimes.  Territorial 
governance regimes utilize capitalist logics, but they are geographically bound.  The capitalist, 
on the other hand, will make use of territorial advantages (e.g. those provided by civic 
entrepreneurs) before moving on to newer territories with greater advantages.  Harvey refers to 
this movement across space in search of greener pastures as capitalism’s “spatial fix.”  As he 
puts it, “The contradictions of capital accumulation build into a crisis of overaccumulation of 
both capital and labor threatening massive devaluations of capital and devastating levels of 
unemployment.”296  Such a crisis requires a spatial fix, that is, new spaces that relieve the 
pressures of overaccumulation and new labor relations.  Charter concentration in the Rust Belt 
reflects an impending crisis of such overaccumulation, or to use Greene and his colleagues 
phrasing, a charter school bubble.297  As I described in Chapter One, charter concentration in 
deindustrialized cities like those of the Rust Belt represents an existential threat to those cities’ 
public financial infrastructure, which has been systemically weakened by the alternating blows 
of capital’s exodus and the concomitant incentive packages that Neil Smith refers to as 
“geobribes.”298  So far, that threat has been managed (not necessarily successfully) by territorial 
regulators that occasionally curb excess (e.g. Imagine, Inc.’s expansion in St. Louis) and periodic 
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infusions of capital from local and global elites.  Perpetual saving is necessary to stave off the 
collapse of the local charter industry not just for the students’ sake—though discursively every 
facet of the charter movement is “for the children’s sake”—but to preserve both the risk and 
repayment structures of (local) charter schools’ (global) bond debt.  In other words, charters are 
often argued as solutions to local issues, but those charter schools tend to be national franchises 
financed by global debt markets.  Smith describes the contradictions of urban neoliberalization in 
stating, “The new concatenation of urban functions and activities vis-à-vis the national and the 
global changes not only the make-up of the city but the very definition of what constitutes—
literally—the urban scale.”299  Thus, the charter school movements’ muddling of spatial scales 
goes beyond shutting down neighborhood schools and replacing them with national charter 
franchises.  It goes beyond firing local educators and replacing them with nationally and even 
internationally imported lower-wage workers.  The financing of the whole endeavor links public 
education infrastructure debt—traditionally a largely local affair as school boards have the power 
to finance facilities costs through local taxation—with the global markets and investor appetites 
for high-risk, high-return bonds. 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to lay out a few major themes and tensions within 
critical policy analysis.  The first is that of the insights and failures of poststructural approaches 
to policy analysis.  While many poststructural analyses offer an important corrective to overly 
reductive or economistic critiques offered by some soi-disant orthodox Marxists, their potential 
for both cohesion of thought and emancipation are severely limited by their radical individuation.  
Neoliberalism’s contextual differentiation, class hierarchies, and policy processes and effects are 
rarely clear and predictable, nor are strategies for opposition straightforward.  Understanding 
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neoliberal policy requires understanding the larger policy ecology that surrounds it.300  
Poststructural theorists find enormous potential with the multiple entry points for opposition to 
neoliberalization, yet as Marcus Weaver-Hightower concedes, “it is difficult to make wholesale, 
directed changes in an ecosystem without intervention at many points.”301  Poststructural 
theorists like Peters and Olssen argue that education provides a space for creating unity across 
and against diverse forms of Foucauldian governance, but they offer no serious explanation of 
the form and content of such education since poststructuralism is inherently suspicious of 
universal ethics and unitive metanarratives, whether ontological or sociological.  Harvey’s 
categories of capitalist accumulation within space and time incorporate ecological concerns 
while retaining a coherent and potentially unitive content.  Like Marx, he lacks robust theories of 
ethics and ontology and, therefore, cannot ground critiques of capitalism’s social injustices in 
fully formed theories of social ontology and the inherent dignity of human life.  Harvey’s 
structural critiques presuppose neoliberal policy circulation, but he largely ignores policy itself 
as a site of critique.  Critical geographers and urban theorists like Peck, Brenner, Theodore, and 
others offer a vital bridge between structural critiques of urban neoliberalization and critical 
policy analysis.  They retain the differentiation and multiplicity of neoliberal policy regimes 
articulated so well by theorists like Ball without losing sight of the spatial dimensions of capital 
accumulation and class discipline.  I have also attempted to offer a theoretically robust account 
for how the regional concentration of charter schools in the Rust Belt and in St. Louis in 
particular is an effect of urban neoliberalization within hypersegregated and deindustrialized 
cities.  I turn now to synthesizing these processes of urban neoliberalization with the reactionary 
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transition from the Keynesian welfare or liberal state to the revanchist neoliberal state elaborated 
in the second chapter.  To do so, I offer Missouri Senate Bill 781 as a focal point of policy that 
illustrates this transition and foregrounds the racial, spatial, and temporal characteristics of what 
Harvey calls accumulation by dispossession. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FROM DESEGREGATION TO DISPOSSESSION 
I will put a very simple proposition to you: namely that today, all politics is about real estate. 
-Frederic Jameson302   
 
 Liberalism, as I detailed in the second chapter, is a matter of different and competing 
notions of individual human freedom.  Classical liberalism focused on maximizing 
decontextualized self-interest within markets free from state interference.  Social liberalism, as 
manifested in Keynesian economics and the social democratic welfare state, re-contextualized 
the individual within the social sphere and sought to use the state to mitigate various oppressive 
market and social forces while also protecting capitalist markets and promoting economic 
growth.  Neoliberalism seeks a revival of free market logics while also utilizing a strong 
interventionist state to promote market growth by creating new markets, expanding existing 
markets, and legitimating the logic of individualized self-interest maximization.  Per Karl 
Polanyi, the free market is a fiction, and markets have always relied on states to maintain that 
fiction structurally and ideologically.  For Polanyi, the state had to develop what he called a 
“double movement” in which it promoted marketization while also protecting society against the 
ravages of marketization.303  Nancy Fraser points to the weaknesses she sees in Polanyi’s binary, 
arguing the political struggles of the twentieth century reflect a “triple movement” involving 
marketization, social protections, and emancipation.304  Social protections such as Keynesian 
protections of the family wage—remuneration that would allow working class men to support a 
family—did not take into consideration feminist struggles for emancipation occurring within the 
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nuclear family and the larger political economy.  Fraser contends that the marketization and 
social protection movements of the state aligned against the emancipation movement.  Under 
what she calls “progressive neoliberalism,” the movements of marketization and emancipation 
align against social protections.305  The neoliberal state encourages all subjects regardless of 
race, gender, sexuality, or religious creed to seek their freedom within new and intensified 
market spaces, provided that they do not seek any social protections from the state along the 
way.306 
 Fraser’s tripartite state movements is a useful way of thinking of the mutations of state 
policies for education equity.  With the Brown decision, and during the three or so decades that 
followed it, the state (to greater and often lesser degrees) implemented social protections against 
the economic and political ravages of public education apartheid.  Such protections produced 
substantial resource gains307 and significant improvements in measurable outcomes.308  However, 
they largely failed to deliver at the level of emancipation as black teachers were not integrated 
into public education’s post-Brown workforce309—those who did have jobs were often ignored 
regarding desegregation310—and the students themselves were assimilated into educational 
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spaces that were either culturally hostile, ignorant, or both.311  The neoliberal turn epitomized by 
the charter school movement has, however, shifted marketization’s alignment away from social 
protections toward emancipation.  As Arne Duncan repeated ad nauseam while arguing for the 
expansion of the charter school industry and the closure of thousands of traditional public 
schools, “we can’t afford to leave talent on the sidelines.”  Public education’s failures, as 
contested as they are numerous, are here framed in the threadbare clichés of market 
emancipation—not emancipation from marketization, emancipation through marketization.  The 
centrist neoliberal worldview constructs access to a safe, free, and appropriate public education 
as the ability to form oneself according to the workforce demands of the twenty-first century in 
spite of the fact that such demands are unknown and unknowable.312  The right to an education 
for a more dignified life is permissible as long as human dignity corresponds to human capital 
development.  For centrist neoliberals, the indignity of public education apartheid before and 
after Brown313 is less about dehumanization and more about suboptimal performance that leaves 
“talent on the sidelines.”  The charter school movement appropriates the Civil Rights Movement 
in much the same way Fraser argues neoliberalism appropriates second wave feminism.  It 
discards social protections and replaces non-market struggles for emancipation through 
education with the structural marketization of educational spaces and a discourse of 
emancipation that accords to market demands.  Dehumanizing structural issues like poverty and 
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racism are thus allowed to exist so long as there are sufficient ladders of opportunity within those 
spaces.  Where such ladders are deemed insufficient in number or degree is where further 
marketization is necessary. 
 This chapter’s focus on the transition from desegregation to neoliberalization in St. Louis 
performs its own sort of double movement.  First, I argue that desegregation efforts in St. 
Louis—and, by extension, nationally—illustrate the failures of the Keynesian welfare state to 
protect black populations from the twinned structural forces of marketization and racism, both of 
which thwarted their historical struggles for emancipation from slavery through Jim Crow.  
During the second movement, I argue that the transition from Keynesian liberalism to 
neoliberalism is part of the ongoing and historic spatial processes of what David Harvey calls 
accumulation by dispossession.  To do so, I bring a critical focus to the policy (and historical 
policy ecology) that put an end to state commitments to St. Louis’s historic school desegregation 
busing program and made Missouri the 34th state to legalize charter schools.  I offer a synthesis 
between the concentration of charter schools in the hypersegregated and deindustrialized cities of 
the Rust Belt described in the first chapter, the theories of neoliberalism as a project of class 
discipline and accumulation of capital elaborated in the second chapter, and the spatio-temporal 
dimensions of urban neoliberalization laid out in the third chapter.  I do not claim that my 
conclusions regarding public education and urban neoliberalization in St. Louis apply pari passu 
with charter concentration in other regions or even within other Rust Belt cities.  Such a claim 
would ignore the path dependency of variegated neoliberalization.  I do, however, claim that St. 
Louis provides an important case study in what Brenner and Theodore call the “cities and 
geographies of actually existing neoliberalism,”314 and critical analyses of other Rust Belt cities 
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might provide important insight into how charter schools are integral components of much larger 
efforts to restructure urban governance, redevelop urban space, and remake urban life according 
to the imperatives of capital accumulation and the restoration of class power.    
 
The Deep Roots of Segregated Schooling in St. Louis 
Since its beginning, Missouri has been a place of converging and often conflicting 
geographical and political identities.  Depending on the historical era and specific territorial 
perspective, St. Louis, the Gateway City, has been both a western outpost of early U.S. colonial 
expansion and the easternmost city of a vast Western frontier.  Missouri entered the union as a 
slave state north of the Mason-Dixon Line, and its position on the banks of the Mississippi made 
it attractive both to the slavery-based agricultural economy of the South and the industrialized 
manufacturing economy of the North.  In other words, Missouri was the geographic convergence 
of the Northern U.S. political economy that structured space and social relations according to 
urban industrialization and the Southern political economy that structured space and social 
relations according to agrarian slavery.  During the decades leading up to the Civil War, the city 
saw ideological (and physical) clashes between the Southern sympathizers and Northern 
urbanites whose politics were, if not anti-racist, certainly anti-slavery.  St. Louis became a 
hotbed for abolitionist activity as anti-slavery German immigrants flooded the city to such a 
degree that, by 1860, fully a third of St. Louis’s citizens had been born in Germany.315  The 
contradictions of this time and place are embodied in Ulysses S. Grant, future commanding 
general of the Union Army and U.S. President, owning slaves on his St. Louis farm during the 
1850s.  Such contradictions have stayed with St. Louis over the years.  Considering the Missouri 
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Compromise and the Scott v Sandford decision in the nineteenth century, the landmark housing 
discrimination decision of Shelley v. Kraemer during the twentieth century, and the focus of 
national and international attention on issues of police brutality in Ferguson during the twenty-
first century, St. Louis has been the epicenter of many of the country’s most decisive and painful 
confrontations at the intersection of race and property.  Alongside each of these junctures, St. 
Louis (and the rest of the country) was forging, expanding, and reforming its public school 
system in ways that reflected and in some instances responded directly to the region’s and 
country’s literal and symbolic battles over race and political economy.  
Understanding St. Louis’s post-Brown struggle to build a racially integrated public school 
system requires that I lay a foundation for why such a goal was and remains so elusive.  Missouri 
built its first high school in 1854 in St. Louis to encourage the wealthy families who sent their 
children to Eastern private schools to invest in the state’s emerging public school system – 
arguably quite an early iteration of a magnet school.316  Two years later, Hiram Revels, who 
would become the nation’s first black U.S. Senator, established a school for free and enslaved 
blacks in St. Louis in defiance of an 1846 law that prohibited black education.  Blanche K. 
Bruce, who would become the first black U.S. Senator to serve out his full term also taught in a 
black school in nearby Hannibal, Missouri.317  Missouri codified its segregated school system in 
its 1875 rewrite of its constitution, and like so many Southern states, its funding of its black 
schools was abysmal despite the fact that black student attendance was at least comparable or 
greater than white student attendance.318 
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For thousands of black children living outside St. Louis, attending school was 
increasingly difficult.  The closer Missouri moved toward the end of Reconstruction, the more it 
strengthened its policies of school segregation.  The result was that, while some suburban 
counties established black schools, many with a relatively sparse black population made little or 
no effort to fund black education.  Because they were legally denied entrance into their county’s 
white public schools, many students had to travel several miles to attend black schools.  Few in 
number and surrounded by the hostility of rural Reconstruction Era Missouri racism, black 
families living outside the city lacked the political power to challenge a legal system that called 
on them to attend segregated schools while simultaneously making no provisions for such 
schools.  Even though districts that had too few black residents to establish a separate school 
system were legally obligated to pay tuition for those students to attend another district, the law 
was unenforced.  In a sense, this unmet obligation is an early instantiation of a student transfer 
law, albeit one aimed at maintaining rather than transcending segregated schooling.  Being 
denied the right to participate in education and the broader political process meant that many 
families were simply unaware that the law existed.  This would not be the first time the arcane 
and often undisclosed rights of black public schoolchildren would be ignored to keep them out of 
white public schools.  For those who might have known, the instinct for self-preservation no 
doubt provided a potent incentive to either bear the burdens of tuition and travel or simply forgo 
education altogether.319   
Education was by no means the only reason for rural black families to move to the city, 
but in many ways, it was a sort of barometer of the relative life chances of black families in 
Missouri and throughout the Deep South.  The huge gains in political enfranchisement following 
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the Civil War led to a massive expansion of black education in places like Alabama’s Black Belt, 
but as reactionary white racism erased the political gains for blacks in the rural South, it deprived 
rural black schools of both their political and economic support.320  As political and economic 
conditions deteriorated in the rural South, the Great Migration accelerated, and border cities like 
St. Louis began their dramatic demographic shifts earlier than more Northern industrial cities 
like Detroit and Chicago.  St. Louis was of a crucial hub of the Great Migration, and thousands 
of black families coming up from Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, and western Alabama either 
relocated to St. Louis or passed through on their journeys north.  By 1900, St. Louis had a higher 
proportion of black citizens than any other U.S. city except Baltimore.321   
The dearth of public education for black students in the rest of the South made Missouri’s 
provisions seem generous.  Missouri’s total educational expenditures for both white and black 
students were (and are) subpar, but by 1919, the state’s per black pupil education spending 
exceeded that of any other former slave state.  Because rural Missouri provided so little for the 
education of its sparse black population, the scant funding of black education was concentrated 
in St. Louis, which in 1907 had built one of the country’s top all-black secondary schools, 
Sumner High School.322  Two decades later, Vashon, another black high school, was added.  
Paradoxically, segregation and systemic underfunding made these two schools among of the best 
public schools in the city since they could recruit the best black teachers and administrators from 
Missouri’s and in fact the country’s best historically black colleges and universities.323  This was, 
however, both a blessing and a curse.  St. Louis’s white population showed strong growth during 
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the early decades of the twentieth century but began leveling off after the 1930s.  The city’s 
black population, on the other hand, went from around 35,000 in 1900 to nearly 154,500 by 
1950.324  The city had gone from a few state-of-the-art black schools during the early decades to 
drastically overcrowded and underfunded black schools at the mid-century point. 
 
Housing Segregation in St. Louis 
The racial dimensions of capital accumulation and urbanism during both the Keynesian 
liberal and neoliberal eras are by no means reducible to segregated housing.  Housing, 
nevertheless, is so intimately bound up with race, class, and the de/resegregation of public 
education, that it provides an illustration of and something of a proxy for other dimensions 
racialized capital accumulation and urbanism.  St. Louis was an early adopter and innovative 
practitioner of residential segregation.  The same racist logic that had justified sending black 
children to underfunded and segregated schools because their learning could be tailored to their 
unique needs prevailed when it came to housing restrictions.  Black residents, the argument 
went, would simply be better off living in neighborhoods that shared their cultural practices and 
racial and political attitudes.325  By 1915, St. Louis officials began drafting urban zoning 
ordinances that would restrict black residents to a neighborhood called the Ville in the city’s 
north tracts or scatter them among industrial and commercial zones along the river, but before 
this plan could be implemented, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Buchanan v. Warley (1917) struck 
down a similar plan developed in another border state river town, Louisville, Kentucky, on the 
basis that it infringed upon the rights of white property owners to freely enter into property 
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contracts326—yet another example of how U.S. law consecrates market freedoms over basic 
human rights like housing.   
With official city ordinances aimed at overt racial segregation off the table, St. Louis’s 
propertied class took a more decentralized approach to preserving segregation.  As Heathcott 
points out, Jim Crow was not endemic to more northern cities like St. Louis like it was in the 
Deep South, and, therefore, it had to be “carefully constructed by white politicians, real estate 
groups, neighborhood organizations and merchant associations over the course of five 
decades.”327  City officials turned to more covert forms of racially restrictive zoning like 
targeting all or nearly all-black neighborhoods for overlapping or contiguous industrial 
development as well as commercial establishments deemed undesirable (e.g. liquor stores, 
taverns, brothels) without ever explicitly mentioning race.328  The close proximity to industrial 
pollution and disreputable business establishments meant that whatever value those already 
deteriorating homes held for black owners prior to the new zoning ordinances was certainly 
slashed after their implementation.  Regardless of its origins in policy, the deterioration of these 
neighborhoods served as confirmation for racist whites that black neighborhoods were sites of 
decaying morals as well as property values. 
Parasitic real estate agents fueled these prejudices and turned them into substantial profits 
through a process known as blockbusting.  Agents would buy a single property in a white 
neighborhood within a few blocks of a black neighborhood and sell or rent the property to a 
black family.  They would then warn other homeowners of what would happen to their property 
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value if they did not sell before the block transitioned into a black neighborhood.  Only a few 
needed to be persuaded before the agent’s duplicitous prognostications became fact.  Working 
class families in St. Louis’s north side neighborhoods feared losing the savings they had sunk 
into their homes, and those fears turned into reality as neighbor after neighbor sold out and prices 
began to fall.  Once a certain momentum was achieved, the process quickly accelerated.  The 
blockbusting real estate agents would buy up as much of the block as they could at fire sale 
prices and immediately sell or rent them at exorbitant rates to desperate black families in search 
of quality housing in a city with one of the country’s most severe housing shortages.  Of nearly 
1,500 rental properties with listed vacancies in 1941, fewer than one hundred allowed black 
residents.  Properties for sale were even rarer.  Of roughly 1,600 available in 1940, ten were 
advertised as for sale to black buyers.329  Racism was useful in manipulating the market, and the 
market reinforced racism with tangible economic consequences for black property ownership.  
Policy, ideology, property rights, racism, and the mobility and circulation of people and capital 
all formed a remarkably efficient system for redistributing working class wealth (by far most 
intensively and perniciously black wealth) to a class of property owners and developers.  While 
many of the white homeowners were able to enter and prosper in stable housing markets 
elsewhere in the city or in the suburbs, the black residents were either gouged on their rents or 
had bought into a disastrous market without any realistic alternatives and were stuck with houses 
that would likely never return to their purchase price. The process rapidly engulfed whole 
neighborhoods and is illustrative of how racism and economic exploitation in St. Louis and 
certainly elsewhere are interwoven and mutually reinforcing.  Even white homeowners who 
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might not have objected to having black neighbors on purely racist grounds (no doubt there were 
few if any) seemingly had to choose among three socially destructive options: 1) they could sell 
their homes and relocate in an effort to retain as large a portion of their capital as possible—an 
act that provided a further incentive for others to do the same; 2) they could remain and almost 
certainly witness their property values collapse; or 3) they could form neighborhood coalitions 
that tried to prevent black families from purchasing or renting homes in the neighborhood. 330  
These options would characterize countless neighborhoods all over the country during the post-
war decades of suburbanization, but they had a much earlier start in St. Louis than most other 
cities.331 
While local planning officials were forced to maintain the thinly-veiled pretense of race-
neutral zoning, neighborhood associations were free to put their racism on full display.  These 
associations had been strong proponents of de jure residential segregation and, like blockbusting 
real estate agents, had circulated materials warning white homeowners of the impending “negro 
invasion.”  One famous 1916 photograph shows an entire city block with an “X” over all but one 
of the houses to indicate those owned or occupied by black families.  The pamphlet warns “An 
entire block ruined by negro invasion…SAVE YOUR HOME!  VOTE FOR 
SEGREGATION!”332  After Buchanan thwarted their attempts to openly ensconce residential 
segregation in city planning, the neighborhood organizations modified their tactics (but not the 
tone of their literature) to promote racially restrictive housing covenants that achieved the same 
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purpose as an official city ordinance.  Because these covenants were drafted, signed, and 
enforced by private citizens and not city officials, they had the protection of the courts that 
refused to become the moral arbiters of private property contracts.  Drawing up these covenants 
followed the patterns of the Great Migration of black families to Northern and border cities.  A 
few of St. Louis’s restrictive covenants dated to the years before World War I, but the practiced 
exploded during the decade that followed it.  Restrictive covenants slowed as migration slowed 
during the Great Depression, but by the 1940s, St. Louis had well over 300 housing covenants in 
place, with 286 of those dating to the 1920s.333  In terms of segregation, the housing covenants 
had achieved the exact same results as the original racial zoning had desired: black residents 
were confined to neighborhoods on the north side, especially the Ville, while the predominantly 
white neighborhoods in the working class south side and the affluent western reaches of the city 
remained for the time racially homogenous.   
In terms of redevelopment, however, St. Louis’s black population was doubly burdened.  
Not only were they confined to depreciated neighborhoods by overtly racist covenants, they were 
specifically targeted by covertly racist redevelopment projects.  The construction of the Central 
Parkway thoroughfare in 1915 had bulldozed black residences and churches with no provisions 
for relocating displaced citizens.  It was the black residents’ efforts to relocate themselves that 
precipitated the racist zoning and restrictive covenants.334  As city redevelopment projects 
intensified over the subsequent decades, black neighborhoods which had become synonymous 
with blighted neighborhoods followed the same predictable patterns of displacement and re-
concentration with little to no acknowledgement of how it was policies and profiteering rather 
than the black families themselves that created blight.  
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By the time the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to racially restrictive housing covenants 
with the Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), decades of their existence had already entrenched housing 
segregation in the city.  The very same realty practices that were court-supported before Shelley 
continued into the era of de facto discrimination.  Those who wished to deny occupancy to black 
families found new ways of doing so, and those who profited from blockbusting were 
unencumbered by possible legal ramifications resulting from their violations of the covenants.  
The Shelleys’ victory in securing the right to purchase their house on Labadie Avenue—just west 
of the Ville neighborhood—signaled that the overcrowded and underdeveloped segregated black 
neighborhoods on the city’s north side were simply insufficient to meet the demands of a 
growing population.  Some have argued that Shelley laid the groundwork for the NAACP’s later 
equal rights victories like Brown,335 while others have argued that the case coincides with a 
decisive split in the NAACP’s tactics from a focus on grassroots, working class politics to an 
elite organization that carried out its political actions in courtrooms rather than neighborhoods. 336  
In any case, Brown’s mandate to desegregate public schools arrived in St. Louis a mere eight 
years after Shelley when St. Louis was transitioning from one form of racist urban housing 
segregation (pre-war restrictive covenants) to the next (post-war public housing). 
Post-war city planners in St. Louis knew they had both an image and a housing problem.  
The racially discriminatory housing policies and practices of the first half of the century were 
reflected in the fact that, when the city’s population was at its height in 1950, 88,000 families 
lived in homes that were built before 1900 and 33,000 homes required shared toilet facilities.337  
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Massive downtown redevelopment projects (including the iconic arch) coincided with slum 
clearance and new mixed-income housing developments supported through federal monies 
coming from the 1949 American Housing Act and appropriations for highway construction.  The 
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) had been 
subsidizing suburbanization for white homeowners since before the war, a process which 
accelerated when the former GIs had newly constructed highways to take them into their city 
jobs in the morning and back to their single-family suburban homes in the evening.  These 
federal programs saw racially mixed neighborhoods as inherently risky investments, and so the 
new municipalities that were springing up just outside the city did their best through realty 
associations and exclusively zoning for single-family homes to ensure that the city’s low-income 
and black residents remained in the city and the federal funds and middle-income families 
continued to flow out to the suburbs.338  City officials knew that they had to take drastic 
measures to compete.  In addition to downtown beautification and industrial development 
projects, the city cleared the 465-acre Mill Creek Valley neighborhood, an almost exclusively 
low-income black community.  Mill Creek Valley was the largest urban redevelopment project in 
U.S. history to date.  The city displaced over 20,000 residents when it tore down 5,630 housing 
units to make way for highway construction, commercial development, and about new middle-
income housing (about 2000 fewer units than had previously existed).  Because the clearance 
was so massive and displaced so many people and because reconstruction money was slow to 
trickle in, the Mill Creek Valley redevelopment project earned the callous if disturbingly 
accurate nickname Hiroshima flats.339  The goal was to create “a vast and modern suburb within 
the city,” and like so many of the actual suburbs, St. Louis’s working class black residents had to 
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live elsewhere. 340 Many of those who were displaced were forced into the already overcrowded 
slums of the north side.   
By far St. Louis’s most notorious experiment with public housing was Pruitt-Igoe.  
Costing state and federal governments almost $22 million, the enormous 33-building complex 
sat on 57 acres of North St. Louis and was initially supposed to be segregated with twenty 11-
floor high-rise apartment complexes for black residents of Pruitt and thirteen for white residents 
of Igoe.  Construction was nearly complete when Brown struck down racially segregated public 
facilities.  Located in the middle of several of St. Louis’s most intensely segregated and 
overcrowded black neighborhoods, very few low-income white residents ever lived in Pruitt-
Igoe.  With the city continuing to demolish low-income black neighborhoods, Pruitt-Igoe quickly 
became another of St. Louis’s racially segregated low-income communities.  Moreover, the site 
was mostly disconnected from public transportation, grocery stores, and job opportunities, and 
the facilities themselves were never adequately funded or maintained.  In less than ten years, 
Pruitt-Igoe became emblematic of the country’s disastrous experiments with high-rise public 
housing that concentrated racialized poverty and crime in what became known as vertical 
ghettos.341   
There is likely no better spatial representation of the transition from the Keynesian 
welfare state to the neoliberal state than the Pruitt-Igoe site.  The symbolic potency of this site is 
well-known.  Architecture theorist Charles Jencks had this to say about Pruitt-Igoe: 
Happily, we can date the death of modern architecture to a precise moment in 
time…Modern Architecture [sic] died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3:32 
p.m. (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab 
blocks, were given the final coup de grâce by dynamite…Without a doubt, the ruins 
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should be kept, the remains should have a preservation order, so that we keep a live 
memory of this failure in planning and architecture.342 
 
Jencks’s wish that Pruitt-Igoe lie in state as a sort of battlefield memorial to its victims describes 
much of the time that has passed since the last of the rubble was cleared away in 1976.  Trees 
and grass cover the space now, but the pebbly ground and the occasional sewer cover or street 
curb give the unsettling impression of an archaeological excavation site for some long-gone 
civilization even though many of its former residents are still alive and reside only a few blocks 
away.  Several of those former residents recently participated in an event titled “Memorializing 
Displacement:  A Local/Global Workshop” alongside artists, academics, museum curators, and 
activists from St. Louis, Chicago, Philadelphia, and South Africa.  The workshop featured 
various archival and artistic ways to “preserve and amplify the stories of the ‘displaced.’”343  The 
group toured St. Louis’s major sites of displacement, including Pruitt-Igoe and Mill Creek 
Valley, and heard stories of what it was like to witness (and be displaced by) restless and 
insatiable urban “revitalization.”  
 Pruitt-Igoe has not been preserved in its emptiness out of a sense of reverence or warning 
as Jencks might have wished.  Rather, the site’s environmental contamination and the abject 
poverty and crime in its surrounding neighborhoods have thwarted numerous efforts by city 
officials over the years to redevelop the property, which the city’s Land Clearance for 
Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) owned.  Freeman Bosely, Jr., St. Louis’s first black mayor 
and vocal opponent of the city’s school desegregation program, tried during the 1990s to turn the 
site into a golf course with surrounding middle class housing as part of his entrepreneurial efforts 
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to attract capital and residents back to the city.  Indeed, it is for this reason that he opposed 
desegregation.  While, as I will elaborate, the desegregation program was a tremendous financial 
benefit for SLPS, busing students to suburban districts did nothing for property values in the city 
itself.  What was needed, on Bosely’s and other neoliberal officials’ view, was not public 
housing but public golf courses and mixed income housing, not (traditional) public schools but 
charter schools and other independent schools that could “anchor” neighborhood revitalization.  
 Not all proposals to revitalize Pruitt-Igoe have reflected urban neoliberalization.  On the 
fortieth anniversary of that dynamite blast, local community organizations held a contest called 
Pruitt-Igoe Now and called for proposals to reimagine Pruitt-Igoe and reintegrate the space, 
which was secured by a chain-linked fence and barbed wire, into the surrounding community.  A 
panel of academics—including Joseph Heathcott, whose work I have cited in this chapter—
judged submissions from all over the world.  The first and second-place proposals both 
addressed the surrounding neighborhoods’ issues as a food desert and envisioned redeveloping 
the vacant space according to urban agriculture and communal practices of growing and sharing 
food.  The third place proposal involved an un-fixed, multi-stage redevelopment process that 
allowed the surrounding neighborhoods to reshape the space over several years according to the 
community’s emergent political and social demands and interests.  This last proposal was a 
poignant and radical departure from Pruitt-Igoe’s origins and material, relational, and symbolic 
or representational development.  Instead of a top-down bureaucratic managerial approach to 
community needs—one which Jencks and countless others recognize as having been doomed 
from the start—the community would shape and be shaped by the space through its own political 
processes over time.  Such a strategic and symbolic departure from the site’s initial approach and 
 179 
 
tragic history is reflected in the proposed name, “The Fantastic Pruitt-Igoe!” which exuberantly 
defies how the space was conceived and what it has come to symbolize.344 
 Unfortunately, Pruitt-Igoe Now’s winning proposals ran into the dead end of urban 
neoliberalization.  Paul McKee, a local property developer, had been quietly piecing together 
vast tracts of massively devalued and abandoned property for more than a decade in north St. 
Louis as part of his NorthSide Regeneration project.  McKee had the help from the state to the 
tune of $40 million in tax credits and from the city in the form of $390 million in commitments 
to tax-increment financing.  For several years, McKee had held on to an option to purchase 
Pruitt-Igoe for $1 million.  In August of 2016, he finally exercised that option following the news 
that the federal government’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (the NGA—a global 
surveillance agency specializing in the satellite imagery facets of espionage and military ground 
troop support) would spend over $1.75 billion to construct its new west-headquarters in north St. 
Louis.  Formerly known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the NGA took on a 
much greater role (and much greater funding) following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 
acceleration and intensification of the perpetual “war on terror.”  The NGA is currently located at 
riverfront property on the city’s southern industrial edge but was looking for a nearly $2 billion 
facilities upgrade.  Such a high-ticket construction project ignited a fierce battle between St. 
Louis and Missouri officials and their politico-entrepreneurial counterparts in Illinois, who 
argued that the NGA should relocate its headquarters to rural farmland bordering Scott Air Force 
Base in southern Illinois.  While I have mostly focused on urban neoliberalization that involves 
the courtship of corporations, the battle for the NGA’s federal dollars shows just how little 
difference there is between corporate power and state power under neoliberalization.  In other 
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words, territorial competition can exist at devolved scales of governance as state entities compete 
to sell their space for the favors of other state entities.   
St. Louis won the spatial race to the bottom by offering a 99-acre tract of land on the 
north side for free.  Originally, city officials had planned to sell the land to the federal 
government for $14 million, but after Illinois offered free farmland, the city mortgaged two of its 
own buildings in order to raise $13 million to buy the land and give it away—this, in addition to 
the state’s $95 million Missouri offered in TIF money and the $36 million in Brownfield tax 
credits and the city’s pledge of $1.5 million in tax money every year for 30 years.345  City and 
state officials’ largesse did not flow out of a sense of patriotism or commitment to rid the world 
of terrorist threats using satellite surveillance.  Instead, the goal was to remake St. Louis’s 
desolate and devalued north side neighborhoods for millennials.  U.S. Representative William 
Lacy Clay put it this way: “The best and brightest want to live near other centers of talent and 
creative energy like Cortex, Washington Avenue and our great research universities…Because 
people who are working on the hardest problems of today and the biggest challenges that 
America will face in the future want to hang out together.”346  For now, I will set aside the 
reasonable argument that the hardest problems of today and the biggest challenges America will 
face in large part involve coming up with meaningful and lasting political-economic solutions for 
the people and not just the places devastated by capitalism’s creative destruction both locally and 
globally.  Instead, I will focus on Clay’s pressing concern for where millennia ls want to live and 
“hang out.”  After all, the latter concern is intimately bound up with the former.  In contrast with 
the community-development and community-driven proposals offered for the Pruitt-Igoe Now 
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contest and the Keynesian city’s earlier massive (and ultimately disastrous) investment in public 
housing for north St. Louis, Pruitt-Igoe and its surrounding neighborhoods are the epitome of the 
neoliberal state.  Neoliberal revitalization here involves massive public investments in spatial 
transformation, not for low-income and majority-minority communities living there but to 
displace those people through gentrification and redevelop that area for the consumer lifestyles 
of middle class (mostly white) millennials who work to maintain global U.S. hegemony through 
high-tech surveillance and data analysis.  Neil Smith describes this local-global dialectic of 
neoliberal urbanism in saying, “The post-1990s generalization of gentrification as a global urban 
strategy plays a pivotal role in neoliberal urbanism in two ways.  First, it fills the vacuum left by 
the abandonment of twentieth-century liberal urban policy.  Second, it serves up the central- and 
inner-city real-estate markets as burgeoning sectors of productive capital investment.”  Smith 
would not likely have been shocked, but he nonetheless might have found it interesting how St. 
Louis upholds the rich tradition of gentrification through militarization.  Much like Haussmann’s 
decadent housing and wide Parisian boulevards were built upon the rubble of the Paris 
Commune, whose revolutionary tactics took advantage of the narrow and overcrowded streets of 
the working-class neighborhoods, St. Louis’s new surveillance site combines local pacification 
through gentrification and global pacification through military hegemony. 
It is a mistake to assume that the NGA’s new $2 billion headquarters, Pruitt-Igoe, and 
other projects of urban neoliberalization and the spatial development of the knowledge economy 
are far afield of education policy.  The massive tax incentives involved to court these millennials 
of course rob SLPS of much needed funds now and decades into the future, but this is only an 
issue for the populations likely to be displaced.  Most of these much-coveted millennials either 
do not have children or do not have their children in the public schools.  St. Louis alderman and 
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tax incentive enthusiast Joe Roddy summed up the logic of neoliberal urbanism and its courtship 
of a largely childless professional class nicely during a December 2016 presentation at which he 
argued for giving a proposed apartment building in the affluent and chic Central West End (part 
of his ward) a 95 percent tax abatement for 10 years and a fifty percent abatement for the 
following five years.  On a slide explaining “How the City Makes & Spends Money,” Roddy 
listed businesses first and foremost and secondly residents without children in the public schools 
(to use a familiar trope, the makers) as those necessary for urban growth.  Below these groups, 
Roddy listed those that cost the city money (the takers) in order of severity.  Those who were 
moderate drains were retirees on a fixed income.  Clearly they lacked the disposable income to 
effectively consume urban space and all it has to offer.  The worst category was “Criminals and 
Residents with children in Public School.”347  Roddy has echoed this sentiment elsewhere.  
Thirty-four St. Louis neighborhoods received less than $1 million in tax abatements from 2000-
2014.  The affluent Central West End, partly lying in Roddy’s ward, received twice as much in 
abatements as the those thirty-four combined.  When confronted by the fact that the city is 
subsidizing affluence at the expense of its public schools, Roddy claimed, “Residents in the 
central corridor often don’t have kids, and if they do, their kids go to private schools…Basically, 
all the rest of society works to support families who have children in the school system.  
Children are very expensive.”348  When the purpose of civic governance is to assist in capital 
accumulation for the local global ruling class, then public provisions for the less wealthy public 
is drudgery, and those people themselves are parasites draining the city of its vitality.  
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Revitalization is not about improving the city for all its residents.  It is about making the city 
appeal to the interests of corporations and childless professionals while simultaneously making it 
unlivable for the poor, especially those with such unreasonable desires as having children and 
educating them in public schools. 
As for the yet to be gentrified north side, the black families who already live in the area 
and might have children in SLPS also need not worry about threats to the SLPS’s funding from 
St. Louis’s civic entrepreneurs like Roddy.  They can send their children to Pruitt school, now 
called KIPP Inspire Academy, which SLPS paid $200,000 to renovate after giving the charter 
franchise free access to the vacant property in 2015.  SLPS built the Pruitt school in 1955 for the 
segregated (though officially desegregated) black children of the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex 
during Keynesian liberalism.  The building sits adjacent to the still empty lot and now represents 
neoliberalism’s version of segregated schooling and urban revitalization.     
Like its Keynesian predecessor, neoliberal education in its unique and politically 
devolved ways is seeking to assimilate black public (charter) school students into its ideology of 
urban political-economy in the twenty-first century.  NGA and Cortex partnered to create an 
annual sort of open house and mixer for STEM students and the public called the Geospatial 
Technology Exchange or GEOx.  The global surveillance and military agency is very conscious 
about its role and brand in St. Louis.  Although it has long been in the city, the NGA no longer 
wants to simply do the work of maintaining the U.S.’s global military hegemony, it wants to be a 
visible brand of the city, to “help catalyze urban renewal in a portion of the city that has suffered 
from neglect and disinvestment for decades.”  Cortex’s president highlighted the benefits of 
rebranding the city by arguing, “As technology innovation becomes more deeply ingrained in our 
region’s DNA, the addition of GEOx will bring an annually recurring event that will help make 
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metro St. Louis a hub for geospatial technologies.”349  Neoliberal urbanism’s metonymy is 
relentless, but it reflects Harvey’s central ideas about capitalism’s spatio-temporal accumulation 
dynamics and categories of spatial representation.  Cortex is not only the cyborg brain of urban 
redevelopment, it is actively engaged in reconstituting or restructuring the region’s “DNA” in 
accord with geospatial surveillance and military hegemony and biotechnological innovations.  
Urban revitalization (etymologically a process for returning to life) ideologically fuses global 
and local power, the organic and the inorganic, and hard and soft forms of discipline in its efforts 
to remake urban life and space.   
  
The Rise and Fall of Desegregation in St. Louis Public Schools 
 Brown was, without a doubt, a decisive victory against the country’s false and racially 
stratified democracy, but it alone could not undo the damage wrought by decades of confining 
and exploiting black populations.  Nor would it be a sufficient defense against the continuation 
and reconfiguration of such forms of exploitation.  In the early 1950s, St. Louis was home to 
over half of Missouri’s black schoolchildren with Kansas City accounting for all but about 12 
percent of the remaining half.350  During the years immediately following Brown, SLPS made a 
show of its efforts to desegregate and even won national acclaim in Time magazine for the 
relative quickness and lack of strife following the historic ruling.351  However, Missouri was only 
quick or progressive in the number of previously all white schools that admitted at least some 
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black students.  The clear majority of schools that were either predominantly black or 
predominantly white remained so for close to two decades after Brown. 
The fixed racial residential segregation in the city meant that the school district would 
have to rezone for the explicit purpose of desegregating, yet the few zoning changes made in the 
years following Brown suggest the district was more focused on mitigating desegregation 
mandates rather than segregation itself.  A 1959 study by Missouri Advisory Committee to the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found very little substantive change to St. Louis’s highly 
segregated schools.  Wells and Crain explain why:   
Behind the public praise of its 1954 plan, the St. Louis Board had made only minor 
adjustments to the attendance boundaries of sixteen of its eighty-four white elementary 
schools to include a small number of black students.  No changes were made for forty-
one white elementary schools, and in the remaining twelve, boundaries were redrawn to 
exclude black neighborhoods.  The board also changed high school “feeder patterns” to 
ensure that students attending black elementary schools would enroll in either Sumner or 
Vashon.  The boundaries of a white high school, Southwest, were redrawn to exclude 
blacks.352 
 
Though it is reasonable to assume that white families had a sense of pride when it came to their 
neighborhood public schools before Brown, their loyalty developed a much sharper edge to it 
when confronted by the prospect of integration.  As one black respondent to an Urban League 
survey saw it, “The closer Negroes got to any school, the more of a sanctuary it becomes.”353  
White St. Louisan’s newfound appreciation and protectionism for their beloved neighborhood 
schools was belied by the fact that they simultaneously fought for a system of open enrollment in 
which any student could attend a school of their choice as long as there were vacancies.  That 
these two policies were contradictory did not seem to matter much to their white supporters.  
Open enrollment was a way for white families whose neighborhood schools were admitting 
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black students to choose another school that had maintained their desired demographics.  The 
practice was similar to the freedom of choice schools operating in the South.354   
Neighborhood had a racial rather than exclusively geographic meaning.  After the district 
had begun busing black students from overcrowded schools on the north side to slightly less 
overcrowded majority-black schools in other neighborhoods—often passing under-capacity 
white schools in the process—black parents complained of the district’s efforts to maintain 
segregation.  The SLPS board simply reaffirmed its commitment to “neighborhood schools” and 
argued “that school authorities were not obligated to change deliberately the character of a 
neighborhood or its school.”355  Such appeals to “neighborhood preservation” as a matter of 
racial and economic exclusion were not unique to the school board or even to St. Louis.  The 
1943 guide Fundamentals of Real Estate Practice instructed realtors (those who were not the 
profiteers of blockbusting) of their duties on the frontlines of protecting property values to deter 
unseemly prospective buyers who were looking to take advantage of respectable middle class 
neighborhoods.  Threats the guide warned against include bootleggers, prostitutes, gangsters and 
“a colored man of means who was giving his children a college education and thought they were 
entitled to live among whites.”356  It is evident here that Roddy’s recent association of black 
families who desire an education for their children with society’s criminal elements is a well-
entrenched trope.357  Such overt racism began a process of transformation in the 1950s and 1960s 
into a sort of dog-whistle that retained the overall purpose of racial and class stratification but 
dropped the descriptive elements.  In 1962, the American Institute for Real Estate Appraisers 
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affirmed the racial and economic connotations of neighborhood in defining the term as an “area 
exhibiting a fairly high degree of homogeneity as to housing, tenancy, income, and population 
characteristics.”358  The school board was simply (and nevertheless inexcusably) denying that it 
had the right to reconstitute neighborhoods by altering the income and population characteristics 
of neighborhood schools.  In doing so, the board subtly upheld the prevailing view of the 1940s 
that, like criminal elements, black families wishing to educate their children presented a threat to 
the morals and more appropriately the property values of middle class neighborhoods. 
St. Louis’s black population had much less cause to glorify and preserve its 
neighborhoods and their schools.  As the city’s black population continued its rapid growth and 
the white population its decline, district gerrymandering and the contradictory calls for open 
enrollment and neighborhood school protectionism became logistically as well as morally 
untenable.  The solution the board adopted during the early 1960s was to bus black students from 
the overcrowded schools on the north side to majority white schools, usually on the city’s south 
side.  The process known as intact busing solved two of the board’s primary objectives: 
preserving segregation and easing the strain on segregated black facilities.  Black children made 
up over 90 percent of those bused.  They arrived at the majority-white schools after classes had 
already begun, attended classes as segregated units, used the cafeteria and other facilities at 
separate times than white students, and ended their school day after the rest of the school before 
being bused back to their segregated neighborhoods.359  As with its plans immediately after 
Brown, St. Louis received national praise for its commitments to desegregation, and one 
University of Chicago study cited the board’s actions as examples of good governance.360  A 
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coalition of black parents, activists from the NAACP and CORE, and St. Louis’s black press 
were far less effusive about the busing, which they saw as closer to a Jim Crow form of 
schooling than the fulfillment of Brown.  Protesters even blocked the path of buses, and after 
several demonstrations, began forming new advocacy groups that demanded real integration 
rather than the token use of the same facilities.361  
The board’s response to the failure of intact busing was an attempt to pacify the 
coalitions of black activists and solve the problem of overcapacity schools on the north side 
through new school construction.  As with Sumner and Vashon during the first half of the 
twentieth century, the new school construction in all black neighborhoods was a Trojan horse for 
segregation.  That the schools in St. Louis’s heavily segregated black neighborhoods could no 
longer meet the needs of a rapidly growing black population was clear, but it was equally clear 
that the passage of a bond that secured funding to build nine new elementary schools in all black 
neighborhoods during the 1960s was an effort to contain black students within black 
neighborhoods and avoid Brown’s mandates.362  The city, thus, rebuilt its public education 
infrastructure out of its desire to avoid desegregating its schools “with all deliberate speed.”  
Thirty-five of the thirty-nine buildings the district constructed between 1954 and 1974 were 
attended primarily by black students either because they were built in hypersegregated black 
neighborhoods (as most were) or as a result of whites abandoning public schools in St. Louis’s 
few racially mixed neighborhoods.363  When it became clear that even new construction was 
insufficient to ease overcrowding, the board turned to portable classrooms and recommission 
older schools as a way of avoiding integration.  The response from activists in the black 
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community was to intensify their pressure on the school board and local leaders.  By the time a 
coalition of parent activists filed their historic lawsuit Liddell v. Board of Education of the City 
of St. Louis, Missouri in 1972, the task of desegregating SLPS was far more difficult than it 
would have been had the board earnestly attempted to do so in 1954.  White flight and the 
concentration of new school construction in segregated black neighborhoods had meant that 
intra-district desegregation was no longer a realistic solution since integrating all of SLPS’s 
remaining white students would still leave several school almost exclusively black. 
Minnie Liddell, the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit that would bring about the nation’s largest 
inter-district desegregation program, was in many ways symbolic of black St. Louisans’ 
struggles to build a life for themselves and their families despite racial and economic oppression.  
Like so many of her generation, Minnie moved to St. Louis from Mississippi as a very young 
child in the early 1940s.  Her family moved into the highly segregated Mill Creek Valley a 
decade or so before it was razed in the name of renewal, and Minnie attended the city’s 
overcrowded black schools until her mother’s illness forced her to drop out of the ninth grade to 
help support the family.  After marrying, Minnie and her husband Charles Liddell settled in 
another of the overcrowded black neighborhoods on the city’s north side.  The Liddells’ children 
initially attended one of the new neighborhood schools that had been built to ease the 
overcrowding and avoid integration but were soon rezoned to one of the dilapidated schools that 
had been recommissioned to keep black students out of the predominantly white schools.364  
Facing an enormous body of evidence that officials had been complicit and even zealous 
in their efforts to create and maintain a segregated public school system, the district signed a 
consent decree in 1974 that allowed it to deny any purposeful wrongdoing but obligated it to 
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implement a plan that would avoid racial isolation in its schools.365  As the proposed plan 
worked its way through the courts, another major legal decision on school segregation, U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Milliken v. Bradley (1974), determined that suburban school districts were 
required to participate in inter-district desegregation programs only if the courts could prove that 
they had acted with the intent to segregate urban schools.  Otherwise, suburban involvement in 
desegregation was strictly voluntary.  In 1979, district court judge James Meredith sided with the 
school district and argued that the intensified school segregation was the result of state and 
federal policies and the private choices of individual homeowners rather than district actions.366  
The plaintiffs appealed Meredith’s ruling, and a year later the Eighth Circuit Court unanimously 
overturned the verdict.  Gary Orfield, who had been the court appointed expert witness, had 
formulated a desegregation plan that involved the suburban school districts on a voluntary basis.  
Because St. Louis neighborhoods were so segregated, and because SLPS had lost so many of its 
white students to the suburbs and to private schools within the city since Brown, Orfield argued 
that intra-district segregation was no longer possible.367  Even if it were possible to integrate 
some schools in the central and south side of the city, the north side, which had the worst 
educational and residential conditions would remain entirely segregated.  Agreeing with Orfield, 
Meredith asked for the district to create more magnet schools, a facet of the solution that had 
been recommended initially by Minnie Liddell herself, and that it facilitate both an intra-district 
and inter-district transfer program if the transfers did not increase school segregation as they had 
during the years immediately after Brown. Meredith put together a desegregation framework that 
would be voluntary and mutually beneficial to the sending and receiving districts.  The state 
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would be responsible for much of the costs of transportation and new school construction if 
necessary.368  Because St. Louis’s population was in freefall from 1970-1980—the school 
district’s white student population dropped by almost half from 35,000 to 18,000—the court also 
asked that the district see to it that future school construction and closures not exacerbate 
segregation.369  Then Missouri Attorney General John Ashcroft had vowed to fight all the way to 
the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of the state’s obligation to desegregate St. Louis’s schools, but 
after that court rejected his petition, he was powerless to oppose the Eighth Circuit’s ruling.370 
In 1981, Liddell’s inter-district plan was turned over to Eighth Circuit Court Judge 
William Hungate.  Hungate had a great deal of leverage for significant change.  Not only had the 
court found state and federal policies responsible for St. Louis’s housing segregation, but the 
successful appeal had also shown the district liable through its neighborhood school initiatives 
and racially motivated rezoning, and with the help of Orfield, Meredith’s court had devised a 
model for how an inter-district program might function.  What Hungate lacked was federal 
accountability for the government’s role in facilitating housing and school segregation.  The 
Eighth Circuit Court had the power to hold the state of Missouri accountable for its part, and 
although the court had similarly found the federal government liable, Reagan’s Justice 
Department was not in the least interested in entertaining the prospect that the federal 
government would cover any of the costs or even admit its own culpability in issues of school 
segregation.  In a sense, Reagan was correct when he famously said in his inaugural address that 
government was not the solution to our problem; government was the problem.   
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The Reagan administration was not the only party hostile to Hungate’s aggressive stance 
on desegregation.  After becoming frustrated with the suburban counties’ unwillingness to 
voluntarily involve themselves with the inter-district program, Hungate issued them an 
ultimatum:  either they cooperate, or he would re-examine their culpability in creating St. Louis’s 
segregated schools in the first place.  If he found them guilty, which the evidence certainly 
suggested they were, he would personally consolidate the entire metropolitan area into one 
school district and force them to rezone for integration.  His tactics earned him the reluctant 
cooperation of the suburban districts and the enmity of the region’s angry white population.  The 
local media referred to him as Attila the Hungate, and after numerous death threats, he had to be 
guarded by federal marshals.371 
When the dust settled in 1983, however, St. Louis had established the largest inter-district 
school desegregation program in the nation’s history with a goal of transferring 15,000 city 
students to county schools and 1,600 county students to magnet schools in the city.  The final 
plan benefited both sending and receiving districts financially.  The sending district continued to 
receive half of the state aid and all of the local money apportioned for every student transferred.  
The state paid the cost of tuition at the receiving district, which gave those districts added funds 
to improve the education of both the transfer and local students.  The settlement also called for 
the state to assume half the costs of operating the magnet schools that existed at the time of the 
agreement and the full cost of any that might open after the agreement.  Even with the transfers 
and the magnets achieving racial balance, several of the city’s schools would remain heavily 
segregated.  For those schools, the settlement established extra funding for updating facilities, 
capping teacher to student ratios at 20:1, providing remedial courses, and hiring added support 
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staff such as nurses and counselors.  To avoid the displacement of black educators that had 
characterized past desegregation efforts, the settlement stipulated that the district take measures 
to guarantee that it maintained a racially balanced workforce.  Hungate also halted a proposed 
property tax rollback that would have hampered the district’s ability to pay for its share of the 
desegregation program.  Ashcroft made opposition to the desegregation plan a centerpiece of his 
successful campaign for governor in 1984 and further petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to end 
the state’s obligation, but was denied again.372 
 
SB 781 and the Neoliberalization of Education Policy 
 St. Louis’s court-enforced desegregation program continued until 1999, when the state 
brokered an agreement that ended court supervision and put a ten-year cap on the state’s 
continued obligation.  Numerous factors contributed to the end of the desegregation program.  
Notably, many Missouri political careers were forged through fiery opposition to the intrusion of 
“big government” into the workings of Missouri’s schools, particularly when that intrusion was 
the enforcement of an expensive desegregation program that was deemed unnecessary by some 
and was a source of resentment by others.  The state’s rural, white Republican power base had a 
visceral hatred of taxation, and that attitude certainly did not change when those funds went 
toward the significant expense of addressing historical racial discrimination in urban schools.  
Opposition to the desegregation settlement was, however, a bipartisan tradition.  Jay Nixon 
(governor from 2009-2017) tried to get the Eighth Circuit to grant St. Louis unitary status and 
put an end to the desegregation program as early as 1993, when he was elected Missouri 
Attorney General, a post he held until being elected governor in 2009.  Nixon had an ally in St. 
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Louis’s first black mayor, Freeman Bosley Jr., who argued that the money spent on the transfer 
program was not doing anything to revitalize St. Louis’s neighborhoods.  Bosely argued that if 
the state were to redirect the transfer money toward neighborhood redevelopment, then white 
families would move back into the city, and the eventual result would be desegregation of the 
city’s schools. 373  Bosley’s rhetoric was clearly in keeping with the entrepreneurial ethos of St. 
Louis mayors who were always one big deal away from putting the city back on track, but the 
idea that the state would continue to disperse the funds after it had been released from its court 
enforced obligation to do so struck many as quixotic.374  
In 1995, U.S. Supreme Court’s Missouri v. Jenkins ruling found that the state’s 
involvement in Kansas City’s desegregation lacked sufficient proof that the suburban counties 
were liable.  The decision also claimed that state involvement in desegregation should be limited 
in time and extent regardless of whether integration was achieved.  This inspired Nixon to take 
another shot at ending St. Louis’s plan in 1996.  Again, he was unsuccessful, but a sense that an 
end to the program was inevitable became palpable in the late 1990s.375  Even though the court 
had repeatedly refused to apply the Jenkins ruling to St. Louis, the fervor of bipartisan antipathy 
to St. Louis’s desegregation program was enough to make many feel that a settlement was far 
better than the district reaching unitary status and the program simply ending.   
The state laid the groundwork for its release from court-enforced desegregation with the 
passage of Senate Bill 781, which sought to end the era of educational equity through 
desegregation and usher in a new era of equity through accountability.376  In other words, SB 781 
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was the death knell of social protections and redistributions under Keynesian liberalism.  Even 
though suburban participation in the 1983 Settlement was technically voluntary, their 
involvement was initially the result of Hungate’s threats to redraw suburban-urban district 
boundaries.  The program’s financial benefits to the suburbs helped to ease that tension, but SB 
781 removed federal oversight and, therefore, reduced the scale of the program and the 
incentives for voluntary participation since there was no one left with the motivation or power to 
redraw the district boundaries.  SB 781 restructured the transfer program’s coordinating 
committee as a nonprofit (the Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corporation, VICC) and 
orchestrated a scale-down of the number of transfer students involved.  Under the new voluntary 
program, the state provided $25 million per year for the first two years to cover transportation 
costs during the transitional phase with subsequent transportation costs calculated according to 
transportation aid within each student’s residential district.  By making the program totally 
voluntary, the state was able to affirm its long-held commitment to local control of school while 
also affirming the new guiding ethic of school reform:  choice. 
Far more substantial than the school choice program under the supervision of the VICC, 
SB 781 made Missouri the 34th state to legalize charter schools, while limiting their operation to 
cities with a population greater than 350,000.377  This meant that charters could only operate in 
Kansas City and St. Louis, cities with the majority of the state’s black population.  The law 
requires that an accredited educational institution (a college or university, a local school district, 
or the Missouri Public Charter School Commission) sponsor the charters in an advisory capacity, 
but governance is left to each charter’s board of directors.  If a local school board denied a 
charter’s application, the charter had the right to appeal.  St. Louis Public Schools, which had 
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lost students to the suburbs and the city’s private schools for decades, now had a new state-
funded threat to its steadily declining enrollment within the city itself.  According to the popular 
wisdom of charter advocates, competition would force the lax public schools to innovate and 
improve the quality of their services that had deteriorated due to monopoly power over public 
education, but St. Louis Public Schools had been struggling to remain viable for the previous 
half century.  SLPS did not need a new source of competition to motivate it.  Suburban schools, 
with their higher property values and explosive growth in population and industry underwritten 
by state and federal subsidies, had long since won that competition and was running up the score.  
As for innovation, the desegregation program itself, with its city magnet schools and mutually 
beneficial transfer financing, was an effort to innovate with curriculum and instruction and foster 
suburban-urban cooperation.  The emergence of charters represented not so much external 
motivation but an effort to hollow out SLPS from within. 
As with its charter school provisions, SB 781 outlined how to rebuild a school system, 
not just dismantle one.  Loss of accreditation instituted the immediate disempowering of the 
elected school board and installed a three-person Special Advisory Board (SAB) with the 
members chosen by the city’s mayor, the governor, and the local council of aldermen.  The board 
had been a contentious battleground between zealous public school reformers, the politically 
ambitious, and anti-busing groups with ties to the racist Citizens’ Council, whose logo shows the 
confederate flag and reads “States Rights; Racial Integrity.”378  While the latter’s power had 
waned during the 1990s, their sentiment persists in pockets of the city and wide swaths of 
Missouri’s suburban and rural electorate.  The SAB represented the preference for the stability of 
neoliberal technocratic managerialism over raucous democratic governance.  
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With the legal groundwork laid for the end of desegregation, the final agreement was 
signed in early 1999.  St. Louis was officially finished with court-enforced desegregation, but the 
Liddell case had continued to shape the neoliberal era of St. Louis Public Schools.  The final 
agreement stipulated that the state pay into a transition fund over the next ten years that would 
eventually total $180 million.  After the last payment was made to an escrow account in 2009, 
the state had fully ended its financial obligation to desegregating SLPS.  SB 781 had also 
restructured Missouri’s school financing, and one of the ways they made their sweeping reforms 
more palatable to the electorate was to tie $40 million in additional funding and a sales tax 
increase pending voter approval, which voters passed in February of 1999.379  Even with the 
sales tax and additional state funds, the school district would be short $7-10 million per year.380  
Hanging SB 781 on the passage of a city sales tax was significant for several reasons.  For one, it 
meant that St. Louis’s tourists would pick up a sizable portion of the difference between what the 
state was paying under court-enforced desegregation and what it would pay to wind down the 
desegregation program—a further incentive for aligning urban revitalization with tourism.   
SB 781 was engineered as long-term austerity via short-term generosity.  The state 
favored the regressive sales tax because it prevented increases in other progressive forms of 
taxation like personal or corporate income tax and property taxes, which a state constitutional 
amendment caps at 10 cents for every $100 assessed value.  Besides, increases in property taxes 
are of a limited value since the city is blanketed with tax abatements.  At the same time, voters 
were unlikely to vote against the sales tax because many would see the act as withholding a 
much needed $23 million from the beleaguered district.  Ballot rejection would have nullified SB 
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781, but instead it passed by a two-to-one margin.381  Because the sales tax was essential to 
ending the desegregation program, the settlement stipulated that the funds it generated were to go 
to the “District schools” involved in desegregation.  No charter schools fell into that category 
since charters had only been legalized in Missouri when SB 781 passed a few months earlier.  
When Missouri changed its school funding formula in 2006, it redirected sales tax funding to 
charter schools despite the fact that those funds were expressly for District schools involved in 
desegregation.  To date, charters have received over $50 million in desegregation remediation 
funds generated through the misappropriated sales tax.  In April of 2016, SLPS filed a lawsuit 
against the state after officials repeatedly ignored the district’s requests to halt the 
misappropriation of funds.  If the judge should rule that the charters must return the $50 million 
to the district, it is likely that many will close.  The pending lawsuit exposes the tension at the 
different scales of territorial governance, a tension that is heightened by the devolved politics of 
neoliberalization.  Ironically, the generally pro-charter appointed SAB has been the most 
effective opposition to the state’s systemic efforts to divert funds from traditional public schools 
to charter schools. 
 
Urban Neoliberalization and Accumulation by Dispossession 
 In the third chapter, I argued that the spatio-temporal processes of capital accumulation 
were consistent with the concentration of charter schools in St. Louis and the larger processes of 
urban neoliberalization.  By devoting so much of this chapter to black St. Louisans’ historic 
struggles for access to safe housing and access to quality education, I have attempted to deepen 
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my analysis of St. Louis’s transition from Keynesian liberalism to the neoliberalism.  SB 781 
marks a pivotal transition in educational policy and equity, but the proper metaphor is not the 
flipping of a switch—it is the turning of a corner.  Neoliberalizing education policy did not come 
as a bolt from the blue; it was not even particularly innovative.  In a sense, it was a new variation 
on an old theme.  St. Louis had long sought to protect white wealth and educational space from 
the black poverty it had constructed through economic and urban policy.  Before Brown, St. 
Louis showed its commitment to public education and racial segregation by building some of the 
country’s most beautiful and innovative school buildings, two of which were segregated and 
overcrowded black schools.  During the mid-twentieth century and immediately after Brown, St. 
Louis showed its commitment to segregated schooling through intact busing and massively 
overbuilding schools in the segregated and overcrowded black neighborhoods.  The mid-century 
construction boom resulted in massive amounts of fixed capital stored in the built environment 
while the city’s population had crested and was about to start losing hundreds of thousands of 
residents every decade.  It was only in the Liddell Settlement (1983-1999) that the city and state 
ever earnestly and systematically pursued redistribution and desegregation.  The Settlement was 
doomed from the start, but contrary to the bipartisan lamentations of the political elite who saw it 
as federal intrusion and wasted money, desegregation’s shortcoming was that it did not go far 
enough.  The program was in effect for less than sixteen years, and those sixteen years occurred 
when the city was so aggressively marketing itself to capital and residents that it had sacrificed 
its current and future tax base on the altar of revitalization.  Redistribution and desegregation 
were aberrations.  Neoliberalization, especially as was ensconced in the policy framework of SB 
781, is a variation on the city’s historic norms of racial segregation, capital accumulation, and the 
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creative destruction of urbanism.  With this in mind, I turn to how SB 781 and the concentration 
of charter schools in St. Louis reflects accumulation by dispossession. 
 Harvey argues that accumulation by dispossession is a continuation of what Marx 
referred to as primitive accumulation and what Polanyi described as the state’s role in creating 
and maintaining fictional commodities like land and labor power.  Because the creation and 
expansion of the U.S. was predicated on the dispossession of indigenous peoples (many of whom 
had no concept that land could be possessed in the first place), the basic concept is painfully 
close to home in this country.  Accumulation by dispossession in the neoliberal age has 
proceeded along similar lines, but it is more complicated than original accumulation since land is 
not just taken outright and developed but must be devalued and revalorized for capital 
accumulation to occur.  Harvey breaks the process down into four elements: privatization, 
financialization, manipulation and management of crises, and state redistributions.382  I will 
analyze SB 781 and the growth of charter schools in St. Louis according to these principles.   
 
Privatization 
One of the ways neoliberalization has sought to maintain the growth of primitive 
accumulation has been to commodify space that had set aside as commons.  Common space has 
historically been created more often through struggle than through ruling class beneficence, and 
the struggle to maintain the publicness of spaces like public parks and public schools under 
neoliberalization has centered on maintaining their open (that is, inclusive) and nonmarket nature 
against efforts to either commercialize or commoditize the space.  This struggle is difficult for 
reasons both structural and ideological.  Common space and social protections expanded under 
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Keynesian liberalism because they coincided with both domestic and global economic growth.  
When economic growth stagnated in the 1970s, the compromise was over and the state looked 
inward to extract profits.  Public or common space in urban centers became an obvious target for 
two reasons:  one, as Rachel Weber puts it, “neoliberal ideology dismisses most forms of public 
ownership and socially and privately unproductive,”383 and two, as Neil Smith has argued, the 
inner city had become the “new urban frontier,” where the “natives” and their “Hostile 
landscapes are regenerated, cleansed, reinfused with middle-class sensibility; real estate values 
soar; yuppies consume; elite gentility is democratized in mass-produced styles of distinction.”384  
Put differently, the structural imperative to maximize profits and maintain growth levels 
reinforced a market ideology that had little inclination to protect or maintain nonmarket spaces 
like schools that it viewed either as opportunities for profit-generation or as parasites devouring 
surplus capital with little to show for it.  If such spaces do not start generating profits, then like 
the “unused” land of the frontier, they should be (re)conquered, cleansed of their unproductive 
people and qualities, and recommodified.  By massively expanding its education infrastructure to 
avoid desegregation (i.e. 35 of the 39 schools built from 1954 to 1974 being segregated black 
schools) SLPS created lots of new public space, especially in segregated neighborhoods that 
were already devalued and would be further devalued during the subsequent decades of 
population loss and intensified social unrest.  The outflow of capital and residents to the suburbs 
and beyond segregated and devalued the urban core’s property values and its schools, which 
were, after all dependent on the property values.  Keynesian desegregation tried to redistribute 
both residents and capital from the well-fortified suburbs in the name of equity, but that only 
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effectively lasted for less than two decades before the left and right hands of neoliberalism united 
to restore both class (and racial) discipline and profitability to the profligate and dysfunctional 
urban schools and neighborhoods.  But while redistribution of students and funds from the 
state/suburbs to the city was just getting underway in 1983, urban entrepreneurialism with its full 
array of tax incentives was already in full effect.   
St. Louis passed its first land redevelopment law in 1943.  Like the charter school 
limitations, land clearance and redevelopment was initially restricted to St. Louis and Kansas 
City even though it was a state law.  An amendment in 1945 (Chapter 353) allowed local and 
out-of-state developers access to tax abatement incentives for property deemed “blighted.” This 
meant that local and out-of-state redevelopers could reshape St. Louis’s built environment at the 
expense of the local tax base, but they relied on city official to declare the property blighted.  The 
state aided urban redevelopment further when in 1951 it passed the Land Clearance and 
Redevelopment Act (Chapter 99), which allowed the city to assemble and clear land for 
redevelopment.385  The two fit hand-in-glove.  Chapter 99 allowed the city planners to assemble 
and clear property with the help of federal redevelopment grants, while Chapter 353 abated 
future taxes, often over 90 percent and for decades, on the property once capital had redeveloped 
it.  Developers benefitted from the city clearing their land and slashing their future taxes, and the 
city government benefitted from new tax revenue streams other than the abated property taxes 
(e.g. earnings and sales taxes).  Because public schools were and are funded by property taxes 
and not earnings or sales taxes, they were the sacrificial lambs of urban renewal.  Two 
Washington University Economists were commissioned to study the effects of tax abatements on 
the school system during the early1980s, the very same time the Liddell desegregation settlement 
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was taking effect.  The economists found “The developer (and possibly the landowner) thus is 
given one-sixth of the total value of his development in the form of abated property taxes by the 
353 program, most of which is paid by the city school district.”386  With the school district so 
heavily subsidizing urban redevelopment, one would think the board would have some influence 
on where and which projects received tax abatements how much they would receive.  It did not.  
Indeed, with the chaos of the balkanized region and the continual churn of redevelopment in the 
city, it was difficult for the board to even know how much money the schools were losing and 
how quickly they were losing it.  As for authority over what was blighted and how much to 
abate, the board was similarly in the dark and kept out of the decision process.  Before 1971, the 
city’s Board of Aldermen reviewed each incentive request on a case-by-case basis, but in 1971, 
they declared the entire downtown blighted.  That designation persisted even after the downtown 
had been redeveloped for business with its office buildings and for tourism with its iconic arch, 
hotels, and sports stadia.  Older buildings, which were not blighted, had an incentive to declare 
themselves blighted so they could compete with newer abated properties.387 
It was not just the downtown business and tourism district that was blanketed with 
abatements.  A 1984 report found that “for the foreseeable future, property taxes would be abated 
for all new commercial and industrial and for 90% of residential construction.”388  Based on the 
1984 city comptroller’s report of abated property, the amount the school district would lose over 
the duration of those abatements—many of which spanned roughly the length of the city’s 
desegregation program (1983-1999) and beyond—was $43.1 million with 1984 alone losing $5.7 
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million.389  During the decade prior to SB 781’s 1998 signing, the city abated over 4,500 parcels 
of residential, commercial, and industrial land, which amounted to 11 percent of taxable 
property.  Taken together with nontaxed land owned by nonprofit entities, over half of property 
in the city of St. Louis paid little or nothing in property taxes.390  In 1996—just two years before 
SB 781—the school board argued that SLPS was losing $17 million per year to abatements and 
called on Mayor Freeman Bosely, Jr. to stop all new commercial property tax abatements, halt 
abatement extensions being granted after the initial abatements’ 25 year period had lapsed, and 
establish a civic task force to review the city’s abatement procedures.  Bosely did none of that 
and countered that it was not the city’s entrepreneurial ethos that was the problem.  After all, 
Bosely’s own father was an alderman who had recently sponsored a bill to give a ten-year 
abatement to a pawn shop—not quite everyone’s vision of urban renewal.  The problem, 
according to Bosely, was the trope upon which all neoliberals rely: the wasteful public schools 
are not good stewards of the funds they have.391  As I have already pointed out, Bosely was 
actively working to end the city’s desegregation program and rather astonishingly hoped that its 
state funding would be diverted to his city’s ongoing process of urban renewal and efforts to 
desegregate by attracting white families back into St. Louis’s residential neighborhoods.  
Although 70 percent of the abatements were residential, those were largely within majority-white 
and gentrified neighborhoods, where the schools were either zoned to preserve white majority or 
the white majority simply was not sending their kids to public schools.   
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Despite the loss of the city’s population, the loss of white buy-in to public education, and 
the loss of its property tax revenues in an effort to appeal to prospective businesses and white 
residents, St. Louis Public Schools made considerable improvements to infrastructure and 
services for both urban and suburban students under the Liddell desegregation settlement.392  
Such improvements were either doubted altogether or deemed unworthy of the state’s increased 
expenses.  When SB 781 came up for a vote in the Missouri State Senate, only eight senators 
voted against it.  One was St. Louis Democrat J.D. Banks, who disagreed with the provision to 
turn SLPS governance over to a three-member appointed board upon losing accreditation, and 
the other seven were rural and suburban Republicans who thought the state was too generous to 
St. Louis and Kansas City in its desegregation severance package.393  No one was apparently that 
concerned with the mountain of evidence that St. Louis had given away SLPS’s past, present, 
and future funding to corporations, (mostly white) St. Louis residents, and property redevelopers 
in what is perhaps best described as a revitalization-industrial complex.  Such a lack of concern 
is not surprising.  The suburban and rural power blocs of state government certainly had no 
problem with such practices, and the politicians from St. Louis are the ones either directly or 
indirectly involved.   
 No one was, in fact, more intimately involved with SB 781’s charter school provision 
than the property redevelopers themselves.  The author of the bill’s charter school language was 
William Kuehling, a lawyer who specializes in urban neoliberalization.  Kuehling now works for 
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one of St. Louis’s most powerful law firms, Thompson Coburn, LLP.  To get the full scope of 
Kuehling’s area of expertise, it is worth quoting his company biography at length: 
Developers, nonprofit corporations, and public entities seek Bill’s varied and extensive 
background in real estate transactions and infrastructure finance.  Bill focuses his practice 
on real estate development, public/private partnerships, land use, and municipal 
law…This work includes the acquisition, sale, construction, development, financing and 
leasing of projects.  He also has experience in governmental incentives for development, 
including tax increment financing, tax abatement, tax sharing agreements, community 
improvement districts, neighborhood improvement districts, and transportation 
development districts.  Clients with unique needs seek Bill’s assistance with controversial 
land use and zoning issues, including obtaining zoning, demolition, and building permit 
approval over significant public opposition.  This includes work in historic districts.394 
 
If legalizing charter schools in the state of Missouri and restricting their operation to the only two 
majority-black urban districts in the state were truly about the failures of desegregation to 
significantly improve urban education, it would be an odd choice to have a lawyer who 
specializes in securing the very tax incentives that systemically defunded SLPS create such a 
policy solution to educational inequity.  If charter schools were really about, say, revalorizing 
urban space devastated by policy-induced and supported segregation and deindustrialization, 
perhaps even “over significant public opposition,” then there could hardly be a better man for the 
job.  Kuehling praised his work in saying that Missouri’s charter school legislation was better 
than most states’ because it placed no caps on the number of charter schools that could open—
provided they were in either St. Louis or Kansas City, of course—and there was little local 
education boards could do to stop charters from opening since charters secured their 
authorization through Missouri universities or the state board of education itself.395  In other 
words, significant public opposition was no obstacle.   
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While Kuehling’s legal and technical expertise in urban neoliberalization was useful in 
drafting SB 781’s charter provisions, he had significant help from the developers themselves.  
The “pioneers” of urban revitalization saw charter schools as an important new tactic in their 
(re)conquest of the urban frontier.  Like Kuehling, St. Louis’s blight barons had well established 
relationships with city officials and knew the complexities of the full array of tax incentives.  
Three of the most vocal proponents of charters and school governance reform were Craig Heller 
of Pyramid Construction, Leon Strauss of Pantheon Group, and Richard Baron of McCormack 
Baron Salazar.396  Heller’s mantra in lobbying for the charter school legislation was “Build them 
and they will come.”397 He was referring to the potential for charter schools to attract families 
back into the city, specifically to the 75 properties he was developing in the struggling Eads Park 
neighborhood.  Heller claimed that SLPS’s image problem was a significant obstacle to 
neighborhood revitalization.  Middle class families did not want to invest in neighborhoods with 
“underperforming” schools.  Property values could rise, however, if Heller and other developers 
were able to market the new forms of school choice to prospective buyers.  Heller’s Pyramid 
Construction was most successful in rehabbing St. Louis’s many shuttered brick buildings as 
chic lofts in the downtown corridor, but the pièce de résistance of gentrification via mixed-
income community development is attracting middle class professionals with children back into 
the city.  As Smith claimed, the neighborhoods had to be “cleansed” and made fit for middle 
class consumption.  Moreover, charter schools’ frequent branding tropes—the ubiquity of 
Preparatory, Collegiate, and Academy—confirms Smith’s claim that “elite gentility is 
democratized in mass-produced styles of distinction.”398 
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As is often the case with the boom and bust cycles of urban revitalization, Pyramid 
Construction had its good and bad years.  In 2007, both Heller and Steffen were invited to the 
White House where First Lady Laura Bush presented them with the Preserve America 
Presidential Award.  In 2010, John Steffen was indicted for fraud after allegedly putting up tax 
credits as collateral for a loan and then bundling and selling those same tax credits and dumping 
the proceeds into another development project.399  Heller, who parted ways with Steffen to form 
his own company LoftWorks, has also seen his fortune turn.  As a consultant who helped 
assemble riverfront property as part of the failed attempt in 2015 to keep the NFL Rams football 
franchise in St. Louis, Heller received $12,500 per month from public-private partnership 
Downtown STL, Inc.  In September of 2015, a judge handed Heller $7 million judgement for 
defaulting on $12 million in loans, which in tandem with $290,000 in unpaid federal taxes, led to 
Heller’s decision to file for bankruptcy in February of 2016.400  The connection between Heller’s 
early fight to bring charter schools to St. Louis and his involvement with the hallmark of 
neoliberal urban revitalization, stadium construction, runs deeper than his lucrative taxpayer 
funded consulting fee.  His former partner in bringing charter schools to St. Louis, William 
Kuehling, sits on the governing board of Downtown STL, Inc. 
In his efforts to lobby legislators and the general public to get behind SB 781, Heller 
worked closely with Leon Strauss, the retired head of one of St. Louis’s most (in)famous urban 
renewal firms, Pantheon Corp.  While Heller was trying to bring charter schools to the Eads Park 
neighborhood he was investing in, Strauss was trying to open a charter (possibly at a vacant 
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SLPS property) to accompany new home construction in the Forest Park Southeast neighborhood 
he and a local healthcare group were trying to redevelop.  According to Strauss, charters “could 
help stem the exodus of people out from the city.”401  To reach his target audience, Strauss had 
formed a 501(c)3 called the Charter Schools Information Center and placed suburban Clayton 
education reform activist Laura Friedman at its helm.  While Strauss and Heller’s discourse 
reflected the market-tested optimism of people who had spent their careers pitching property 
redevelopment to financiers and city officials, Friedman had the zeal of a crusading reformer.  
For Friedman, charters were obviously “the winning option,” since they “allow businesses and 
foundations to see the clear results of their investment” unlike traditional public schools whose 
poor test performance was a clear indicator that “private dollars, as well as tax dollars, need to be 
better spent.”402  Friedman unsurprisingly offered no comment on the hundreds of millions tax 
dollars that abatements and other incentives had converted to “private dollars.”  Charters were 
the winning option not just because they promised businesses and foundations greater returns on 
investment; they also offered the institution discipline lacking in public schools.  Friedman 
argued that “The charter school law also gives the local board both the big stick of accountability 
and the carrot of true site-based management.  As sponsors, or in conversions of existing schools, 
school boards use the charter tool to demand, and receive, results.”403  While Strauss positioned 
himself as a sort of elder statesman who came out of retirement to help his city when needed, he 
was no stranger to accumulation through class discipline.  Strauss was most famous for the 
iconic Fabulous Fox Theater, which was nearly in ruins when he began the public-private 
partnership of redeveloping the property in the 1970s.  Strauss may have had great success with 
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the city’s cultural attractions, but his record with housing is much more contentious.  In the 
1970s, Pantheon used public subsidies and the city's loose definition of blight to clear out 500-
800 families who were low-income rental tenants in order to make way for a condominium 
development.  When those families brought a lawsuit seeking federal relocation monies, the 
courts denied their request on the grounds that Pantheon’s project was one of private 
development rather than public purpose.404  Such is the benefit of the public-private partnership.  
The public aids private development with tax incentives, while shielding private developers from 
the public.   
Richard Baron has certainly eclipsed his St. Louis charter school compatriots in terms of 
national influence.  Baron pushed for site-based management schools within neighborhoods his 
company was redeveloping.405  These schools share the same autonomy as charters but would 
preserve the local board as affiliated albeit largely powerless governing institution.  Baron’s 
firm, McCormack Baron Salazar (MBS) is the darling of national neoliberal mixed-income 
housing development.  MBS has built a fortune and its reputation on the transition from the era 
of large-scale government investments in public housing under Keynesian liberalism to 
depoliticized neoliberal community revitalization projects like Choice Neighborhoods and Hope 
VI.  These programs seek to deconcentrate poverty through building mixed-income communities 
that include “revitalized” schools.  One such example in MBS’s portfolio is the Centennial Place 
and Centennial Academy charter school in Atlanta, which the company built after demolishing 
Techwood Homes, the country’s first housing project built in 1936 by Roosevelt’s Public Works 
Administration to address the need for adequate housing during the throes of the Great 
Depression.  Critics of MBS’s mixed-income redevelopments have argued that they are 
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instrumental in privatizing public institutions like housing and schools and end up displacing far 
more low-income residents than they integrate into new development, essentially revitalization 
through gentrification.406  Baron was interested in making his neoliberal neighborhood 
revitalization project in St. Louis’s Carr Square neighborhood “a demonstration project for the 
welfare-to-work effort in Missouri,” arguing that with the help of corporate philanthropies, Carr 
Square could be “a prototype for what a quality neighborhood school might look like in one of 
the city’s poorest neighborhoods.”407  His company’s subsequent profitability is a testament to 
his school reform experiments in St. Louis.  MBS is also heavily involved in revitalizing vacant 
SLPS property through its close partnership with the district’s Building Revitalization 
Collaborative, including several of the historic Ittner-designed buildings.  The education reforms 
Baron helped to usher in put further pressures on an already strained public system, which has 
resulted in declining numbers and further neighborhood school closures.  The robust vacant 
school property market continues to create opportunities for MBS’s many ventures in mixed-
income development.   
 
Financialization 
 The privatization of public space depends upon deregulating whatever policies create and 
maintain that space and reregulating through new governing bureaucracies and partnerships.  
Finance takes new and more complex forms within these new bureaucracies and partnerships.  
Trading tax incentives as currency, borrowing from presumed future elevated tax increments to 
                                                 
406 For critiques of McCormack, Baron & Salazar’s work in New Orleans, see Jay Arena, “A People’s 
Reconstruction,” Jacobin, August 28, 2015, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/katrina-ten-year-anniversary-
public-housing-charter-schools/; Jay Arena, “New Orleans, Public Housing and the Non-Profit Industrial Complex,” 
Counterpunch, July 10, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/07/10/new-orleans-public-housing-and-the-non-
profit-industrial-complex/. 
407 Tucci, “Strauss, Baron Heading Efforts for City’s Alternative Schools.” 
 212 
 
finance present development through TIF, classifying profitable property as blighted to receive 
new abatements for new development—these and countless other practices endemic to St. Louis 
illustrate the bizarre, illogical, and often only quasi-legal financial processes of urban 
neoliberalization.  With charter legislation created and promoted by such pioneers and 
innovators, it is not surprising that Missouri’s charter school financing is both arcane and 
vulnerable to corruption.   
In Chapter One, I described the rapid expansion and the closure of Imagine, Inc. schools 
in St. Louis and Kansas City.  I will, therefore, be very brief in illustrating how those forms of 
financialization support the process of accumulation by dispossession.  Imagine, Inc.’s wealth 
extraction is most easily and clearly summarized by the graphic below, which the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch created following their investigation into the for-profit charter company’s real estate 
transactions.  The graphic shows how Imagine acquired properties through subsidiary companies 
and flipped them to other subsidiaries of property management companies like Entertainment 
Properties Trust.  The subsidiaries generated massive profits with each sale, while rental prices 
skyrocketed to maintain profitability.  To maintain profitability for all involved, Imagine 
dramatically increased the rents.  Increased rent payments meant that the school spent less and 
less on its side project of educating St. Louis’s racially and economically segregated school 
children.   
Notice how often Samuel Glasser appears in the graphic.  Glasser is a local property 
developer who had been convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine in the 1970s and who pleaded 
guilty to bank fraud in 2011.408  Glasser first got into the charter school market when in 2003 he 
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leased one of his properties to a charter operator that Imagine would later acquire.  When 
Imagine was expanding rapidly in St. Louis in 2006-2007, Glasser offered two vacant SLPS 
properties he had acquired by listing non-educational plans on his sales agreements with the 
district as a way of circumventing the board’s policy against selling to charter school 
operators.409  Glasser flipped the properties to SchoolHouse Finance, a subsidiary and property 
acquisition arm of Imagine, for $665,000 more than he paid the district a matter of months 
earlier.  As the owner of the general contracting company Samuel & Co., Glasser then made 
nearly $1 million more in profits and fees for rehabbing Imagine’s newly acquired properties.  
The neoliberal state chipped in its part when the Missouri Department of Economic 
Development awarded Glasser nearly $500,000 in historic tax credits, which he then charged 
Imagine an additional $150,000 to apply.410 
Imagine had no cause for alarm at Glasser’s profiteering; it was all part of the plan.  
Figure 4 traces the details of Imagine, Inc.’s real estate transactions.411  The EMO was flush with 
cash from a real estate trust funded by Joseph E. Robert, Jr., an investor and “philanthropist” 
who made billions off distressed properties during the federal government’s savings and loans 
crisis during the 1980s.412  A Kansas City-based property management corporation called 
Entertainment Properties Trust owned Robert’s trust (JERIT CS Fund I) along with 26 Imagine 
School, Inc. properties across the country.  Acting through its subsidiary SchoolHouse Finance, 
Imagine sold its St. Louis schools to Entertainment Properties for ten times what it paid Glasser.  
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Entertainment Properties then leased the buildings back to SchoolHouse Finance in order to 
extract rental income, which is why Imagine’s St. Louis schools spent approximately 15-21 
percent of its state revenues on rent.  For comparison, a locally run charter, City Garden 
Montessori, spent less than 4 percent of its revenues on rent during the same year.413  On top of 
the rent, Imagine extracted 12 percent of each school’s annual revenues as operating costs and 
imposes a series of additional administrative fees.414  With so much money meeting the needs of 
rent-seeking capitalists, comparatively little was left over for actually educating St. Louis’s most 
impoverished students.  It should come as no surprise that Imagine’s state-mandated 
performance scores were some of the lowest in the city.  I do not wish to suggest that student 
performance data is at all a reliable indicator of quality public education.  It is, nonetheless, 
significant that Imagine spent so little on educating the 3,800 students in its six St. Louis schools 
it could not even afford to play the “accountability” game.  When the state closed Imagine’s St. 
Louis schools in 2012, it cited their poor performance rather than their property profiteering as 
the reason, effectively sending the message that the extraction and upward redistribution of 
millions of public education dollars is fine as long as it produces the “results” demanded by 
neoliberal public school accountability regimes. 
If Imagine seems like an egregious example of accumulation by dispossession, or if the 
fact that St. Louis (and Kansas City) eventually closed Imagine’s schools after they had funneled 
millions of dollars to their financiers and property developers is a source of comfort or evidence 
of a working system, it is worth a reminder that Imagine is still one of the largest charter school 
operators in the country.  While now officially a nonprofit, it is run by many of the same 
profiteers, and it maintains its significant footprint in the segregated cities of the Rust Belt.  It is 
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also worth a reminder that, even when charter schools are independently operated with the best 
of intentions, their ties to global bond markets and local rental property intensify financialization.  
 
Figure 4: Imagine, Inc.’s Real Estate Transactions 
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The Management and Manipulation of Crises 
 To a great extend this whole chapter—perhaps the entire dissertation—is a sustained 
study of the management and manipulation of crises.  Structural critiques of political economy 
and racism naturally tend toward analyses of how inherently social issues are created and 
subsequent “solutions” created and recreated in such a way as to make perpetual intervention 
necessary.  Capitalism demands uneven development and cycles of creative destruction to meet 
its insatiable demands for growth.  Such imperatives are inherently contradictory and unstable.  
They exhaust the land and its resources and must search for new land and resources.  They 
exhaust the lower classes through slavery and wage-labor and must, therefore, search for new 
lower classes and forms of slavery.  State intervention must always be at the ready to rescue 
capitalism from its cycles of creation and destruction, but the state is vulnerable to the same 
contradictory impulses.  It creates a commons, a public space, to shelter society from the market, 
only to enclose that space when market logic dictates such protections are no longer necessary, 
and as Karl Polanyi claims, enclosures are “a revolution of the rich against the poor.”415  It was 
the crisis of overcrowded, underfunded, and segregated public schools that drove Minnie Liddell 
to organize parents and file a class action suit against St. Louis Public Schools in 1972.  These 
schools reflected the political economy of the city and the families’ overcrowded, underfunded, 
and segregated neighborhoods.  For a brief period, the state created a system for rebuilding and 
re-envisioning public education space in the full material, relative, and representational sense of 
the word.  No policy is perfect, and the 1983 Liddell Settlement was no exception, but it did 
unite grassroots community activism with sustained academic study in an effort to force the state 
to respond to social injustices that it had created and maintained.  Its most significant 
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shortcoming was that it did not and could not address the political economy and social relations 
that led to economically and racially segregated neighborhoods and schools.  It, therefore, 
became one more crisis to manage and manipulate, and those new spaces of desegregation 
became one more commons to enclose.   
Like many public school boards, SLPS’s board and district educators were suspicious of 
charter schools, especially in relation to the other “accountability” reforms contained within SB 
781.  If the district lost accreditation due to poor student test performance, the state board could 
close the school or convert it to a charter.  Teacher and administrator contracts would be voided, 
and the educators would have to apply for other positions in the district or at their old place of 
employment now under new management.  Missouri law prohibit public school teachers from 
striking, so there was little organized labor could do to oppose SB 781’s disciplining of 
educators.  As for the school board, loss of accreditation meant the elected board was dissolved 
and replaced by the appointed three-member Special Advisory Board (SAB).  As early as 1999, 
Missouri Education Commissioner Robert Bartman tried to revoke the district’s accreditation, 
but the 1999 settlement agreement stipulated a grace period until at least 2002.416  
As I previously stated, SB 781’s charter provisions and accountability reforms totally 
changed the policy landscape of public education in Missouri, but charters were initially slow to 
get off the ground in St. Louis.  Even though board approval was not necessary for opening 
charters, the transition to full neoliberalization of public education policy and practice in St. 
Louis would run more smoothly with a friendly school board, at least until the state board could 
revoke accreditation.  In 2002, St. Louis’s mayor, Francis Slay, partnered with the Regional 
Business Council to jointly run four candidates for four open seats on the elected school board, 
                                                 
416 Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle:  The Long Road to an Equal Education in St. Louis, 198. 
 218 
 
which SB 781 had reduced the size of from twelve to seven members elected at large.  Mayor 
Slay lent the candidates $50,000 of his own campaign funds and put together a coalition of local 
corporations that raised a total of $235,000.417  With the help of former board member and 
educational liason Robbyn Wahby—currently the Executive Director of the Missouri Charter 
Public School Commission, which oversees all Missouri charters—Slay selected candidates who 
shared his views of reform.  Among them was former mayor and champion of public-private 
partnerships and urban revitalization, Vincent Schoemehl.  When all four candidates won, the 
city entrepreneurs had an immediate majority, and their first act of business was to hire corporate 
school turnaround firm Alvarez & Marsal for a one-year, $5 million contract.418  Alvarez & 
Marsal immediately installed one of its own partners, William Roberti, as acting superintendent 
of St. Louis public schools despite his total lack of experience in educational administration.  As 
the district’s “Chief Restructuring Officer,” Roberti received $675 an hour to impose austerity on 
the financially struggling district.  The former CEO of Brooks Brothers understood saw his new 
job in the exact same terms as his old one:  “It is ordinary business as far as I’m 
concerned…We’ve got logistic problems, we’ve got distribution problems, we’ve got 
organizational problems, we’ve got systemic problems, we’ve got finance problems…Whether I 
was a CEO of a clothing company or a manufacturing company, or whatever, I’ve always been a 
problem solver.”419  Roberti’s program of “problem solving” included closing sixteen schools 
(twelve of which were in the city’s poorest neighborhoods on the north side); laying off 1,463 
district employees; and upping the student to teacher ratios to 26:1 for elementary schools, 28:1 
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for middle schools and 31:1 for high schools.420  Roberti and the other partners at Alvarez and 
Marsal had little concern about blowback from their draconian cuts.  The firm and Roberti were 
hired on contract and had no plans to remain in St. Louis after their “restructuring” was 
complete.  The school board knew exactly how Roberti planned to save money when they hired 
Alvarez and Marsal.  During his initial pitch to a selection committee, Tony Alvarez, the firm’s 
co-founder, was asked about how to handle public opinion in the face of such drastic cuts.  He 
responded with a private sector solution:  hire a PR firm.421  This is the hallmark of urban 
neoliberalization: create and reinforce structural crises of uneven development, cut aid and social 
safety nets, upwardly distribute resources, and manage political consequences by marketing the 
process as successful reform. 
The public mounted a counter-reform effort, and by 2006, several of the mayor’s four 
corporate reform candidates had lost re-elections and their majority.  In 2007, the state stripped 
SLPS of its accreditation, which per SB 781 dissolved the elected board’s authority and installed 
the three-member SAB appointed by Governor Matt Blunt, Mayor Slay, and the President of the 
St. Louis Board of Aldermen.  Mayor Slay selected Melanie Adams, who had worked with one 
of his four reformer candidates at the Missouri Historical Society and who was also the former 
Executive Director for Teach for America in St. Louis.  In 2016, Adams left the SAB to take a 
position in Minnesota.  Slay replaced her with Darnetta Clinkscale, who was one of the four 
candidates he and the business community successfully ran back in 2002.  If nothing else, Slay 
shows persistence in his defiance of the public’s opposition to his preferences for who governs 
the city’s schools.     
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For the position of Superintendent, the SAB selected Kelvin Adams in 2008, the former 
chief of staff for Paul Vallas’s Recovery School District in New Orleans.  Adams had no 
previous experience in running an urban school district, yet he had plenty of experience in 
restructuring one.  Because an unaccredited board cannot authorize charter schools, Adams and 
the SAB have had a limited role in charter expansion in St. Louis despite what their property 
dealings with KIPP suggest.  It is the state politics of accreditation—in tandem with local politics 
of spatial redevelopment—that has engineered the revanchist reversal of desegregation and the 
expansion of charter schools.  The 1983 Liddell settlement made student transfer financially 
beneficial for both sending and receiving districts.  Why such a provision is necessary should be 
obvious.  If urban schools are structurally, administratively, or even pedagogically unsound, 
losing money from student transfers would certainly not improve their circumstances.  Similarly, 
suburban schools, even under federal enforcement, would not have graciously participated as 
long as they did if they had had to assume the added costs without compensation.  It is the state 
that bore most of the costs of student transfers and magnet school construction and operation.  
The administrative restructuring that accompanied loss of accreditation under SB 781 
complimented an earlier reform.  Missouri’s Outstanding Schools Act of 1993 required 
unaccredited schools districts to cover the costs of transportation and tuition of any student 
wishing to attend an accredited district of their choice.422  Thus, it was a sort of inversion of the 
desegregation program.  After the state board revoked SLPS’s accreditation in 2007, a group of 
parents (all of them white) who lived in the city but had previously paid tuition for their children 
to attend public schools in Clayton, the seat of St. Louis County and an affluent suburb known 
for its high quality public schools, demanded Clayton request reimbursement from SLPS 
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according to the 1993 statute.  When Clayton refused on the grounds that SLPS under the 
governance of the “transitional” SAB was not a traditional district and, therefore, was an 
exception to the statute, the parents sued.  The initial summary judgement of Turner v. School 
District of Clayton (2007) sided with the Clayton school district, but the Missouri Supreme Court 
reversed that judgement in 2010.  Missouri’s highest court argued that the relevant statute was 
unambiguous in demanding that an unaccredited district is responsible for transportation and 
tuition costs for any student wishing to attend school in a neighboring district, and unaccredited 
means the same thing whether the district is governed by the elected or the appointed board.423  
The costs associated with the accountability transfer program (as opposed to the desegregation 
transfer program) fell entirely on the district and presented an existential threat. 
SB 781 began the process of ending the 1983 Liddell settlement, but the end of 
desegregation was not finalized until a year later with the 1999 Liddell settlement.  The 1999 
settlement determined that the state would continue making set payments for ten years to wean 
the district from the desegregation funding upon which it had come to depend considering its 
declining enrollments, dwindling tax revenues, and increased expenditures on maintaining its 
aging (and vacant) facilities and meeting the obligations of new state and federal mandates such 
as those coming from NCLB.  Of the original $180 million the state agreed to pay over the 
subsequent decade, over $96 million had remained in an escrow account.  The money was 
supposed to be used for new construction and infrastructure improvements, but the district’s 
continued decline in enrollment from depopulation and charter competition meant that there was 
very little need for new construction, especially when the district was closing schools so rapidly.  
Since the district was not able to use the funds for general operating costs, it had borrowed 
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against the settlement over the years to fill holes in its budget.  A year after the Missouri 
Supreme Court ruled that unaccredited districts would have to pay the full cost of student 
transfers to accredited districts, the district struck a deal that freed up all that desegregation 
money sitting in the escrow account and marked for new construction.  The 2011 agreement 
allowed Adams and the SAB to use the funds to clear $56 million in debt, with the remainder 
going toward technology upgrades, professional development, and various other districtwide 
improvements.424  When the state board restored the district to provisional accreditation the 
following year—an act which meant the district no longer was responsible for the transfer costs 
stemming from the Turner case—it cited the sound financial management of the SAB and 
Adams as a principal reason.425  The revanchist state, therefore, not only won a tremendous 
victory with SB 781 ending the 1983 Liddell desegregation settlement; it ultimately redirected 
most of its financial obligations from the 1999 settlement away from desegregating schools or 
improving infrastructure and toward, most significantly, debt payment.   
 
State Redistributions 
 The creation and promotion of charter school legislation by property redevelopers and 
civic entrepreneurs; the public wealth extraction by charter profiteers like Imagine, Inc.; the 
disbursal of over $50 million in desegregation funds to pay down bond debt; the hiring of a 
corporate consulting turnaround firm to impose austerity cuts on a financially struggling district; 
the closure of public schools and their redevelopment as mixed-income and market-rate condos, 
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in many cases by the same people who worked to create the charter legislation and accountability 
reforms that ultimately placed those former schools on the market—all of this effectively 
reverses the redistribution of public funds from their downward direction under social 
democratic desegregation to their upward flow under neoliberalization.  The rollback of forms of 
state welfare for the poor and marginalized finds its completion in the rollout of forms of state 
welfare for the capitalist class looking to gentrify a neighborhood or maximize their profits with 
charter school property or bond debt or both. 
 But as I have maintained throughout this dissertation, education reform policies cannot be 
understood separately from urban reform policies.  Because urban neoliberalization 
manufactured crises that the charter school movement exploited, it is worth looking at whether 
those processes of urban neoliberalization have abated or intensified since SB 781 altered the 
public education landscape in the late 1990s.  Doing so provides some indication of whether the 
structural instability of public education finance will lead to new crises and consequences of 
either increased charter school concentration or perhaps other forms of privatization.  In 2016, 
financial analysts at the PFM Group produced a report of the city’s tax incentive uses from 2000-
2014, a close approximation of the time since SB 781.  The PFM report found that over the 
fifteen-year period, the city had approved $402 million in TIF and $307 million in tax 
abatements.  State incentives totaled $1.48 billion in real estate related tax credits and $249 
million in state investments and bonds.  More interesting than the shear amount of these 
“geobribes” is their location.  Rather than encourage development in St. Louis’s poorest and 
most racially segregated neighborhoods, tax incentives subsidized the development of already 
gentrified areas.  The study found a correlation between incentive use and increased assessed 
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value, but “This is probably because incentive use follows overall investment patters.”426  In 
other words, public money and private money are both investing in the same places (Figure 5).427
 
Figure 5: Tax Abatements and TIF 2000-2014 
Even though tax abatements pepper the city, their spatial concentration and intensity in the 
gentrified central corridor (from downtown through Cortex and the Central West End) is 
obvious.  TIF projects have clustered almost exclusively in the central corridor.  Both forms of 
tax incentives have largely ignored the segregated neighborhoods of the north side.  These are 
the same neighborhoods whose overcrowded and segregated schools led to the Liddell suit and 
settlement, the same neighborhoods where SLPS built so many schools from 1954 to 1974 to 
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avoid desegregating the district.  Figure 6 shows the location of the vacant properties SLPS is 
trying to sell or has already sold to real estate developers or charter schools.428 
 
Figure 6: SLPS Vacant Properties 
While the city has sacrificed its public school’s property tax revenues on the altar of urban 
revitalization that has concentrated in the city’s wealthiest tracts and ignored the poorest, vacant 
public schools are concentrated in the poorest areas and offered as alternative incentives for 
revitalization.  Put differently, the city offers prospective investors capital to locate in already 
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wealthy spaces.  For its poor spaces, the city instead offers its abandoned public space for 
redevelopment.   
 I have shown in this dissertation that regional and local charter school growth and market 
concentration is driven by far more than neoliberal elites’ claims of superior performance or 
consumer demands.  As a vanguard of neoliberal education reform, charter schools categorically 
bear a greater resemblance to market entities than to traditional public schools.  Like market 
entities, charter schools grow by exploiting market opportunities either through franchising or 
startups.  Such opportunities are greatest in the concentrations of fixed capital and educational 
consumer populations offered by cities, which is one reason why charter schools have remained 
primarily an urban phenomenon.  Not all urban space, however, presents the same political 
economic opportunities for growth.  Charter concentration and market saturation appears to have 
regional proclivities for hypersegregated and depopulated urban space.  The relationship between 
education policy and urban revitalization policy in St. Louis provides compelling evidence for 
why charter schools have thrived within the political economic instability of such racially 
segregated Rust Belt cities.  Critical geography and urban theory provides a crucial lens for 
analyzing the path dependency of neoliberalization as well as for synthesizing structural 
economic imperatives such as creative destruction and capital accumulation with the role policy 
plays in legitimating neoliberal ideology and governance within and outside of public education.  
More work is necessary to compare and potentially synthesize the political economic histories of 
charter-concentrated cities within and outside of the Rust Belt to understand more fully the role 
of charter schools in urban revitalization.  Similarly, more work on the political economic links 
between desegregation and charter schools is necessary to develop a more robust appreciation for 
the role education policy plays within the larger policy ecology of urbanization.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?   
Having pointed to systemic injustice under urban neoliberalization, the critic is often 
charged with the task of illustrating systemic justice.  To a point, this is fair.  Criticism should 
have a positive project.  A coherent and cohesive critique must be driven by a sense of what is 
neglected or what is stolen.  It must also be able to point to some set of objective criteria, without 
which no concept of justice could survive.  Poststructural criticism of governmentality has 
largely faltered on this point.  It remains stuck within the liberal idiom of freedom from rather 
than freedom to.  Free-market liberals desire freedom from state interference with their economic 
relations.  Foucauldian poststructuralists desire freedom from interference with forming 
subjectivities, whether such interference comes from the state or any other system of 
rationalizing and legitimating social relations.  Neither form of atomized individualism allows 
for much in the way of collective struggles for the common good.  They either have a conception 
of the common good so thin as to allow only for maximizing self-interest in economic relations 
irrespective of value judgements, or the common good is rejected in toto as too absolutist, 
permitting only the contradiction that the common good is freedom from prescriptive 
understandings of the common good.  That said, a fully developed vision of what the common 
good is, the role of education in reflecting and fostering such a vision, and how urbanism would 
have to change in St. Louis or any other deindustrialized and hypersegregated city order to 
redevelop around such a vision is outside the scope of this work.  I will offer in this chapter 
instead only preliminary considerations and preconditions for such a project.  My purpose in 
doing so is not to abandon the preceding chapters’ themes of charter schools’ relationship to 
urban neoliberalization but to argue for a radically new form of urban political economy that 
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transcends the failures of the Keynesian liberal and neoliberal eras.  In other words, schools 
reflect the political economic form and content of the societies in which they exist.  Educational 
equity and social justice cannot depend on public school reform.  They must be the result of 
larger political economic reform.    
 
Zombie Neoliberalism 
 If society in the U.S is to move beyond neoliberalism’s hegemonic grip on political 
economy, urban life, and even the individual’s sense of self and if emancipation and social 
protection are to align against marketization, then the problem of capitalism’s perpetual 
mutations are of paramount importance.  History does not repeat itself because it cannot.  If 
forces of oppression and exploitation mutate over time, then so too must projects of liberation.  
Whether the topic is access to a safe, well-resourced, and equitable public education or adequate 
housing and a dignified source of income, it is quixotic to think that the exact same tactics or 
even modes of analysis that have historically failed to secure those common goods with any 
degree of longevity can be counted on to deliver them now.  Busing will not deliver integrated 
schools.  High-rise public housing will not solve urban housing crises, at least not within the 
constraints of the political economy of late capitalism.  Much of the reason for this failure is that 
liberals—and even many who consider themselves further left of the average liberal—criticize 
neoliberalism as though Keynesian social liberalism was the proper form of a just political 
economy.  Such a supposition ignores the fact that Keynesian liberalism has been the exception 
not the rule of capital accumulation.  As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it: 
What misled economists and many others about the long-run tendencies of capitalism 
was the movement...toward economic and social democratization in the period from 1945 
to 1980, a period in which the destruction of inherited capital in World War II and the 
political acceptability of progressive taxation combined to limit and in some respects to 
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reverse tendencies toward gross inequality inherent in capitalism.  What was in fact an 
atypical period was not identified as such…What we should have learned from Marx, we 
have recurrently had to learn all over again.429 
 
If we set the end date of Keynesian liberalism as the paradigmatic form of political economy a 
few years earlier than MacIntyre to the mid-1970s where it is usually set, then neoliberalism has 
already achieved greater longevity than Keynesian liberalism, the basis of which was pragmatic 
class-compromise rather than liberation.  If the ruling class has deemed such compromises no 
longer necessary for capital accumulation, then what are the chances it will return to them out of 
a sense of civic obligation or humanitarian goodwill?  With this in mind, the title of this 
dissertation should not be mistaken as a desire to recover the symbolic ground the public lost to 
neoliberalism’s symbolic and literal appropriation of public space.  Certainly the ideals of 
Minnie Liddell’s struggle and the commitments to state redistribution by liberals such as Gary 
Orfield and Judge William Hungate are more ethically grounded than the upward redistribution 
of public funds and space ensconced in William Kuehling’s charter provisions of SB 781 or the 
dominant notions of equity within the broader charter school movement.  Liberal attempts at 
social protections left the larger racialized and exploitative political economy in place, and, 
therefore, like most other social protections within the market society, they were lost to the 
rollback and replaced in the rollout phases of neoliberalism’s metaregulation cycles.  Moreover, 
what is lost is not just the public space but a robust conception of the purpose of such space.  On 
this point, I rely on two meanings of lost: that which the public possessed and no longer 
possesses and that which the public has ostensibly been in search of but never has found.  Public 
education space was literally or materially lost in the transition between Keynesian liberalism 
and neoliberalism, but the idea that such space was ever sufficiently oriented toward a robust 
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notion of the common good is one of historical fiction rather than fact.  Again, fully theorizing 
the common good is not the goal of this dissertation.  Nonetheless, because one needs a starting 
point from which to move against neoliberalization, space is as good a place as any since it is so 
crucial to capital accumulation and class discipline.   
 The mutations of capitalism from Keynesian liberalism to neoliberalism have intensified 
contradictions inherent to capitalism to the point of utter irrationality.  I explored these 
contradictions thoroughly in the second chapter, but we need only to consider the strong state 
intervention necessary for “free” markets for evidence of neoliberalism’s irrationality.  How then 
can neoliberalism continue as the paradigmatic policy framework when it seems ready to 
collapse under the weight of its own contradictions?  Neil Smith claims that Jürgen Habermas’s 
assertion that modernism was “dominant but dead” applies equally to neoliberalism.430  
Neoliberalism is dead because it has no life coursing through its veins.  It has no original insights 
into political life, and while its tactics and constituencies change, its effects of degrading poverty 
and rampant wealth inequality are hardly novel.  Neoliberalism just recycles and reconfigures the 
old and disproven theories of the nature and benefits of free markets, albeit in forms increasingly 
estranged and nearly unrecognizable.  The 2016 presidential election provides a useful example.  
The Republican candidate was an entertainment personality who has spent his life pretending to 
be a shrewd businessman and a man’s man.  Candidate Trump became President Trump after 
running an a largely xenophobic and racist campaign that appealed to a cliché-ridden patriotism, 
American exceptionalism, and entirely indefensible economic theories about how to create and 
maintain widespread prosperity.  Much of the same is true of the modern hero of the Republican 
Party, Ronald Reagan.  How did the Democrats counter such an uninspiring repetition of tropes?  
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They ran a Clinton in total defiance of the reality that the last President Clinton left office 
disgraced by scandal and having successfully implemented a full range of policies that decimated 
left-politics, criminalized poverty, deregulated the financial industry, and made millions of 
working class Americans unemployed through the automation and offshoring of jobs.  Even 
Bernie Sanders’s nearly successful nomination—as unfathomable as his platform sounded to 
neoliberal ears—was just the resurgence of New Deal social democracy.  Sixty years ago, 
Sanders would not have had to refer to himself as a Democratic Socialist.  Democrat would have 
sufficed.  As Smith reminds us, neoliberalism under Reagan was not “the ferment of new ideas;” 
rather, it was “the recycled axia from the earlier liberal tradition.”431  Jamie Peck calls this 
lifeless but brutal and dominant political economy “zombie neoliberalism.”  It lumbers on 
through continual mutation.  Rather than burying its core principles for having failed so often 
and so greatly, “the new neoliberalism learns (and evolves) by doing wrong, having become 
mired in the unending challenge of managing its own contradictions, together with the social and 
economic fallout from previous deregulations and malinterventions.  It fails, but it tends to fail 
forwards…It is (re)animated as much by contradiction as by conviction.”432  With vivid horror, 
Peck concludes, “The living dead of the free-market revolution continue to walk the earth, 
though with each resurrection their decidedly uncoordinated gait becomes even more erratic.”433  
It is too early to determine the extent to which Peck’s description applies to the federal 
government’s free-market commitments and policy agenda under a Trump administration, but it 
is safe to assume that capital accumulation will be a driving force and erratic will be an 
appropriate adjective.   
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 Whatever happens at the federal policy level, it is certain that the deindustrialized and 
hypersegregated cities of this country do not have any dominant policy agendas that reflect a 
significant departure from the civic entrepreneurialism that has been their mode of urban 
governance in the neoliberal era.  In fact, the political class of the “progressive” neoliberal 
enclaves of urban America seem poised to double down on their commitments to becoming 
global cities.  That is, they are planting the flag of “enlightened” and “emancipatory” global 
neoliberalism in defiance of what they perceive to be the uncivilized protectionism of Trump’s 
right-wing populism.  Not only does the prominence of the fossil fuel and financial industries in 
the incoming administration categorically deny claims to populism, the cosmopolitanism of the 
urban political class itself is only concerned with making cities into places of consumption and 
profit generation over and against the demands of social justice.  Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 
are correct in claiming that:  
Orthodox neoliberal ideology is now increasingly called into question, but the political 
machinery of state-imposed market discipline remains essentially intact; social and 
economic policy agendas continue to be subordinated to the priority of maintaining 
investor confidence and a good business climate; and policy agendas such as free trade, 
privatization, flexible labor markets, and urban territorial competitiveness continue to be 
taken for granted.434 
 
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore theorize possible pathways for countering and replacing 
neoliberalism’s hegemony.  At one end, they have the continuation of zombie neoliberalization 
with its recycled policies and emergent but predictable forms of technocratic crisis management.  
Moving across scenarios of decreasing marketization and increasing socialization—what the 
authors describe as “disarticulated counter-liberalism” and “orchestrated counter-liberalism”—
they arrive at zombie neoliberalization’s antithesis of “deep socialization,” (Figure 6) 
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characterized by the “construction of alternative, market-constraining, redistributive, and 
socializing frameworks for macrospatial regulatory organization.”435  If variegated 
neoliberalization is the uneven development of neoliberal policy regimes alongside the 
neoliberalization of regulatory uneven development,436 then its inverse is in deep socialization or 
the spreading of differentiated modes of political-economic socialization across time and space 
resulting in a new socialist rather than liberal hegemony.  What Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 
have effectively theorized is the critical policy analyst’s response to Fraser’s call for the 
realignment of the state’s social protection and emancipation impulses.  
 Brenner, Peck, and Theodore caution that their scenarios are not an inevitable 
progression.  Society could remain stuck in unforeseen but increasingly erratic and contradictory 
forms of neoliberalization, or it could move to a disarticulated counter-liberalism before zombie 
neoliberalization reasserted the primacy of its fictionalized free markets and commodified social 
relations.  The framework these authors offer is one that moves toward emancipatory and non-
marketized social relations, but they acknowledge that an array of imaginable or unimagined new 
forms of totalitarianism or imperialism could also replace neoliberalism as a world-historical 
movement.  These are important caveats, and the notion that history is on a sort of inevitable 
trajectory toward emancipation is as ignorant of the past and present as it is dangerous for the 
future. 
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 234 
 
 
Figure 7:  Scenarios for Counter-neoliberalization 
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 Any pathways to deep socialization that might be unique to St. Louis or possible within 
other hypersegregated and deindustrialized cities must first wrestle with macroeconomic issues.  
Neoliberalization is path-dependent, and so it seems deep socialization must also be, but 
neoliberalism is a regional, national, and global phenomenon.  It is important to avoid localizing 
the blame for deindustrialization.  Political corruption and the disaster capitalists in St. Louis no 
doubt bear their portion of the burden of guilt, but it is the exodus of capital at the macro-level 
that created the opportunities to revalorize that space.  When St. Louis first opened up tax 
incentives for out-of-state developers in 1945, Mayor Kauffman recognized the emergence of a 
new era and remarked that “The language of the law was practically written in offices of New 
York insurance companies.”437  With the likes of Boeing, Monsanto, and Anheuser-Busch Inbev 
having corporate or major division headquarters in the St. Louis area, the language of many city 
and state laws might very well have been written in Riyadh, Beijing, Sao Paulo, or any other city 
for that matter.   
 The struggle against local neoliberalization must simultaneously be a project of 
macroeconomic socialization.  Considering that most trade unions are at historically low levels 
of density and have had a waning influence on policy for decades, it seems unlikely that they 
would play a leading role in deep socialization at any level.  Two prominent pathways for 
socializing capitalism’s markets are a universal basic income (UBI) or some sort of decentralized 
cooperative ownership of the means of production such as what Marxist economist Richard 
Wolff calls Worker Self-Directed Enterprises (WSDEs).  These are by no means the only ways 
to think about deep socialization, but they each offer different strengths and weaknesses that, in 
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some sense, any project would have to address.  I will take each in turn and consider what it 
would have to offer a city like St. Louis. 
 
Universal Basic Income 
 A UBI attempts to create a system of state redistribution of the surpluses of market 
capitalism in such a way that every citizen is guaranteed an income characteristically at or above 
what passes for poverty in a given region or country.  Such an idea is popular for a number of 
reasons.  First, and perhaps most urgently, UBI addresses the problem of present and future job 
loss due to automation.  If Frey and Osborne are correct that 47 percent of existing jobs are 
vulnerable to automation during the next two decades, then most Western countries are facing 
either a massive expansion in redistribution or a revolutionary response to income inequality. 438  
Indeed, if Frey and Osborne are right by half, significant state redistributions will be necessary to 
maintain social stability and effective demand within a consumer economy.  Frey and Osborne’s 
work is urgent but hardly unique.  It is practically consensus, not just among economists or 
sociologists but among the general public, that just as the twentieth century was witness to the 
decline of a single income family wage for working class (non-professional) people to near non-
existence, the twenty-first century will witness the decline of most of the wage work done by the 
working poor.  Indeed, for some time, the state has already subsidized poverty wages through 
redistribution.  No doubt at least some of the reason welfare programs such as EBT have 
continued throughout neoliberalization is that they allow the nation’s largest employers like 
WalMart and McDonalds to get away with paying their workers poverty wages.  Automation, 
however, will replace those jobs regardless of where the state sets the minimum wage. 
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 UBI would have profound implications for public education nationally and would 
demand the reorientation and even reconceptualization of the purpose of public education.  As I 
showed in Chapter Three, the emergence and location of STEM and STEAM charter schools in 
St. Louis follows the city’s efforts to reinvent itself as a hub of biotechnology hub.  The 
emphasis on STEM fields within public education would likely continue regardless of changes to 
the political economy, but its status as a panacea for urban education and employment is 
untenable under a guaranteed income system.    
 Artists and so-called creative types embrace UBI because it free up tremendous amounts 
of time to pursue their craft.  Instead of taking a job, often one with long hours and low wages, in 
order to cover the basic necessities of housing and food, artists can pour their energy and time 
into their passionate rather than mundane pursuits.  They are also free from the need to sell their 
art on markets.  Creative pursuits are thus unencumbered by the demands of temporary work and 
patronage.  The same could be said of new and various social relations.  With so much time 
devoted to what David Graeber provocatively refers to as “bullshit jobs,”439 little is left for new 
non-market social relations.  With UBI, people would have more time for recreation and leisure, 
but they would also have more opportunities to engage in politics, mutual aid, and any number of 
other activities that could form and strengthen community.  Such freedom has the potential to 
transform deindustrialized spaces like St. Louis.  Art, cooperative and communal forms of leisure 
and political engagement, freedom from degrading and dehumanizing wage-work could 
collectively produce a counter-neoliberal form of urbanism that would invariably alter not just 
the city’s social relations but its built environment as well.  
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 The primary and fundamental problem with UBI is that it leaves control over the means 
of production and the distribution and redistribution of its surpluses where they have historically 
been and failed—i.e. in the hands of the capitalists and the liberal state.  The principal issue with 
UBI is not, as many free market capitalists incorrectly argue, that people receive money without 
having worked for it.  This is, in fact, an odd problem for the capitalists to raise, since capitalism 
itself is predicated on the owner of capital receiving money without having to work for it.  I am 
not referring only to some sort of caricature of a capitalist factory owner smoking a cigar with 
his feet propped up and sipping scotch while he counts the money he expropriated from his 
alienated workers, although the point certainly applies to such a figure.  Rather every dividend 
payout, every bond disbursement, every rent collected, every sale of appreciated stock value, and 
so on is a transfer of value to those whose labor did not produce it.  This applies to global one 
percent to a far greater degree than anyone else, most of all to the eight people who own as much 
wealth as the poorest half of humanity.440  But it remains the case that middle and lower-middle 
class benefits like appreciated home value and pension investments involve the transfer of value 
in the absence of work.   
No, the fundamental problem with UBI is that it is every bit as vulnerable the crisis 
resolution-followed-by-rollback cycles of Keynesian liberalism.  UBI only has to stimulate 
effective consumer demand and then rollback benefits with the elites who run the economy and 
the state decide making sure people are less poor than they otherwise would be is no longer 
worth their time and money.  Some preliminary experiments with UBI in Finland suggest that 
without the proper protections, center-right corporate interests can co-opt UBI as a justification 
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and method for rolling back other welfare state provisions.441  Moreover, centralizing power over 
the masses’ livelihood is something both Foucauldian poststructuralists and post-Soviet Marxists 
agree is a bad thing.  Neoliberalism’s soft-power benefits (e.g. expanding “universal” healthcare 
through corporatized insurance markets or block granting housing and educational spending) 
have always come with the strong strings of governmentality attached.  There is every reason to 
believe that one’s basic income would require some significant ideological payment from the 
interpellated subject.  
 
Worker Self-Directed Enterprises 
The second significant option for moving toward deep socialization is a decentralized but 
confederated socialist economy built with cooperative models.  One of the leading proponents of 
such a plan is the Marxist economist Richard Wolff.  Wolff and his colleague Stephen Resnick 
argue that one of the fundamental failures of “actually existing socialism” such as that embodied 
by the Soviet Union was that it retained the structures of surplus appropriation and alienation.  
Instead of a handful of capitalists appropriating the value created by a mass of workers, the 
bureaucratic state appropriated the surpluses generated by similarly disempowered and alienated 
labor.442  For this reason, Resnick and Wolff refer to actually existing communism as state 
capitalism.  Wolff theorizes and actively promotes an alternative pathway to socialism in what he 
calls worker self-directed enterprises or WSDEs.  Wolff argues that WSDEs transcend the 
problem of labor disempowerment and alienation found in capitalist and dominant 
socialist/communist governments because “no separate group of persons—no individual who 
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does not participate in the productive work of the enterprise—can be a member of the board of 
directors…Instead, all of the workers who produce the surplus generated inside the enterprise 
function collectively to appropriate and distribute it.  They alone compose the board of 
directors.”443  Socialism is thus more fully democratized under sites of production cooperatively 
run by the workers themselves who produce the surplus value.  Every worker is an owner and 
every owner a worker.   
Such an arrangement of democratizing and socializing workplaces resolves a number of 
crises in late capitalism surrounding unemployment and worker redundancy.  Most obviously, 
worker-owners are highly unlikely to lay themselves off or outsource production in order to 
increase profits, whereas the history of capitalism tells quite a different story about owners who 
are not workers.  The reasons why outsourcing is not a threat are too obvious to merit discussion.  
Technology and mechanized productivity is more interesting though.  Technological advances 
such as those described by Frey and Osborne are not much of a threat to WSDEs.  Worker-
owners could either use increased efficiency and productivity that comes with technological 
development to boost profits they control, or they could use greater productivity to collectively 
reduce their work hours, or both.  Under capitalism, management’s purpose is to maximize 
shareholder value over and against workers’ interest.  Therefore, technologizing production 
means fewer workers are necessary and must be laid off.  The benefits not just of maintaining 
employment but of maximizing leisure time and profits present an obviously brighter 
technological future for worker-owners than for mere workers.  Unlike UBIs, there is no threat of 
rolling back redistribution because there is no need for redistribution in the first place.  Surplus 
capital is fairly distributed the first time. 
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There are also spatial and scalar benefits to decentralized socialism like WSDEs.  
Because ownership under corporate capitalism is either national or global rather than local, there 
is little natural incentive to care about consequences to local economies and ecologies.  When 
decision making is in the hands of a board and majority shareholders who do not live anywhere 
near the site of production, they are far less inclined to care about toxicity and pollutants 
affecting local populations and ecosystems than they would be if the site were in their 
community.  Similarly, the layoffs, plant closures, and relocations that have devastated company 
towns and major cities like St. Louis are far less likely to happen when the worker-owners are 
part of those communities.  During the last two decades, corporate tax inversions (relocating 
corporate headquarters to low-tax havens like Ireland or many Caribbean nations) and investor 
strip mining have devastated local economies.  Strip mining is when CEOs extract profits from a 
company in such a way sacrifices their long term viability for short term boosts in stock prices.  
Due to deregulating executive compensation under neoliberalization, most executives profit far 
more from stock options than from their already inflated salaries.  They also tend to remain at a 
company for only a few years rather than a considerable chunk of their working life.  They 
therefore have an incentive to impose austerity cuts or make various high-risk investments that 
drive up stock price before cashing in their chips and leaving the company (and its community) 
in a broken and devalued state.  WSDEs, on the other hand, are far more likely to have deep 
connections to the surrounding community that would prevent ecological or economic 
devastation of the sort St. Louisans have experienced during the ebbs and flows of capital and 
urban redevelopment.  St. Louis Aldermen prove that ties to the community do not inevitably 
lead to good governance, but WSDEs would not be only the local petty bourgeoisie of the St. 
Louis wards.  They would be working people with kids in the school systems. 
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One drawback from WSDEs is that it requires complex forms of territorial governance.  
Even though decentralized socialism solves some of the problems presented by centralized 
bureaucracies, there are vital social tasks that require largescale bureaucracies.  Traditional 
macro-economic and political concerns like defense and currency stability would still be 
necessary as decentralized and democratized socialism still relies on market exchange.  Other 
large scale issues like healthcare and infrastructure (transportation and communication) would 
require some form of confederation.  There is also the conundrum of climate change and global 
ecological degradation.  Capitalist nation-states have driven global ecological devastation, so 
they would seem like the last place to invest hope in a solution for it.  Nonetheless, global 
ecology presents such massive and potentially devastating issues that it is difficult to imagine 
anything but a well-coordinated response could stave off widespread disaster.  Some form of 
non-marketized global confederacy would be necessary in order to combat issues such as climate 
change.  If such scales of semi-autonomous confederated socialism seem impossibly complex, 
just consider the Rube Goldberg machine that is global capitalism, wherein local, regional, 
national, and global capitalisms must access global commodities markets dominated by a relative 
few corporations and commodity cartels and regulated by a cacophony of state, non-state, and 
supra-state bodies.  Complexity hardly seems like a stumbling block.  
The local level of segregated and deindustrialized cities like St. Louis hardly seems less 
complex or absurd under neoliberalization.  On the contrary, they are sites with some of the 
greatest potential for radical politics and deep socialization.  The massive property vacancy 
caused by deindustrialization and depopulation has forced the city to take ownership of large 
swaths of real estate under a city department called the Land Reutilization Authority or LRA.  
The city has an enormous backlog of property scheduled for clearance, but it cannot even keep 
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up with the demands of cutting grass.  The city estimates that it spends $1 million a year cutting 
grass on vacant LRA properties.  In 2016, the city passed a bill put forward by two aldermen that 
allows owners of property adjacent to LRA vacancies to assume ownership of the vacant 
property if they pay $125 in registration fees and agree to cut the grass for a trial period of two 
years and agree to pay future taxes on their new property.  The program is called Mow to 
Own.444  The LRA owns around 4,000 parcels of land.  If acquiring property by cutting grass is 
not too absurd, then it is certainly reasonable to create a large-scale housing/land cooperative that 
is democratically run and managed by residents.  In 2011, residents of a run-down trailer park in 
Fridley, Minnesota, refused to continue putting up with absentee landlords and neighborhood 
decline.  They formed a cooperative and purchased the trailer park from its negligent owners.  
The residents now run the thriving cooperative, and several are both owners and employees.445  
A small fraction of the money St. Louis officials have devoted to tax incentives in a failed effort 
to attract mobile capital investment through interurban competition would be sufficient to create 
and sustain several cooperatively owned and managed neighborhoods.  Such neighborhoods 
would not fall victim to the sort of elite neglect, disinvestment, and disinterest of Pruitt-Igoe.  As 
importantly, there would be no reason to stop at housing cooperatives.  As Cooperation Jackson 
in Jackson, Mississippi, demonstrates, a diverse network of cooperative enterprises can unite 
racial justice and socialist economics as a path of resistance against a hostile local, state, and 
national government.  Cooperation Jackson describes its theory of political change and social 
justice as “centered on the position that organizing and empowering the structurally under and 
unemployed sectors of the working class, particularly from Black and Latino communities, to 
                                                 
444 “Tackling Vacancy:  Mow to Own” (City of St. Louis, May 4, 2016), https://www.stlouis-
mo.gov/government/departments/sldc/news/tackling-vacancy-mow-to-own.cfm. 
445 “Park Plaza Cooperative - A Resident-Owned Community” (Park Plaza Cooperative, n.d.), 
http://www.parkplaza.coop/. 
 244 
 
build worker organized and owned cooperatives will be a catalyst for the democratization of our 
economy and society overall.”446  The protests in Ferguson and throughout metropolitan St. 
Louis unleashed political energy that has the potential to situate criminal justice reforms within a 
much larger project of structural anti-racism and deep socialization of the local economy.   
All of this sounds utopian.  In a sense, it must be.  Utopian thinking is necessary to move 
beyond recycling liberalism in perpetuity.  The cyclical devaluation and revalorization of urban 
space will continue to devour urban life and drain already degraded and dehumanized 
neighborhoods of their vitality in the name of revitalization unless and until a new imaginary 
emerges at the level of policy.  What is necessary is not nebulous poststructuralist calls of 
“governed of the world unite against governmentality” or the totalitarian bureaucracy of state 
capitalism, but a real political strategy driven by utopian possibility.  Paulo Freire puts it this 
way:  
It is necessary to go beyond rebellious attitudes to a more radically critical and 
revolutionary position, which is in fact a position not simply of denouncing injustice but 
of announcing a new utopia.  Transformation of the world implies a dialectic between the 
two actions:  denouncing the process of dehumanization and announcing the dream of a 
new society.447 
 
The new utopian dream must be approached with caution.  The utopian vision cannot be assumed 
to be free of conflict or political struggle.  Paradoxically, it should not even be thought of as ideal 
or perfected.  Such a claim may seem antithetical to common conceptions of utopia, but it has 
been there from the start.  Thomas More’s utopia was not the realization (even in fiction) of a 
perfected society.  It was a work of profound political criticism of his own society’s 
compromised ethics.  The imagined world was not a replacement or even a perfection of the real.  
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It was a way of thinking about the real in relation to necessary change.  In other words, utopian 
thinking is not about the real becoming the ideal.  It is rather the extraordinary guiding the 
ordinary.  This claim should not be confused with mere optimism.  It might in fact come closer to 
a pessimism—though of the sort infused with tragic hope and marked by persistent struggle.   As 
Jameson remarks, “Utopian thinking demands a revision of Gramsci’s famous slogan, which 
might now run:  cynicism of the intellect, utopianism of the will.”448  Elsewhere, Jameson 
criticizes the notion that utopian thinking amounts to “establish[ing] positive criteria of the 
desirable society” as the project of liberalism not radical politics.  Instead, proper utopians “aim 
at the alleviation and elimination of the sources of exploitation and suffering, rather than at the 
composition of blueprints for bourgeois comfort.”449  Such is the political project of the twenty-
first century.  The twentieth century demanded socialism or barbarism.  It saw more barbarism 
than socialism.  The twenty-first century demands utopianism or barbarism.  Time will tell what 
it gets. 
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